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CHAPTER

1

Introduction
Professor Xuhui Lee
Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies

This volume is a collection of essays based on a lecture series course taught in the
School of Forestry & Environmental Studies at Yale University in the fall semester of
2008. The course explored the environmental ramiﬁcations of economic growth in
China and the challenges that growth poses to protecting China’s natural resources
and preserving its biodiversity. The course discussed the scientiﬁc foundation for
environmental decisionmaking and strategies for engaging the Chinese government,
private, and nongovernment sectors in sustainable development. Eleven prominent
environmental scholars were invited to Yale to present lectures and join the course
discussion with Yale faculty and students. Their presentations and the subsequent
discussions, written up by students in the course and approved by the scholars
themselves, form the basis for the individual chapters in the book. A short biography
of each scholar appears at the end of the chapter presenting his or her material, along
with a short biography of the student author.
The lecture series was motivated by three broad questions: 1) What are the most
pressing environmental problems China faces now and in the future? 2) Which
problems are conﬁned to China’s national boundaries and which have a global
footprint? 3) How can the international community contribute to China’s
environmental reform?
The rationale for the lecture series was simple. China is the fastest growing economy
in the world. Associated with its rapid growth are environmental pollution, loss of
biodiversity, and depletion of natural resources. The central government of China, in
recognition of these environmental challenges, is seeking policies and regulations that
can promote sustainable development “in harmony with nature.” Some of the
environmental damages are not conﬁned to China’s national boundaries. In our
opinion, it is imperative that developed countries play a constructive role in helping
China meet these challenges. The fusion of western environmental thinking with China’s
reality will help promote stewardship of natural resources in China and worldwide.
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The course was a 3hour weekly lecture and discussion. In the ﬁrst half of the
meeting, which was open to the whole Yale community, the invited speaker lectured
on a topic in his or her area of expertise. In the second half, the speaker and I led a
discussion with participating students. A cheese and wine gathering that followed the
lecture gave the invited guest an opportunity to interact with the faculty and students
in an informal setting.
Professor Jianguo Liu (middle) speaking to students at the reception after his lecture

Photo credit: Yong Zhao

Active student participation was an exciting aspect of the course. Prior to each
class meeting, all the students wrote a detailed critique of the background readings,
which was very helpful in framing the issues for an indepth class discussion. The
students had the opportunity to play host to invited speakers, arranging oneonone
meetings as well as social events during their visits, and were each assigned the role of
moderating one discussion session. The students were also tasked with writing an
essay on the assigned topic.
The book chapters represent a joint effort between the students and the speakers.
The writing was carried out by the student author and was based on the lecture given
by the speaker and supplemented with ideas raised during the class discussion. For
the beneﬁt of a nontechnical readership, several chapters contain additional
background information provided by the student authors that was not covered by the
lecture.
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Professor Jiming Hao (center, front row) attending dinner hosted by students

Photo credit: Yong Zhao

The book is organized as follows. Chapter 2 explores the developing
environmental relationship between the U.S. and China. Chapter 3 discusses
partnerships between nonstate actors in EU universities and research institutes and
their Chinese counterparts. Chapter 4 argues that many seemingly unrelated factors
of human and natural systems are vital to understanding how best to protect the
environment. In Chapter 5, lessons of a Beijingbased environmental NGO are
analyzed to provide insights into how nongovernmental actors can effectively
participate in environmental management. Chapter 6 discusses the role of the
circular economy, circular industry, and ecocities in meeting the challenges arising
from industrialization and population growth. The next two chapters (Chapters 7
and 8) deal with air pollution and global warming issues related to energy use and
consumption habits. Chapter 9 takes the reader to China’s west where a balancing act
is played out between human and wildlife needs. Chapter 10 evaluates scenarios of
environmental impacts associated with livestock farming. Chapters 11 and 12 present
an analysis of two speciﬁc pollution cases, the ﬁrst on the status of air pollution in the
Pearl River Delta in southern China and the second on water pollution in Lake Taihu
in central China. The last chapter (Chapter 13) is a synthesis of the crosscutting
themes that have emerged out of the individual chapters. A Chinese version of
Chapter 13 is appended at the end of the book.
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CHAPTER

7

2

Greening the Dragon: The U.S.China
Environmental Relationship*
Dr. Gary Waxmonsky
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency**
Benjamin Jacobs
Yale College

chapter summary
In the words of Daniel Esty, Professor of Environmental Law and Policy at Yale and
former adviser to President Obama’s transition team, there is good and bad news
regarding China’s environmental trajectory: “The good news is, from a global
environmental perspective, if we get China on the right course, almost nothing else
matters. But the bad news is, if we don’t get China on the right course, almost nothing
else matters.” For this reason, the United StatesChina environmental relationship is
arguably the most important bilateral effort of the 21st century.
This chapter explores the developing environmental relationship between the
United States and China, drawing upon Dr. Waxmonsky’s extensive experience in
the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Office of International Affairs.** After
providing background information on China’s environmental issues and the history
of U.S.China environmental policy, the chapter focuses upon new bilateral efforts,
such as the Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED), that attempt to tackle both short
term and longterm environmental issues in Asia’s largest country.
Thanks to bilateral efforts like the SED and China’s internal elevation of its
environmental agency to ministry status, the outlook for U.S.China bilateral
relations is bright. Strides have been made in areas such as water pollution, air
particulates, and even complex issues like climate change. However, such
achievements have come at the behest of particular political actors on both sides,
so maintaining their efforts through political transitions will be key for the next
group of U.S.China environmental leaders.
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china’s environmental crisis
“If you care about global environmental quality, no single nation is more
important than China.” –Gary Waxmonsky

China’s environmental issues are well documented. The country is riddled with both
shortterm (e.g. water pollution) and longterm (e.g. climate change) environmental
problems. The shortterm problems are often highly localized, while the longterm
ones are increasingly dispersed. The responses of the multilayered Chinese partystate
reﬂect these differences. Shortterm, pointsource environmental crises are typically
dealt with swiftly to assuage an anxious public. Longterm, complex issues involving
multiple sources, on the other hand, tend to fall by the wayside. While every level of
Chinese government is increasingly focused upon environmental concerns, it is
difﬁcult to quantify the impacts of issues that span multiple regions or years. In most
cases, economic incentives continue to trump environmental concerns for leaders at
the county and provincial levels.
Figure 1 Population densities in China (number of people per square kilometer)

Source: China County Population Census (ACMR 2004)

To a certain extent, the scale of China both geographically and demographically
explains its unique environmental challenges. China is a large continental region like
the United States, Canada, Russia, and Brazil, which means that there are stark
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regional differences across a number of metrics. China’s western regions contain 40
percent of the landmass but only 10 percent of the population. The country’s
increasingly developed eastern areas house the remaining 1.2 billion citizens, with
some urban areas maintaining the highest population densities in the world (see
Figure 1 above). In addition to this uneven population distribution, China’s provinces
exhibit extreme differences in GDP per capita, property values, water resource
availability, vulnerability to climate change impacts, and energy use per capita. Due
to the structure of China’s government at the city, county, provincial, and central
levels, these differences can often serve as roadblocks to effective environmental
policy in interprovince issues.1

background on u.s.china relations
“Getting the U.S. to cooperate with and understand China’s multiple
challenges—enormous development alongside of its pollution control and
natural resource management issues—is one of the great issues of our era.”
–Daniel Esty
Joint efforts between the United States and Chinese governments on environmental
issues began shortly after China’s great opening to the world in the late 1970s,
paralleling economic collaboration at the time. China has maintained a national
environmental policy center since the late 1970s (although its name and position have
changed considerably), and the ﬁrst formal bilateral undertaking with the U.S. was
achieved in 1980. This was the U.S.PRC Environmental Protection Protocol (EPP),
which outlined environmental initiatives and formalized the structure for
cooperation. It followed shortly after the 1979 U.S.PRC Science and Technology
(S&T) Agreement, which established similar guidelines for governmentto
government scientiﬁc exchange. It is worth noting that, through the 1980s, U.S.China
environmental cooperation was largely limited to joint research on problems such as
the health effects of indoor air pollution. Collaboration on environmental policy, law,
and governance would come only much later. Subsequent iterations of both the U.S.
PRC EPP and U.S.PRC S&T Agreement remain guiding documents for bilateral
cooperation today.
Collaboration on environmental issues in both the public and private spheres
increased in China for the following two decades, as the country continued its
socioeconomic opening. But the next signiﬁcant event in terms of China’s
international environmental policy did not occur until 1998, when the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) elevated the status of the National Environmental
Protection Administration (NEPA) to the State Environmental Protection
Administration (SEPA). This shift sent a signal to the international community that
the CCP would be newly dedicated to environmental issues, and the party’s
commitment was reﬂected accordingly with additional resources for SEPA. Direct
exchange between the PRC’s SEPA and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
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(EPA) then increased during the ﬁnal years of the Clinton administration and the
ﬁrst years of the Bush administration.
Increased bilateral efforts resulted in a formative international agreement signed
in December 2003. This instrument, known as the U.S.China Environmental
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), established the policy and administrative
rules that have governed bilateral environmental relations to date. Most signiﬁcantly,
it established a Joint Committee for Environmental Cooperation (JCEC), which is to
meet every two years in plenary session. In this forum, the U.S. EPA Administrator,
China’s Minister of Environmental Protection, and their senior deputies come
together regularly to review cooperation under the MoU’s various annexes and to
prioritize efforts for the coming years. The JCEC structure ensures that cooperation
is fully coordinated across all relevant units of the EPA and the Ministry of
Environmental Protection and accurately reﬂects the capabilities and interests of
both agencies. However, cooperation under the JCEC is limited to the domestic
mandates of both agencies, whereas environmental challenges in large, complex
economies are often related to factors outside the purview of environmental
regulators. This problem has become increasingly apparent over time.2
Table 1 Goals and achievements of the Tenth Five Year Plan (20002005)

Indicators
Air Pollution
SO2 emissions
Industry
Domestic
Soot Emissions
Industry
Domestic
Industrial Dust Emissions
Water Pollution
COD discharge
Industry
Domestic
Ammonia Nitrogen
Industry
Domestic

Actual
2000

Planned
2005

Actual 2005
(completed by
6/17/06)

Comparison
with Planned
2005 (+/ %)

19.9
16.1
3.8
11.7
9.5
2.1
10.9

17.9
14.5
3.5
10.6
8.5
2.1
8.98

25.5
21.7
3.8
11.8
9.5
2.3
9.1

42
50
9
11
12
10
1

14.5
7.0
7.4
1.8
0.8
1.1

13.0
6.7
6.5
1.65
0.7
0.9

14.1
5.5
8.6
1.5
0.525
0.973

8
18
32
9
25
8

Source: Estimations based upon China Environmental Yearbook 2001 and 2006, the 10th Five Year Plan for
Environmental Protection and status of the China environment report, 2005 (see Yearbook for units of emission
amounts).

In November 2005, the JCEC convened in Washington, D.C., during an unexpected
time of change in Chinese environmental policy. Shortly after the plenary session, the
Songhua River spill occurred and SEPA Minister Xie Jinhua was removed from his post
by the CCP. Notwithstanding this major development, cooperation under the MoU
continued apace. In 2006, China’s Eleventh FiveYear Plan (FYP) began and built upon
the environmental progress of the Tenth FYP (see Table 1 above). Notable goals of the
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Eleventh FYP include: a 20 percent national reduction in energy intensity (energy used
per unit of GDP), and a 10 percent reduction in “major contaminants” (including
sulfur dioxide in the air and Chemical Oxygen Demand, or COD, in the water). These
signiﬁcant goals are both slated to be achieved by the end of the FYP in 2010.
In September 2006, the Bush administration established the U.S.China Strategic
Economic Dialogue (SED). This bilateral initiative, which was administered by the ofﬁce
of then Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, represents an unprecedented effort to energize
and coordinate meaningful bilateral policy in every arena except security. The SED will
be discussed in detail here, but there is one more signiﬁcant change to note before moving
forward to bilateral goals and achievements. In March 2008, the CCP elevated the SEPA
to full ministry status, renaming it the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP).
Some claimed that this elevation was merely environmental window dressing before the
2008 Summer Olympic Games in Beijing. Regardless of the intent, the change signiﬁes
China’s increased political commitment to addressing environmental issues, and the
MEP has received increased symbolic, economic, and political capital.3

today’s bilateral relations
While the U.S. EPA’s relationship with China dates to the early 1980s, only fairly recently
have bilateral efforts shifted from longterm joint research to realtime issues like
regional air quality management and enforcement of environmental regulations. In
short, the role of the EPA shifted from scientiﬁc liaison to strategic consultant. Through
the development of both institutional and personal relationships, U.S. governmental
actors gained the access necessary to provide advice on highimpact environmental
policy. Over the past decade, the Chinese have been increasingly receptive to such advice
as motivations for the bilateral relationship have developed on both sides.
Media reports in the West often cite the transfer of air pollution across the Paciﬁc
from China to the U.S., which could serve as one motivation for bilateral
environmental efforts. While hemispheric transfer is certainly a factor, it is worthy of
note that to date the EPA lacks empirical evidence about the percent or types of air
pollution in the U.S. that can be directly attributed to China. However, there are
several other more measurable factors on the U.S. side. The American government is
interested in Chinese performance in multilateral environmental regimes (MERs).
Washington remains concerned about the safety of U.S. imports from China and the
environmental components associated with that issue. Looking at the long term, U.S.
political actors seek to understand China’s position regarding greenhouse gas
reductions. The U.S. remains concerned about China’s environmental footprint both
in the Asia Paciﬁc region and in developing areas like Africa. In terms of economic
development, the U.S. government seeks to establish political ties as a point of entry
for private ﬁrms that sell green goods and services. And ﬁnally, the U.S. has a global
interest in increased transparency, accountability, and public participation, related to
both environmental issues and political development more generally.
Cooperation under the EPAMEP MoU currently addresses the following
categories: (1) air pollution (2) water pollution (3) toxic substances (4) hazardous and
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solid wastes and (5) environmental law and enforcement. The structure of the current
MoU mandates the creation of different annexes, each of which addresses one of these
issue areas and is led by a different part of EPA. The annexes have had different impacts
depending upon the needs of the Chinese and the abilities of the EPA, as well as each
party’s willingness to partake in information exchange. Regardless of the differences
between annexes, the premise behind each of these partnerships is that China can
beneﬁt from U.S. experience—both positive and negative—and wants to do so.4

the sed – a revolutionary approach
The Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) represents the best effort to date between the
U.S. and PRC on highlevel and highimpact environmental efforts. The ﬁrst
discussions about the SED occurred in August 2006—only one month after Henry
Paulson, Jr. became Secretary of the Treasury. The SED is essentially a process
whereby the Secretary of the Treasury meets with one of the four Chinese Vice
Premiers every six months to discuss everything in U.S.China relations that does not
directly deal with security affairs. On the U.S. side, this dialogue is informed by what
the administration views as core values: transparency, the rule of law, and responsible
international engagement. The discussion ranges from issues like currency reform
and foreign direct investment to clean energy and climate change. The EPA and
SEPA/MEP have been involved in the policymaking process and the semiannual
meetings since the program’s inception.
Figure 2 Agreeing to the tenyear E&E Framework

U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson(right) and Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan shake hands after sign
ing the U.S.China 10year cooperation agreement on energy and environmental protection during the press
conference at the U.S. Treasury Department in Washington, June 18, 2008. (Xinhua Photo)

The signiﬁcance of the SED meetings cannot be overstated. Highranking ofﬁcials
from both the U.S. and PRC spend approximately two days together at each semiannual
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session, presenting information from their respective agencies in order to plan policy
for the future. This type of engagement is unprecedented and unparalleled between a
Western actor and China, and its continued success is seen by many as crucial to the
overall bilateral relationship. As we discuss later in greater detail, the SED currently rests
largely on the shoulders of Secretary Paulson and his personal rapport in China.
Whether this type of relationship is sustainable depends largely upon the ability of the
next U.S. administration to leverage Secretary Paulson’s achievements and build upon
them. In China, personal relations retain the utmost importance, so the staff changes in
the new administration will present an even larger challenge to actors on the U.S. side.
For the most part, energy and environmental issues have been addressed in
tandem under the SED. Both sides have viewed China’s energy consumption and
environmental issues as inextricably linked, so approaching these issues from a joint
policy perspective would be more meaningful than examining each in isolation. The
clearest connection between energy and environment in China is air pollution, since
it tends to be the direct outcome of increased energy production and consumption
(i.e., the use of fossil fuels). Finally, another reason for this paired approach to energy
and environment is that both sides view this aspect of the SED as “lowhanging fruit,”
where compatible interests are clearer than on such issues as currency reform, capped
gas prices, and intellectual property rights.
At the fourth SED session in 2008, both parties ﬁnalized a document called the Ten
Year Framework for Energy and Environmental Cooperation. Secretary Paulson
developed the idea for the Framework in 2007 in order to insure a longterm legacy of
the SED—one not tied to any individual political actor. The Framework goes far
beyond the topics addressed under the EPAMEP MoU. In addition to clean air and
clean water, it encompasses clean and efﬁcient electricity generation, clean and efﬁcient
transportation, and speciﬁc topics of nature conservation (e.g., protected areas
management). Energy efﬁciency is likely to be added to this menu in 2009. The
Framework also introduces the concept of “EcoPartnerships,” which seek to pair
nongovernmental entities on each side. Due to the recent signing of the Framework, it
is still difﬁcult to determine its effectiveness. This question, like many others, still
largely depends on resources and political commitment. One larger goal of the
Framework is a trickledown impact on other aspects of U.S.China bilateral relations,
such as technology transfer in nongreen industries and increased economic
collaboration between state and corporate actors. In short, if the Framework
establishes formalized channels of coordination on energy and the environment, these
channels can potentially facilitate similar exchange between nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), local communities, and private corporations in each country.5

constraints on environmental collaboration
“The resource limitations are not just financial—a few motivated, bilingual
employees can accomplish a lot more than dozens of lessmotivated employees
that don’t know the language or the culture. But getting that kind of talent
into a domestic agency is not that easy, and it’s the China relationship now
that needs that kind of support.” –Gary Waxmonsky
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A major obstacle in any cooperative international relationship is limited resources.
Despite its recent elevation, the MEP still maintains a relatively small staff of about
500 people in Beijing. The issue of resources is equally signiﬁcant in terms of the U.S.
EPA. There is no central appropriation for international environmental cooperation
within the EPA, whether with China or any other country. Thus, the needs of a
collaborative program like the SED compete directly with the domestic needs of the
EPA, particularly in an era of increased environmental concern at home and
increasingly restrictive budget constraints.
Once information is exchanged between the EPA and the MEP, an additional
constraint is implementation within China. This constraint arises for two interrelated
reasons: (1) limited institutional capacity and (2) the fragmentation of the Chinese
governmental structure. Despite the elevation of the MEP to ministry status, its
funding remains miniscule compared to the departments charged with economic and
infrastructure development in China. Even if the MEP is ﬁnancially able to push
through environmental legislation at the central level, enforcing it throughout
China’s fragmented governmental structure presents another challenge. This
fragmentation is both vertical and horizontal. Horizontally, the MEP has to work
with other actors like the Ministry of Water Resources (MOWR), the Ministry of
UrbanRural Construction (MOC), and the National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC) in order to accomplish meaningful policy changes. Vertically,
the centralized MEP has to coordinate with various actors at the provincial, county,
and even township levels, particularly local Environmental Protection Bureaus
(EPBs). The decentralized fragmentation supports an imbalanced incentive
structure, one that favors energy and pollutionintensive economic development. To
date, the EPA has seen little evidence of provincial ofﬁcials disciplined for failing to
meet an environmental or energy efﬁciency metric. Thus, there is a real danger that
talks sparked by the JCEC and SED will remain precisely that—talk.

other international actors
While this chapter has focused upon bilateral environmental efforts between the U.S.
and PRC governments, various other international efforts related to China’s
environment are under way. The totality of bilateral interaction between the U.S. and
China is a more complex picture, including the work of governments, corporations,
and nongovernmental organizations. This chapter has focused mainly on ofﬁcial
governmental relationships. In China’s highly centralized oneparty political system,
this focus allows insight into the negotiations with the largest and most immediate
impact. However, additional environmental partnerships with China can be found
in new multilateral agreements or in activities of established international
organizations.
Signiﬁcant efforts in this regard include: the Asia Paciﬁc Partnership (APP) on
Clean Development and Climate, which is a 2006 effort of the Bush administration
toward clean development in the region; Methane to Markets (M2M), which is an
international partnership established in 2004 with the goal of safely harnessing
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methane from coal plants and mines and recycling it as an energy source; the United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), which includes most nations of the
world including the U.S. and China; and the “Major Economies” Process, which is a
multilateral effort of the largest greenhouse gas emitting countries to incorporate
clean technologies. China is also both a recipient and provider of funds to the Asian
Development Bank (ADB), which has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in
support of China’s environmentally sound development.
There are signiﬁcant international relationships affecting China’s environmental
policy in which the U.S. holds no inﬂuence. The European Union (EU) is the most
instructive example of this fact. The EU has played a similar role to the U.S. in China
through the investment of both economic and human capital in green efforts. The EU
is currently drafting a multilateral agreement with China on environmental
governance, which when ﬁnalized will provide signiﬁcant resources to support EU
China partnerships of an environmental nature. It is worthy of note that another
constraint on effective international environmental cooperation is the lack of
meaningful coordination between international “donors.” To date, signiﬁcant actors
such as the EU, U.S., and Japan have failed to fully coordinate their environmental
efforts in China. This failure appears to stem from the economic incentive structure,
as each country attempts to position its government and corporations ﬁrst in China’s
expanding green market.6

looking ahead
“What will happen to the management of U.S.China relations [through the
current U.S. political transition] is very much in play right now.” –Gary
Waxmonsky

The largest question regarding the future of U.S.China bilateral relations,
environmental or otherwise, remains the next U.S. administration. The Obama
administration will need to decide whether or not to continue the SED and the
relationships established within it, and will have the opportunity to refashion
bilateral environmental relations as China formulates its next (twelfth) FiveYear
Plan. The new administration will probably not dismantle the SED for fear of being
seen as downgrading a vital bilateral relationship. But at the same time, it may not
choose to infuse the relationship with the dynamism and political commitment that
Secretary Paulson brought to it. Without strong central leadership, centrifugal forces
are likely to reassert themselves. The strategic nature of the relationship, and the
important role of energy and environmental cooperation in this relationship, may
diminish in the months and years ahead.
There are areas of environmental cooperation with China that hold promise
regardless of whether the SED continues in its current form. These include
environmental information management, environmental ﬁnance/“green credit,”

yale school of forestry & environmental studies

15

6

For more on the significance
of additional international
actors, see Chapter 3 in this
volume, which was coau
thored by Dr. Alice Newton.

16

lectures on china’s environment

greening supply chains, tariff relief for environmental goods and services, and
sustainable ports and shipping. Some of these areas will involve a shift away from
purely governmenttogovernment cooperation, in an effort to infuse Chinese ﬁrms
with increased environmental awareness. An instructive example is “green credit,”
which entails making environmental performance a criterion in access to bank loans
for Chinese entrepreneurs. Such ﬁnancial incentives will be critical in moving China
toward credible economywide or sectoral greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions. China’s
SED commitment to launch national sulfur dioxide emissions trading by the
beginning of the next FYP in 2010 should also help position the country for eventual
adoption of GHG emissions trading. Still, the success of this type of market
mechanism requires a foundation of reliable, publicly accessible information and
consistent enforcement.
In China, the CCP is striving to improve coordination between levels of
government and to strengthen environmental incentives for ofﬁcials. Some of this
change has been bottom up, since economic growth has harmed certain segments of
the population and prompted social action. In such cases, the human impact of
environmental degradation catalyzed government action. To prevent increased social
unrest, the CCP seems prepared to accommodate increased transparency and
accountability. The recent establishment of the Ministry of Environmental
Protection's six regional environmental supervision centers around the country
(Beijing, Xi’an, Shenyang, Chengdu, Guangzhou, and Nanjing) has the potential to
enhance enforcement of China’s national environmental goals across the various
provincial and local jurisdictions, just as EPA’s regional ofﬁces are designed to do in
the U.S. The jury is still out, but the U.S.China environmental relationship seems
headed in the right direction.

discussion questions
1. Best approach? (economic, political, health, cultural)

Which approach is most effective to address these issues with Chinese leaders today?
Does the CCP respond to quantitative, economic analysis like the World Bank’s? Are
bilateral discussions phrased in terms of the health of the environment, or the health
of the Chinese people? Are culture and ethics used to frame the discussion as well as
economic costs?
2. Topdown vs. bottomup

To what extent does the U.S. government, American nonprofits, and other nonpri
vate organizations work with these actors on bottomup approaches? Furthermore,
what improvements can be made to their approach? Thus, is it possible that change
in China is also coming from the grassroots level? Are the public and NGOs acting in
opposition to, or in step with, the central government? Does the U.S. engage these
actors on environmental issues as well as senior CCP officials?
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3. The development of the rule of law and free flow of information in China

Why do we focus on making China look legally and administratively like the U.S.
when the U.S. appears to be unable (or unwilling) to mitigate climate change? Does
mitigation, and therefore environmental stewardship and improvement in general,
involve something more than an established rule of law, federalism, transparency,
etc.? And if this is true, how does this change the U.S.China environmental
relationship? What concrete strides have been made in terms of the transparency of
government action and information?
4. The relationship between environmental policy and economic development

To what extent does economic development need to be at the forefront of
environmental discussions? Or can we define a set of environmental priorities as
separate from development goals? Are economic discussions powerful places to bring
in the environment or are environmental issues more effectively addressed directly?
For example, the SED is set up to facilitate topdown economic discussion. How does
this shape the direction of environmental discussions? What are the pros and cons?
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CHAPTER 3

EU Collaboration with China in
Environmental Capacity Building*
Dr. Alice Newton
University of Algarve, Portugal
Angel Hsu
Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies

chapter summary
While Chapter 2 in this book discussed the United States’ cooperation with China
on environmental concerns, this chapter explores similar efforts by the European
Union. Bilateral collaboration can take various forms. For example, the dialogue in
Chapter 2 with Gary Waxmonsky focused on government cooperation through the
Strategic Economic Dialogue. This chapter, on the other hand, explores
partnerships between nonstate actors in Chinese and EU universities and research
institutes. Alice Newton discusses how capacity building in the Chinese
environment aligns with the research priorities of the European Union under the
Seventh Framework Programme (FP7). Recognizing that many environmental
problems that the EU faces are transboundary in nature and global in scope, the EU
has made working with Chinese counterparts in the area of scientific research a key
element of their strategy to address environmental challenges.
Ontheground partnerships for knowledge exchange and capacity building are
important for giving the Chinese tools to effectively manage their environment.
Newton brings the perspective of a practitioner who has had years of experience
working handinhand with Chinese partners on various research activities. One
example of capacity building is the Erasmus Mundus education exchange program,
which sponsors students from China to study in European universities and
European students to study in Chinese universities. The program also funds
Chinese scholars to teach in European universities and European scholars to teach
in Chinese universities. While the program clearly represents only one specific
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example of capacity building, the Erasmus Mundus program can serve as a
potential model for other industrialized nations.
This chapter explores four main points: Why collaboration with China on
environmental issues is important; how the EU research priorities align with
China’s environment, focusing on one particular aspect of China’s environment,
coastal and marine ecosystems; how EU capacity building works through the
Erasmus Mundus program; and how EUChina collaboration in the environment
can be improved.

“This lecture is really about how science policy and management [go] global.
We really need to see how we can negotiate between countries to come together
and to share joint research interests in order to move forward.” –Alice Newton

introduction: china’s position in the global environment

1
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Harmony is a key principle in Chinese philosophy, and “harmonious development” a
core goal of Chinese growth policy. Since Deng Xiaoping introduced market reforms
in 1978, China’s economy has grown tenfold and experienced doubledigit average
GDP growth rates annually. This growth, however, has challenged the idea of
harmonious development with respect to the country’s environment. The statistics
are not unfamiliar—China is home to sixteen of the world’s twenty most polluted
cities; half of the country’s rivers are severely polluted; China’s carbon dioxide
emissions and energy consumption are among the highest in the world; and high
sulfur and nitrous dioxide emissions are causing acid rain and acute air pollution.
China’s ruling “technocrats” are well aware of the environmental consequences of
the country’s rapid industrialization. In 2004, the State Environmental Protection
Agency (SEPA) and the National Bureau of Statistics launched a “Green GDP”
initiative to calculate economic losses associated with China’s environmental
degradation. They estimated that a loss of $64 billion in 2004, or 3.05 percent of
China’s GDP, could be attributed to environmental degradation. The report also said
that approximately 1.08 trillion RMB (roughly 135 billion U.S. dollars) would be
needed to clean up all the industrial pollution and household waste produced, but
that the Chinese government was only investing a fraction of the actual cost—190
billion RMB (24 billion U.S. dollars).1 Although the results of the 2006 report were
never released for political reasons, ofﬁcials said that the methodologies used to
calculate the “Green GDP” were low estimates of environmental damage to health
and did not account for ecological impacts. However, politics aside, the preliminary
results of the report attempted to place China’s dire environmental situation in a
common, easily understood vernacular.
When placed in the global context, China’s environmental problems are becoming
increasingly transboundary in nature. At the root of many of these transboundary
pollution problems is China’s reliance on coal. China depends on coal for 60 percent
of its energy production, which is more coal intensive than the United States, Europe,
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and Japan combined.2 The country burns over 2.7 billion tons of coal per year and is
anticipated to burn 25 percent more by 2020. The effects of China’s appetite for coal
are manifested not only in the country’s growing contribution to global greenhouse
gas emissions, but also in the sulfur dioxide and particulate matter felt by
neighboring countries such as South Korea and Japan, as well as the western United
States. China’s migratory air pollution problems epitomize why China’s environ
mental challenges are becoming a global concern.
Reﬂective of China’s Olympic motto—“One World, One Dream”—China’s
environmental problems necessitate outside engagement to collectively ﬁnd
solutions. Since countries such as those in the European Union have already
industrialized and “cleaned up” their environments, we argue that this imbalance
between the European Union and China “colors” the relationship between the two
with regard to science and policy. Are developed countries simply exporting their
pollution to developing countries like China and being hypocritical in chastising such
countries for poor environmental performance? Industrialized countries must take
leadership roles if they expect China to follow suit.
Chinese industry represents an area that could beneﬁt from the experience of
international counterparts. While China in 2006 produced a sizeable portion of
global steel, cement, aluminum, and other energy and greenhousegasintensive
goods (Figure 1), the Chinese manufacturing processes for these commodities are
often less energy efﬁcient than those found in other countries. For instance, the
Chinese steel and cement industries consume 20 and 45 percent more energy,
respectively, than the international average. Clearly, if Chinese industrialization is to
follow a sustainable trajectory, international experience and partnerships can help
China move toward its goal of more sustainable, harmonious development.
This seemingly bleak overview of China’s environment is the reason why global
coordination is needed to help China address its complex growth challenges. Many of
the environmental problems China faces cannot be solved without the experience
and leadership of other countries who historically have followed very similar
development paths. However, given China’s 1.3 billion people and increasing
consumption patterns, the question then arises as to whether China can afford to
industrialize like its predecessors.
Figure 1 China’s global share of production in selected sectors

Source: Rosen and Houser 2007
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eu research priorities and the chinese environment
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In recognition of China’s importance in the global environment, collaboration with
China on environmental research has become an important aspect of the EU agenda.
To support research initiatives, the European Union created Framework Programmes
for Research and Technological Development, referred to as Framework Programmes
(FP). The ﬁrst FP was initiated in 1984 with the idea of fostering transnational joint
research projects by requiring EUﬁnanced projects to have at least more than one EU
member state3 on a research team. While environmental concerns have been a
component of the FPs since their inception, the FPs have since taken a more
multidisciplinary systems approach to environmental research, incorporating
economic and social dimensions. The ultimate goal of the EU Framework
Programmes is to build a European Research Area based on education, research, and
innovation that promotes cooperation across national borders.
Structured in threeyear increments, the EU Framework Programme is now in its
seventh iteration, otherwise known as FP7. As demonstrated by the near exponential
growth of the program’s budget (Figure 2), the European Union is investing heavily
in scientiﬁc research to address the challenges of global change. The main
environmental research objective of FP7 is to promote sustainable management of
both the environment and natural resources. To accomplish this goal, FP7 seeks to
further knowledge on complex interactions between the climate, ecosystems, and
human activity and to develop appropriate technological solutions.
Figure 2 The budget for the EU Framework Programmes from 1984 to the present day

Source: European Commission 2008

Speciﬁc points of action focus on:
●

●

forecasting changes in the global climate, ecology, earth and ocean systems;
developing tools and technologies for monitoring, prevention, and mitiga
tion of environmental risks and pressures, including environmental health;
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sustaining both the natural and humaninfluenced environment.

Climate change is at the top of the list of research priorities for FP7 (Figure 3). The
European Union has been cautious in its approach to working with China in the area
of climate change. As one of the world’s largest emitters of greenhouse gases, China
is both sensitive to its contribution to global climate change and interested in the
impacts, particularly in relation to coastal cities and agriculture. Rather than pointing
blame at the Chinese for their growing greenhouse gas emissions, the dialogue
regarding cooperation on climate change research should focus on winwin scenarios
and payoffs for both parties. Thus, as the European Union seeks to mitigate China’s
greenhouse gas emissions, one of the primary aims of such cooperation should
concentrate on how China can effectively manage the effects of climate change.
Figure 3 Research areas of the FP7

4

Source: European Commission 2008

Another critical research area in which there is potential for EUChina
collaboration is environmental health. China faces a huge challenge with regard to
environmental health. The World Bank estimates that there are 750,000 premature
deaths per year due to pollution, while 500 million in China do not have access to safe
drinking water.4 With these staggering numbers, environmental health represents an
opportunity for the European Union to engage China in dialogue regarding joint
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research. However, issues of environmental health remain a controversial and
politically sensitive topic within the Chinese government.
Water quality, management, and scarcity issues are also of prime importance for
China’s environment. Three hundred cities in China are facing acute water shortages,
and many of China’s rivers and lakes are severely polluted. One recent example of the
deteriorating condition of China’s lakes is the May 2007 algal bloom of Lake Taihu in
the Yangtze Delta Plain, bordering Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces. High algal blooms
(HAB) such as the Lake Taihu incident occur primarily due to anthropogenic activity
and are a threat to the health of humans and organisms living in and around the lake.
The hypoxia, or oxygen deprivation, that leads to HABs is the result of
eutrophication, an inﬂux of chemicals into a marine ecosystem that alters the
nutrient balance of estuaries and coastal zones and reduces dissolved oxygen, on
which some organisms depend. The following section discusses an example of EU
China joint research on China’s coastal ecosystems.

one example of euchina collaboration: the erasmus mundus
program

5
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programme/back_en.html

Collaborative research is one mechanism by which implementation of capacity
building occurs. In line with this strategy is the European Union’s educational
exchange initiative called the Erasmus Mundus program. Appropriately named after
Erasmus, a renowned ﬁfteenthcentury Dutch scholar and humanist, and mundus,
the Latin word for “world,” the Erasmus Mundus program convenes world scholars
for cooperation in higher learning. The European Commission ﬁrst introduced the
program in July 2001 with the goal of promoting intercultural understanding through
exchanges with thirdworld countries.5 Students can select from a range of master’s
courses.6 Erasmus Mundus supports study in the natural sciences, geography,
agriculture, forestry, engineering, and technology.
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Figure 4 The hypoxic area in the Yangtze (Changjiang) River estuary

Source: Xiao et al. 2007
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An example of an outcome of the Erasmus Mundus program is an academic study
in which Professor Newton worked with Chinese academics to conduct a survey of
one of China’s river estuaries—the Yangtze (Changjiang).
The Yangtze River estuary (Figure 4) faces serious eutrophication and hypoxia:
between 1959 and 2006, hypoxia increased in the estuary from 1,800 km2 to over
15,000 km2. Being one of the largest rivers in the world, the Yangtze River estuary is
also confronting problems of eutrophication and hypoxia in the adjacent area. The
Chinese partners employed an internationally developed tool called Assessment of
Estuarine Trophic Status (ASSETS), which determined the amount of eutrophication
in the estuary using a pressurestateresponse model based on three main indices:
inﬂuencing factors, overall eutrophic condition, and future outlook. The study
concluded that the ASSETS tool was a more useful way of evaluating coastal and
estuarine systems in China than previous Chinese methods (Xiao et al. 2007).

the future of euchina collaboration
“There’s a tricky balance between policy and politics. You have to be careful
not to step over that line.” –Alice Newton
Programs like FP7 and Erasmus Mundus are indicative of the European Union’s
progression toward more sciencebased approaches to environmental policy. An
example of this shift over the last few decades is the Land Ocean Interactions in the
Coastal Zone (LOICZ) project,7 which aims to build capacity and provide training for
water and coastal management. A core project under the International Geosphere
Biosphere Programme (IGBP) and the International Human Dimensions
Programme on Global Environmental Change (IHDP), LOICZ provides projects and
internship opportunities for Erasmus Mundus students interested in water and
coastal management.
LOICZ connects scientists from around the world who investigate changes in the
biology, chemistry, and physics of the coastal zone. Although it primarily started as a
network for research scientists in 1993, LOICZ has since expanded to include social,
political, and economic sciences to reﬂect anthropogenic inﬂuences as well.
Grounded in sciencebased approaches, the LOICZ consortium strives to bridge
academic knowledge and policy. Newton admits that environmental decision making
is often based on consultation of environmental managers rather than the scientiﬁc
community. Therefore, if more knowledgebased training can be provided to
environmental managers, the link between science and policy will also be
strengthened. LOICZ recently opened a regional ofﬁce or node in Yantai, China, and
held a conference on continental margins research in Shanghai in September 2007.
Chinese scholars have made a valuable contribution to the LOICZ program and are
increasingly engaged in collaborating on international research.
A similar capacitybuilding effort in coastal zones and management is the SPEAR
(Sustainable options for People, catchment and Aquatic Resources) initiative,8 which
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has been in place since 1983 under FP4 as part of the EU’s International S&T
Cooperation Programme (INCO). INCO’s research objectives focus on health and
health systems, sustainable use of natural resources, food security, and cultural
heritage. The SPEAR program’s goals are to develop and test an integrated framework
for interpretation of coastal zone structure and dynamics in communities that are
predominantly dependent on marine resources. In China these systems include
Sanggou Bay, which is part of a rural watershed, and Huangdun Bay, which is situated
in an industrial zone south of Shanghai. Both of these systems are characterized by
community dependence on largescale cultivation of seaweed, shellﬁsh, and ﬁnﬁsh
for economic livelihood. The SPEAR project’s analytical approach attempts to assess
optimal management for such areas, accounting for complex interactions between
ecological processes and human activities. European Union scientists work closely
with Chinese partners to provide a sciencebased approach to better management in
these areas, building the capacity of local ofﬁcials to sustainably grow and manage the
natural resources of the area.
While the European Union aims to expand collaboration with China in
environmental capacity building, there are several challenges that confront future
developments. As Waxmonsky of the U.S. EPA also admits,9 language is a barrier that
plagues relationships between EU and Chinese actors. Twoway Erasmus Mundus
exchanges, where EU students can study in China and receive intensive language
training, could facilitate better cooperation in the future. Another challenge lies in
determining the right partners for capacitybuilding exercises in China. Newton
suggests that a “mapping exercise” of scientiﬁc laboratories and research institutions
could ensure ideal matches and best ﬁts between researchers in the European Union
and China. Lastly, although the tide is slowly changing, more direct linkages between
academics involved in capacity building in key countries like China and policy
makers in the European Union would enhance the policymaking process. Perhaps
the European Union could learn from the Chinese experience on this point. Many of
China’s leaders, such as President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, as well as a high
number of other government ofﬁcials, have engineering degrees. Furthermore, the
Chinese government frequently consults Chinese academic institutions for policy
research and advice.
Despite these challenges, Erasmus Mundus and other academic research programs
are a model for ontheground collaboration between Chinese and EU counterparts.
These programs represent practical implementation of capacity building rather than
highlevel, oftenabstract dialogues between governments regarding environmental
issues. Additionally, academic research is often viewed as nonpolitical and
nonthreatening. As relatively “objective” exercises, scientiﬁc collaboration can in
some ways be a more effective means of capacity building than other efforts, which
must ﬁrst navigate bureaucratic or political channels.

conclusion
This chapter explored the importance of bilateral cooperation in researching and
understanding China’s environment, particularly coastal ecosystems, and how

yale school of forestry & environmental studies

eu collaboration with china in environmental capacity building

capacity building works through academic exchange. While serving as potential
model for other industrialized countries to engage with China on environmental
issues, the Erasmus Mundus program and other similar efforts by the European
Union can be improved, perhaps ﬁrst through the realization that capacity building
can be bidirectional.
This perspective does not touch on the varied channels by which actors in both
contexts join together to improve the global environment. Some of these actors
include nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), local government institutions, and
private corporations. Albeit limited in scope, the experience described in this chapter
is complementary to the Chinese goal of advancing a “scientiﬁc outlook on
development” to achieve a more harmonious society. Building the capacity of
Chinese academics to apply more quantitative tools and approaches will help China
move toward a more sustainable growth trajectory.
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CHAPTER 4

China’s Environment and
Globalization: Unexpected
Connections*
Professor Jianguo Liu
Michigan State University
Marissa Matsler
Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies

chapter summary
Many seemingly unrelated factors of human and natural systems are in fact tightly
connected and vital to understanding how best to tackle the enormous challenge
of environmental protection in China. This is evidenced by multiple recent trends:
an increasing divorce rate leading to increased environmental degradation;
increased GDP from product exports increasing toxic pollution domestically;
increased sprawl and household construction leading to biodiversity loss in nature
reserves; and increased domestic forest cover leading to increased deforestation
internationally.
Governmental programs and goals conceived from separate studies on natural
and human systems often do not take into account underlying issues like those
identified above, although the Chinese government has been trying to promote
harmonious relationships between humans and nature. Suggested is an
“environmental revolution” in China that takes a holistic approach to
environmental protection in the context of globalization.

introduction: setting the stage for a drama
China is in a unique place in history. The economic standard of living of its citizens
has increased dramatically over the past three decades, while at the same time its
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environmental quality is among the worst in the world. Amazing growth in gross
domestic product (GDP) and international trade has made China one of the pivotal
producers of the world’s goods, while a variety of industrial emissions poison its
people and environment. Massive forestation policies are allowing China to begin to
restore ecosystems while at the same time increasing its dependency on foreign wood
imports and destroying forests elsewhere (Liu and Diamond 2005).
The gap between an environmentally healthy and an economically prosperous
China appears to grow larger every day (Liu and Diamond 2005; Liu and Diamond
2008; Liu et al. 2003; Lehrer 2008). As will be explored in the next few sections, there
are many complex processes behind this gap. The traditional delineation of research
into increasingly speciﬁed ﬁelds of social sciences and natural sciences has produced
some understanding of the issues facing society and the natural world. However, this
traditional approach to research often ignores the complicated relationship that
society has with the natural world. This paper will focus on some complex and
seemingly unrelated relationships by integrating social sciences and natural sciences
via the Coupled Human and Natural Systems (CHANS) approach, in hopes of
bringing about greater understanding and change for more effective environmental
protection (Liu et al. 2007; Lehrer 2008).
China’s environmental woes

Environmental damages in China span all ecosystem types and have effects that reach
beyond political boundaries. The most internationally visible pollution issue in
China is air pollution. The 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing raised awareness of this
qualityoflife concern to a much larger global audience than ever before.
Unfortunately, water pollution and biodiversity loss are also of serious environmental
concern (Liu and Diamond 2005).
Figure 1 Growth of total industrial waste gas emissions in China, 19942006 (amounts in 10 billion m3)

Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2007

Air pollution in China has been increasing at dangerous levels for quite some time.
This is due mainly to the steady increase of industrial emissions over the past ﬁfteen
years, as summarized in Figure 1 and Figure 2. Since 2000, China has been the world
leader in SO2 emissions (Liu and Diamond 2005).
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Figure 2 Comparison of particulate matter and gaseous industrial emissions in China, 19942006 (in
million metric tons)

Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2007

As depicted in Figure 3, this has resulted in severe increases in acid rainfall, which
now affects about a quarter of China’s land. It is estimated that more than 400 million
urban residents breathe “bad”, heavily polluted air in China (Pan 2007).
Figure 3 Distribution of acid rain in China in 2006

Source: http://showchina.org

Water is also of extreme concern. Exponential increases in industrialization have
greatly increased the demand for water and caused more severe water shortages. On
the other hand, industrial wastewater, combined with agricultural runoff, has
wreaked havoc on the natural hydrologic cycle of China’s waterways, causing 75
percent of China’s lakes (Liu and Diamond 2005) as well as 70 percent of its rivers to
be polluted (Pan 2007). The increase in wastewater output also affects marine systems
in China. Eutrophication of China’s seas due to industrial and agricultural pollution
has driven the number of red tides up from only 24 per year in the 1960s to nearly
100 per year at the beginning of the 21st century (Liu and Diamond 2005).
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A third environmental woe is biodiversity loss. Because China’s territory
encompasses many different bioregions, there are a great number of unique species
in China. From coastal monsoon climates to seemingly inhospitable extreme desert
ecosystems, there is a huge variety of life (Liu et al. 2003). Ten percent of the world’s
terrestrial vertebrate and higher plant species are found within China’s boundaries
(Liu and Diamond 2005). That’s more than 2,300 terrestrial vertebrates and over
30,000 higher plant species, half of which are found only in China (Liu et al. 2003).
Unfortunately, 1520 percent of them are endangered or threatened (Liu and
Diamond 2005; Liu et al. 2003) due to environmental pollution, habitat destruction,
and other human activities.
Impact on the people

Of course, the people of China are directly bearing the brunt of the country’s
environmental problems. It is estimated that environmental degradation accounts for
a 720 percent loss of GDP across China’s provinces. For scale, that was approximately
$200 billion in 2005 (Liu and Diamond 2008). This high price only takes into account
effects that can be directly attributed to environmental problems, such as large
environmental cleanups related to pollution. For example, just before the 2008
Olympics sailing competition in Qingdao, military forces were sent to remove macro
algae by hand that had bloomed uncontrollably and made the race route impassible.
The laborintensive and timeconsuming cleanup also involved more than 1,000 local
volunteers. According to the People’s Daily, overall, the government of Qingdao
planned to spend “over 200 million U.S. dollars every year, nearly 3 percent of the
city’s annual GDP,” for environmental cleanups from 2003 to 2008.
There are many other monetary effects of pollution on the Chinese workforce that
are not included in the estimates of ﬁnancial losses, due to the difﬁculty of accurate
measuring. These unaccountedfor monetary losses include missed days of work and
medical expenses from hospital visits due to illness caused by poor environmental
quality.
China is also paying for its environmental situation more than monetarily. It is
estimated, astonishingly, that more than 700,000 deaths a year can be attributed to
the air pollution alone in China (Liu and Diamond 2008). Another disturbing
statistic shows that half of Chinese urban children have blood lead levels that exceed
the World Health Organization’s (WHO) standard maximum blood lead level, which
is set at 100 micrograms per liter (Wu 2000). Recent studies have shown that even
blood lead levels as low as 50 micrograms per liter can result in a variety of
debilitating brain conditions (Lanphear 2000). This may cause a range of potential
problems in China’s society as this generation of children grows up dealing with the
effects of lead poisoning on their mental capacities.
Social issues extend beyond human health and impede the progress of one of
China’s most sacred governmental goals: harmonious society. Environmental
degradation has caused increased numbers of social conﬂicts in recent years. A total
of 51,000 severe social clashes were recorded in 2005 alone that were associated with
environmental complaints. The number of appeals to the government for help
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dealing with environmental issues is also on the rise, totaling 400,000 from the
general public in 2005 (Pan 2007).

globalization: a doubleedged sword
China’s environmental challenges are not just domestic. They have increasingly been
becoming global challenges as a result of globalization. On the one hand,
globalization has played a pivotal role in China’s economic miracle and exports of
cheap products to many other countries. On the other hand, globalization has
become a major driver of environmental degradation in both China and many other
countries around the world.
Imports and exports of goods and products

China has the thirdhighest timber consumption in the world (Liu and Diamond
2005). Timber imports have increased exponentially since 1998, when the logging ban
in China took effect (Figure 4). In other words, the logging ban has had the
unintended and unfortunate effect of exporting deforestation to other tropical
regions of the world, negating many of the positive aspects of the observed Chinese
reforestation (Figure 5) (Liu and Diamond 2005; Liu et al. 2008).
Figure 4 Imports of timber to China, 19932006

Source: International Tropical Timber Organization
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Figure 5 Percent forest cover of total land cover in China, 19622006

Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2007

Exports have played an even larger role than imports in environmental degradation.
In recent decades, China has become a “world factory,” producing an increasingly large
amount of goods for other countries around the world (Liu and Diamond 2005). As
shown in Figure 6, this has brought increased monetary wealth to China. However,
exports are of great concern because of pollution they create (Liu and Diamond 2005).
Figure 6 Total value of imports and exports in China, 19802006

Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2007
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Many of the factories involved in the production of exports use a variety of
hazardous materials and create a great amount of greenhouse gas emissions. While the
factories’ products are exported around the world, the hazardous waste used to produce
them stays within the country. Production for industrial exports accounted for one
third of 1,700 million tons of CO2 emissions in China in 2005 (Weber et al. 2008).
Cultural imports

The importation of the western lifestyle and habits has increased the level of
consumption, not only in urban areas of China, but also in ecologically sensitive rural
regions. For example, automobiles have become increasingly popular in China over
the past few decades as a symbol of status and modernity. With rising standards of
living, a continually increasing number of Chinese citizens are able to purchase cars
(Liu and Diamond 2005). It is estimated that there were already 37 million vehicles on
the road in 2006. The number of vehicles has continued to increase explosively. These
automobiles have become increasingly important CO2 emitters in China.
Household proliferation (rapid increase in the total number of households) has
also spread across China. Traditionally, population growth was singled out as a
primary driver of the problem. But recent studies suggest that household
proliferation appears to play a more important role, especially in ecologically
sensitive regions such as biodiversity hotspots. This is due to the realization that even
when population growth levels off or declines, households continue to increase in
number in many places in the world (Liu et al. 2003).
“Environmental scientists have been paying a lot of attention to population
size, which is important in terms of environmental impacts. But what we find
is that in some areas, even with declining population size, not just a declining
population growth rate, there has been a substantial increase in the number of
households.” –Jianguo Liu
Demand from more households sets off a chain reaction of production, such as
cement and other building materials as well as household goods. Production of all of
these goods greatly increases the environmental stress on China and the rest of the
world (Liu, Daily, et al. 2003; Yu 2007). The amount of ﬂoor space per capita has
grown from approximately 7 m2 in 1978 to nearly 30 m2 in 2006. This means that
larger housing units have been built despite that fact that average household size
(number of people in a household) has been declining, further decreasing efﬁciency
and increasing emissions of pollutants such as CO2 (Liu 2008).
One of the intriguing ﬁndings has been a connection between this growth in the
number of households and the spillover of divorce as a cultural norm to China
(Figure 7). Traditionally divorce was rare in China, but the numbers of divorced
couples had jumped to almost 1.9 million in 2006. Divorce splits one household into
two, thus increasing the number of households and reducing the number of people
in each household. A study on the global effects of divorce on household size showed
that the average numbers of people in divorced households were 2741 percent
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smaller than those of married households in the twelve different countries sampled
(see Figure 8). To put that into perspective, if the average household size had stayed
the same as the married household size over the studied time period from 19982002,
7.4 million fewer households would have been created. These 7.4 million households
represent an enormous amount of embodied energy and natural resource use, all of
which is due to a purely social and cultural act (Yu 2007).
Figure 7 Number of new divorces in China 19792006

Source: China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs
Figure 8 Household size in married and divorced households around 2000
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Globalization has also unintentionally affected China’s nature reserve system (Liu
et al. 2003; Liu and Diamond 2005; Liu, Ouyang, et al. 2003; Lehrer 2008). The Wolong
Nature Reserve in southwestern China is an illustrative example of this phenomenon.
Established in 1975, the Wolong Nature Reserve is approximately 200,000 hectares. Its
primary goal is to protect giant panda habitat (Lehrer 2008). When the reserve was
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mapped during its ﬁrst twentyﬁve years of existence to track panda habitat, it was
found that good habitat had actually decreased (see Figure 9) since the establishment
of the reserve. These were very disturbing results. When probed further, the reason
for this continued habitat degradation was discovered.
Like most other nature reserves in China, there are villagers inside Wolong. The
human population size increased by about 70 percent from 1975 to 1997 and the
number of households more than doubled. These rapid increases in the numbers of
villagers and households led to more intensive and extensive human activities, such
as collection of fuelwood (major energy source) in panda habitat, agriculture, house
construction, and road construction. After the reserve’s establishment, the reserve
was transformed from a basically closed economy to an open economy, including
international tourism. The added domestic and foreign tourists on the land were
themselves a stress on the environment, and the income gain to the villagers in the
reserve due to tourism generated more demand for consuming natural resources and
increased degradation further.
Figure 9 Degradation of panda habitat before and after Wolong Reserve establishment

Source: Jianguo Liu

To mitigate the effect of these villagers on the protected areas, an “ecohydropower
plant” was completed in 2002 and villagers are given government subsidies through
two new conservation programs that began in 2000 and 2001. These subsidies are
meant to help the villagers afford the use of electricity and minimize the use of
fuelwood. They are also designed for villagers to return cropland on sleep slopes to
forestland, and to monitor and protect forests from illegal harvesting. These new
policies have been quite effective and panda habitat has begun to recover.

environmental protection efforts: a glimmer of hope
The Chinese government has responded to the rapid environmental degradation
within its country by implementing many remediation programs. These programs
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aim to control air pollution, reduce water pollution, mitigate biodiversity loss, and
reduce soil erosion and desertiﬁcation. Many of these programs also provide global
environmental beneﬁts by increasing vegetative cover, lowering pollution to other
countries, reducing timber import from and forest degradation in other countries,
and enhancing carbon sequestration. Below we highlight three of these national
programs with signiﬁcant global importance.
The Natural Forest Conservation Program (NFCP) manifests itself as a strict
nationwide ban on logging natural forests that started in 1998. Monetary incentives
are offered as compensation to halt all logging activities in natural forests, which
began with twelve provinces in the 1998 pilot program and expanded to eighteen
provinces in 2000 (Liu et al. 2008). ‘Mountain closures’ also ensure that not only
logging is stopped, but that all human activity including grazing and the gathering of
fuelwood is prohibited in these areas. This is intended to mitigate the effects of
erosion as well as to prevent natural disasters caused by deforestation (Liu et al. 2008).
In fact, NFCP was a direct response to an enormously destructive ﬂooding event that
occurred in 1998 (Liu and Diamond 2005; Liu et al. 2008). The lack of vegetation in
many areas greatly exacerbated the ﬂooding effect, and ofﬁcial statistics put the death
toll at approximately 4,000. Response to this ﬂood illustrates the highly reactive and
crisiscontroloriented environmental policy in China.
A second major project started in China, the Grain to Green Program, also
attempted to mitigate erosion and desertiﬁcation and increase forest cover. It began
as a pilot program in only three Chinese provinces in 1999 and grew to a fullﬂedged
program in over twentyﬁve provinces by 2002. Farmers are paid in grain to convert
their cropland to grasslands and forests. Farmland qualiﬁes for conversion if it has
over ﬁfteen or twentyﬁve degrees of slope. Farmers are also supplied with tree
seedlings and some cash for miscellaneous expenses. These farmers can then afford
to plant and maintain a tree plantation on cropland that previously would have lost
a great deal of nutrientrich soil due to erosion.
Figure 10 Increase in number and size of China’s nature reserves from 1957 2007

Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2007

Nature reserves are a third environmental program undertaken by the Chinese
government. As displayed in the Figure 10, the number of nature reserves in China
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has grown exponentially since the initiation of the program in the 1950s. Likewise, the
area of each nature reserve has also grown impressively. By 1997, the total area of
nature reserves was 800,000 square kilometers, approximately twice the area of
California. Amazingly, this number doubled by 2007 with total reserve area at nearly
1,600,000 square kilometers, an area that could comfortably ﬁt the state of Texas twice
within its borders with room to spare.
Aside from these three examples of government efforts, there have been many
other environmental programs put in place. Environmental awareness among the
general public has been increasing. A wide range of new and more environmentally
friendly technologies imported from developed countries have been in operation.
The efﬁciency in using energy and many other resources has been improving. These
are encouraging signs, but much more needs to be done to make fundamental
changes in China’s environment.

moving forward: “environmental revolution”
“In order to fundamentally improve China’s environmental protection, we
need a revolution—an environmental revolution.” –Jianguo Liu
As discussed above, there is a variety of complex factors that play into each speciﬁc
manifestation of environmental degradation. Reforming the administrative structure
and changing the model of economic development are key to making fundamental
improvements in China’s environment (Liu and Diamond 2008). In addition, changing
the angle at which the environment is viewed, and researching it from a holistic
perspective, could greatly strengthen environmental management (Liu et al. 2007).
Reforming the administrative structure and changing the model of economic
development

Changing the incentive structure for government leaders in China would be a place
to start the environmental revolution. Ofﬁcials have traditionally been selected and
promoted on the basis of their economic performance. If ofﬁcials were also evaluated
on their environmental performance, they would be compelled to devote resources to
monitoring factory and business cleanliness as opposed to turning a blind eye to cut
corners that increase gross domestic product but degrade the environment (Liu and
Diamond 2008).
Giving environmental governing bodies the authority to properly enforce
pollution standards would also add strength to China’s environmental programs. At
present, ﬁnes for polluting are ineffectual. It is easier and cheaper for a company to
pay the ﬁnes than to clean up their factories (Liu and Diamond 2008). However, the
recent elevation of China’s State Environmental Protection Administration to the
higher level Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) is a step in the direction of
increased authority and enforcement of emission standards.
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The administrative structure could also be enhanced by highlevel cooperation. At
the moment, many government agencies in China do not work together and consider
many environmental standard violations outside of their jurisdiction. For example,
the MEP is not responsible for all environmental sectors. The State Forestry
Administration, for one, is the body that concerns itself with forestrelated policy,
limiting the reach of the MEP into forestry affairs. Because of this, many violations
fall through the cracks and are not dealt with by the government. If a national body
could be formed to coordinate all the disparate environmental agencies of China,
environmental protection would improve drastically (Liu and Diamond 2008).
During the past three decades, China’s main goal was to promote rapid growth in
GDP. The dominant development model must be transformed from inefﬁcient
resource use and high pollution to high efﬁciency and low/no pollution for both
environmental and socioeconomic sustainability. One way to achieve this goal is to
fully evaluate short and longterm socioeconomic costs of environmental
degradation. Once people realize these costs, it would be easier to treat environmental
protection as an integral part of sustainable economic development.
Interdisciplinary approaches

A few other suggestions for increasing environmental protection efﬁcacy stem from
interdisciplinary thinking and integration of social and natural sciences. They both
stray from the traditional regulation path and attempt to treat the root illness as
opposed to merely mitigating symptoms (Liu et al. 2007).
The ﬁrst suggestion is regularly undertaking systematic assessments of the recently
developed ecological function zones. The assessments would dynamically rank all the
regions of China by ecosystem fragility, level of ecosystem services, economic
productivity, socioeconomic and demographic conditions, vulnerability to human
activities, and so on. This dynamic ranking system could then be incorporated into
economic decisions in the future. If this is done, human activities that cause high
environmental stress on an ecosystem can be moved to robust and resilient locations
and fragile ecological function zones that are providing crucial ecosystem services
could be left alone.
Working hand in hand with the protection of ecological function zones is the
nationwide implementation of “ecocompensation,” or payments for ecosystem
services. The Chinese government has already started a pilot ecocompensation
program, but this program needs to be more widespread and effectively enforced. In
this ecocompensation system, households and institutions would receive payments
for their effort and outcome in protecting ecosystems. For example, headwater
communities would receive funds from the government or other sources (e.g.,
beneﬁciaries in lower reaches) if they kept their environment clean and pollution
free. If they improved the baseline quality of the area, they would receive even greater
compensation. This is an incentive scheme that beneﬁts not only the community
receiving subsidies but also all downstream communities in the entire region (Liu
and Diamond 2008).

yale school of forestry & environmental studies

china’s environmment and globalization: unexpected connections

Another important way to reduce stress on fragile ecosystems is to provide valid
relocation options to rural communities in sensitive regions. In many previous cases,
this ecomigration of communities has proved difﬁcult. Most rural communities
have lived in the same location for many generations and cannot manage to acclimate
to their relocation communities. Even past attempts at retraining populations have
been unsuccessful and many villagers have decided to move back to their rural
communities.
However, in an attempt to stop the trend of cultural transfer that brings increased
numbers of households and inefﬁcient energy use to rural villages in fragile
ecosystems, an ecomigration of citizens away from such villages is necessary.
Interviews with rural youth in Wolong Nature Reserve have suggested that 90 percent
of young people want to move away from their village. The biggest obstacle standing
in their way is opportunity. This is where education can come into play. If the youth
of rural villages are given access to quality education, then they are more likely to
attend universities in urban areas and ﬁnd jobs in the city as well. At the same time
that they are moving their career paths in a new direction, they move their
environmental impact in a direction away from the fragile ecosystem of their village
to less environmentally sensitive areas. In this new social position, they are better able
to earn higher wages to send home to the older generation remaining in the village,
allowing the village to update itself to current environmental standards. This type of
ecomigration is a winwin situation for the people and environment of China.

conclusion
Although China’s environmental problems are complex, it is possible to ﬁnd creative
solutions based on the great body of knowledge generated by both social and natural
scientists. More research using a Coupled Human and Natural Systems (CHANS)
approach is needed to continually connect seemingly unconnected dots and
fundamentally improve China’s dire environmental situation.
In this globalizing world, China’s environmental revolution cannot be achieved
without assistance from other countries, especially developed countries. These
nations have contributed to and also have suffered from China’s environmental
degradation. They can provide a range of assistance, from providing environmentally
friendly technologies, investing in industries with clean and efﬁcient resource use, to
increasing environmental awareness and pollutant emission standards. The joint
efforts between China and the rest of the world can lead to a green China and a
sustainable planet.
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CHAPTER 5

The Role of Environmental NGOs in
Shaping a Green China*
Ma Jun
Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs, Beijing
Yong Zhao
Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies

chapter summary
This chapter argues that, as a result of the historical development of China’s
environmental management system, environmental nongovernmental organi
zations (ENGOs) are playing an important role as environmental information
disseminators, law facilitators, and communication promoters among four groups
of players: the central government, local governments, manufacturers (polluters),
and civilians (pollution victims). The analysis of a successful Beijingbased ENGO,
the Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs (IPE), provides insights into how
ENGOs can effectively participate in the environmental management system. From
the success and lessons of IPE and the projected demand from civil society for a
better environment, we suggest that localization of ENGOs in China, the
government’s endorsement, and broad trust from government, manufacturers, and
civilians are essential for the future development of Chinese ENGOs.

introduction
Since the 1970s reform and opendoor policy, China has experienced great changes in
many aspects of the society. The environmental crisis resulting from economic
development has become a serious threat to the sustainable development of China
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into a harmonious society. Traditional topdown control from the central
government alone cannot effectively manage the environment. Thus new partners
and methods are needed to face the challenge. Environmental nongovernmental
organizations (ENGOs) have become an important player in China’s environmental
management by ﬁlling the gap between the topdown control system and the
requirements of reality on the ground.
An objective of this chapter is to give a short account of the development of
China’s ENGOs from the perspective of historical institutional change. In addition,
the current function of and future outlook for China’s ENGOs will be discussed. An
illustrative case analysis will be made of the Institute of Public & Environmental
Affairs (IPE).

environment ngos in china: origin, role, and development
On March 31, 1994, the Chinese ENGO Friends of Nature (FON) was founded in Beijing
by Conjie Liang, a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference
(Figure 1). Since then, the number of ENGOs has grown rapidly. By the end of 2006,
among 345,000 NGOs in China, there were 2,786 ENGOs, including 1,382 government
organized NGOs (GONGOs), 202 civilianorganized NGOs, 1,116 studentinitiated
NGOs, and 68 NGOs outside the mainland, either internationally or based in Hong
Kong, Macau, and Taiwan (Niu and Pan 2007). These ENGOs participated in a broad
range of activities related to environmental protection, such as environmental
education, species protection, policymaking, and environmental monitoring.
Figure 1 On June 5, 1993, more than forty young people participated in an informal meeting about
environmental protection in Linglong Park in the southern suburb of Beijing. It is said that this
meeting was the first nongovernmental voluntary environmental protection meeting. In the photo,
the man giving the lecture is Congjie Liang, founder of FON, and the surrounding listeners are the first
members of FON.

Source: Friends of Nature 1993
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Origin of ENGOs: A greening government and an awakening civil society

The emergence and development of ENGOs in China were connected to several
major societal changes in the early days of implementing the country’s opendoor
policy. The institutional change in government since the reform and opendoor
policy in the late 1970s set the stage for citizens to participate in environmental affairs.
Before the reform, the government was the sole supervisor, legislator, and regulator
for environmental management (Figure 2). In this system, there was no direct
interaction between the manufacturers and the consumers. The manufacturers, being
mainly stateowned factories, were politically driven rather than revenue driven. The
power balance was one sided among the three groups of actors in environmental
affairs.
The government had strict control of both the polluter and the consumer (see
curved arrows in Figure 2). The manufacturer and the civilian had little power in
inﬂuencing the government’s policymaking (straight arrows). The civilian was the
recipient of the impact of pollution produced by the manufacturer, but had no
oversight power over the latter’s unsound environmental practices.
Figure 2 The relationship between various actors in environmental management before the reform
and opendoor policy of the late 1970s

The goal of the reform and opendoor policy was to adapt market economy
practices to a socialist system in order to liberate the productivity of the Chinese
people. This was a major turning point in Chinese history, and all aspects of China’s
society have changed to facilitate or to adapt to the new national strategy. Realizing
that the former tight control of its people was no longer effective in managing a
marketoriented society, the government started to move away from micromanaging
civil affairs and instead concentrated its efforts on national strategy, policy, and

yale school of forestry & environmental studies

47

48

lectures on china’s environment

lawmaking. In March 1998 at the Ninth People's Congress, Luo Gan, the Secretary
General of the State Council, declared that “the government has taken up the
management of many affairs which it should not have managed, is not in a position
to manage, or actually cannot manage well” (Saich 2000; Ho 2001). The retreat of the
government from civil affairs not only successfully stimulated economic productivity
and efﬁciency, but also left some ﬁelds blank for other social forces to ﬁll in.
Environmental protection was one of these blank ﬁelds.
In the meantime, the government structure went through a decentralization
process, a process that actually had a negative impact on environment protection.
Schwartz (2004) argues that at the central government level, staff reduction left the
State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) unequipped to provide crucial
services such as regulation enforcement, environment monitoring, education and
training.
Figure 3 illustrates the institutional change in the environmental management
ﬁeld owing to the reform and opendoor policy. The roles of various actors are
inseparable.
Figure 3 The relationship between various actors in environmental management before the reform
and opendoor policy without the participation of ENGOs. Open arrows indicate weaker interactions
than filled arrows.

In this system, the central government not only supervises local government, but
also relies on the local government to implement environmental policy and law and
monitor environment performance. However, at the local level, ofﬁcials are reluctant
to establish environmental protection goals because the funding and resources for
achieving these goals have become a local responsibility, and because economic
development is usually the primary criterion for performance evaluation. From an
institutional perspective, since the local government has a large responsibility for
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implementation of environmental laws and regulations (Dasgupta et al. 2001; Wang
2000), it is susceptible to corruption, given the strong incentive to pursue economic
development at the cost of pollution. Such an incentive results in an increase in the
negotiation power of polluters in environmental management. On the other hand,
local victims of pollution only have weak negotiation power to counter the industrial
interest groups because they are usually incapable of suing the polluter and the local
government and because the industrial interest groups and the local government have
shared interests. In addition, local civilians cannot effectively exert buying power
because the polluting manufacturers usually do not rely on local markets to make a
proﬁt. Thus, this institutional change weakens the negotiation power of civilians in
environmental management.
While there has been institutional degeneration of environmental management
capacity, economic development, a major achievement of the government
institutional change, has also brought great challenges for environmental protection.
In the 1990s, industrial output increased at a rate of more than 15 percent annually,
contributing 45 percent of China’s GDP in 2001 (Dasgupta et al. 2001). In 2008, China
maintained its world dominance in manufacturing many products (Table 1). This
economic growth comes at the cost of environment degradation. In 2008, more than
60 percent of China’s fresh water was contaminated and more than half of China's
major cities failed to meet modest national air quality standards. In response, citizens
started to complain to different levels of the government. During the period from
1991 to 1993, the government received over 130,000 complaints annually (Dasgupta
and Wheeler 1996). Some of these complaints developed into protests. Recognizing
that environmental degradation could undermine its goal of social stability, the
government is now willing to go green in order to prevent further social unrest.
Table 1 China’s manufacturing output in 2008, as a percentage of global total
Item
Toys
Shoes
air conditioners and copy machines
chemical fibers
color TVs and digital cameras
cell phones
crude steel
computers and refrigerators

Percentage
70%
66%
>60%
>50%
50%
47%
36%
33%

Source: Ma et al. 2008

The worsening environmental crisis demonstrates the deﬁciency of the topdown
environmental management system. The government feels the necessity of having a
strong civil society to achieve its social agenda. The civil society also senses the
necessity and possibility for NGOs to contribute to the solution of environment
problems. The changing relationship between the government and civil society is
evidenced by the wellpublicized story of the establishment of FON and the rapid
development of ENGOs afterwards. From only nine ENGOs, four of which were
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student organizations in 1994, the number increased dramatically to 184 student
environmental organizations and 73 nonstudent ENGOs in 2001 (Figures 4 and 5).
Figure 4 Growth in student environmental organizations, 1967–2001

Source: Yang 2005

Figure 5 Growth in (nonstudent) environmental organizations, 1985–2002

Source: Yang 2005

ENGOs are diverse in organizational form. According to the classiﬁcation by Yang
(2005), there are seven types, as shown in Table 2.
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Table 2 Main types of environmental NGOs in China
Organizational Type

Registration status

Examples

Registered NGOs

Registered as social organizations
(
) or private, nonprofit
work units (
)

Friends of Nature; Green River
Institute of Public &
Environmental Affairs; Green
Earth Volunteers

Nonprofit enterprises

Registered as business enterprises
but operate as nonprofit
organizations

Global Village of Beijing;
Institute of Environment
and Development

Nonprofit work unit

Unregistered organizations that
function as NGOs

China’s Green Beats

Webbased groups

Unregistered groups that operate
mainly through the Internet

GreenWeb; Greener Beijing

Student environmental
associations

Registered with campus Youth
Leagues yet function and are
perceived as NGOs

Sichuan University
Environmental Volunteer
Association

University research
centers and institutes

Affiliated with institutions of higher
learning but operate as NGOs

Centre for Legal Assistance to
Pollution Victims, China University
of Political Science and Law

Governmentorganized
NGOs (GONGOs)

Social organizations established by
government agencies, also known as
stateowned NGOs (SONGOs)

China Environmental Science
Association

Source: Yang 2005

The role of ENGOs in environmental management and protection

In China’s environmental management system, the government plays a much more
important role than the market and civil society. From the perspective of institutional
development, the rise of ENGOs in environmental management is closely related to
the development of the government management system. In some ﬁelds, such as
transportation pollution control, natural resource extraction, and land use change,
the government relies on command and control policies. For the major pollution
generation sector—industrial pollution—the situation is much more complicated,
and the Chinese government deploys two instruments: pollution levies and pollution
permit trading.
China has been collecting pollution levies since 1982 (Wang 2000). The
government wants to use the levy to add external costs to polluters so that they have
the incentive to change their polluting behavior. In principle, the levy collected will be
used for the improvement of the environment. However, this mechanism has several
defects. For one thing, the environment has a limited carrying capacity, and simply
adding external costs cannot necessarily prevent the environment from being severely
degraded. According to the analysis of Wu (2005), because the levy is typically priced
at 1015 percent of the true cost to control pollution, the polluter may simply consider
the levy as part of the production cost and add it into the sales price. Furthermore, 80
percent of the collected levy goes back to the polluter, supposedly to fund efforts to
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improve its environmental performance. Therefore the polluter does not really feel
the pressure to change its behavior.
The Chinese government has also tried to implement a pollution permit trading
system, but progress is slow. In 1999, after several years’ discussion between the
Chinese government and Environmental Defense Fund of the U.S., China initiated
SO2 emissions trading in two industrial cities, Benxi and Nantong. In March 2002, the
“4+3+1” project to implement an emissions trading system in four heavily polluted
provinces, three major cities, and one major energy company (China Huaneng
Group) was ofﬁcially carried out by SEPA together with Environmental Defense
Fund. Finally in December 2008, the ﬁrst set of permits—in the amount of 50 tons of
SO2 emission— was bid on by seven buyers in the Tianjin Pollution Permit Trading
Center, resulting in a transaction of 150,000 RMB.
Compared to the pollution levy system, the pollution permit trading system has
several advantages. First, the polluters have more incentive to implement a better
pollutant control system because extra pollution permits can be traded or stored.
Because the local government is no longer the permit provider, which requires less
participation, the likelihood of corruption is lower than in the levy system. Second,
local people and ENGOs can contribute to pollution reduction by buying the permits
locally.
The trading system also has problems of its own. It is difﬁcult to calculate the total
allowable amount of pollutants and to distribute emission permits in an equitable
manner, especially in China, whose regions vary greatly in terms of economy, culture,
and environment. Another difﬁculty is that the regulatory system is unable to manage
the trading market with proper instruments such as laws and trading taxes.
Furthermore, a standardized market did not exist at the inception of the system.
Although some people believe that emissions trading is more effective than the levy
system, its implementation is complicated by the fact that the right to issue these
permits still rests in the hands of local governmental ofﬁcials. The incentive for them
to protect the polluter to enhance economic performance may compromise the
integrity of the system.
From the analysis above, it is clear that the government’s two instruments are not
sufﬁcient to control industrial pollution. This is where ENGOs can play an important
part (Figure 6). As information distributors, justice facilitators, and interaction
promoters, they can help strengthen environmental laws and market instruments.
ENGOs can work on the popularization of environmental laws and facilitation of
public prosecution, making the legal instruments more active in environmental
management. They can take the responsibility for uniting civilians to interact with
polluters and local governments. For this reason, ENGOs with professional
negotiation skills can act as representatives of pollution victims. As a result, they
strengthen the role of civilians to directly counter the power of polluters.
Similarly, ENGOs can strengthen market instruments by disseminating pollution
information. Market forces cannot be functional unless environmental information
reaches a critical level of transparency so that consumers with concern about
environment and health can make choices about what to purchase. It is therefore
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essential that public have adequate access to the information. Using a model to
compare the implicit price of pollution from community pressure and the explicit
price in the form of the pollution levy, Wang (2000) demonstrates that the implicit
price, which measures the attitude of the local community, is at least as high as the
explicit price charged by the government. Consumers are less likely to purchase the
products if they know that the ﬁrms that produce them are heavy polluters. Investors
also react signiﬁcantly to environmental news when deciding how to invest their
portfolios. Heavy emissions may signal that a ﬁrm’s production techniques are
inefﬁcient (Wang et al. 2004). The behavior of consumers and investors will not
amount to a positive force unless the information can be easily accessed by the public.
Figure 6 Same as Figure 3, but with an active participation of ENGOs. Because of the communication
and interaction between ENGOs and other parties (twosided arrows connecting to the ENGOs box),
market instruments and environmental laws are strengthened.

In summary, the presence of ENGOs not only improves the function of the market
and legal systems in environmental management but also provides alternative ways to
mediate the interactions between the government, manufacturers, and civilians.
Action: Repertoires, limitations, and opportunities for ENGOs

ENGOs in China have now expanded into many aspects of environmental protection,
such as environmental education, species protection, policymaking, and environmen
tal monitoring. They organize public lectures, workshops, conferences, field trips,
media campaigns, and Internet publications and communications (Yang 2005). Most
of them avoid confrontational methods in their actions (Ho 2001; Lee and Ma 2008).
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ENGOs face several challenges, including funding, registration, data access, mem
bership recruitment, establishment of local branch offices, and recruitment of capa
ble staff. Among these limitations, two major constraints are funding and registra
tion. Fundraising is difficult for ENGOs, and even for GONGOs. The funding situa
tion is so poor that more than 60 percent of ENGOs do not have office space. Many
of them have to look outside the country to foreign governments, philanthropists and
corporations for support (Schwartz 2004). Some of them do not have a strong and
charismatic leader, which is necessary to engage in successful fundraising during the
startup phase, and can become a problem that hampers their longterm development
(Ho 2001).
The second difficulty is related to ENGO registration. In 1998, to control the power
of civil organizations, the central government issued a proclamation called
Regulations for the Administration and Registration of Social Organizations. Under this
regulation (Ho 2001), registration is a tedious and difficult process. Prior to registra
tion, the NGO must be approved by a sponsoring institution (
).
Therefore it is essential that the leader of the proposed NGO has already estab
lished a good relationship with the government so that they can find officials willing
to sponsor them. The total number of staff in an NGO should be more than fifty indi
viduals or more than thirty nongovernment units (
). The NGO must
have a fixed address, specialized staff, and financial resources of RMB 100,000 for a
national office or RMB 30,000 for a regional (provincial level and lower) office.
Within the same administrative area, no more than two social organizations with the
same or similar scope of business are allowed to apply for registration, eliminating
the possibility of ENGOs uniting in dealing with the same issue. There is no right of
appeal if an application is rejected for failing to meet any of the conditions men
tioned above. To date, a large number of organizations remain unregistered, and oth
ers operate within a different registered category such as “nonprofit organization.”
Ironically, the 1998 regulation has resulted in more difficulty for the government in
controlling the ENGOs (Ho 2001).
Many Chinese ENGOs act as information distributors, and the funding and
registration limitations these ENGOs face can be partially overcome by the
development of Internet sites. The Internet makes it much easier to run webbased
environmental groups. The rapid increase in Internet use allows them to gain instant
access to millions of users (Figure 7). These webbased groups can be functional
without registering with the government. It is also difficult for the local government
to manipulate the information posted on the Web. Furthermore, they need less staff,
little or no office space, and a lower budget for maintenance. Because people can
access the information and share it with their neighbors, these web groups will be a
major force that determines environmental performance locally.
ENGOs have also been helped by the Government Information Disclosure Bill, a
regulation implemented by the State Council in 2007 that strengthens civil society’s
right to acquire environmental information. For a long time, environment infor
mation was not accessible to the public because it was considered a state secret. The
public had to rely on imprecise visual cues such as visibility instead of quantitative
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pollution data to judge environmental quality. Although in principle the bill grants
the public the right to access this information, various government agencies have yet
to determine how to present the raw data in a form meaningful to the public. This
presents an opportunity for ENGOs to participate in information disclosure.
Figure 7 Growth in Internet users in China, 2005–2008

Source: CNNIC 2008

institute of public & environmental affairs: a case analysis
The Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs (IPE) is a good example of an
organization that utilizes the new opportunities mentioned above. The NGO,
established by Ma Jun in 2006, is a Beijingbased nonprofit think tank with a focus
on environmental policy and governance research. In the following we provide a brief
overview of its operation.
Political background

Facing the challenge of massive environmental degradation, the Chinese government
has introduced a “scientific outlook” approach to achieving sustainable economic
growth. The Eleventh FiveYear Plan has laid out clear goals related to environmental
protection, including reduction of energy consumption per unit of GDP by 20
percent and major pollutants by 10 percent relative to the 2005 levels by the end of
2010. However, several barriers exist in the process of translating the plan into action.
At present, polluting enterprises far outnumber the monitoring capacity of local
governments. Because the cost of regulatory violation is lower than the cost of
compliance, there is little incentive for the polluters to clean up their acts. To
overcome these barriers, the government has started to push for greater transparency
on corporate violations and to improve the public's access to environmental
information. It is against this political background that the IPE was founded.
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The IPE can be considered an element of a new form of environmental governance
whose point of departure is improved access to environmental information. There are
several policy and legal bases for this. On the government side, the relevant legal or
regulatory documents include the Environmental Impact Assessment Law (200309
01), the State Council’s Guidelines on the Comprehensive Implementation of
Administration Bylaw (20040322), the Provisional Measures on Public Participation
in Environmental Impact Assessment (20060318) and the Environmental Information
Disclosure Measures (20080501). On the corporate side, the important legal docu
ments include the Cleaner Production Promotion Law (20030101), the Rules on Major
Enterprises’ Cleaner Production Auditing Process (200512), and the Environmental
Information Disclosure Measures (20080501). These regulations provide the legal
basis for open information access.
IPE’s goal and operational strategy

The mission of IPE is to improve environmental information openness and public
awareness by increasing the public accessibility to environmental data. In doing so, it
exerts pressure on local governments and private companies, especially multinational
corporations, to improve their environmental performance. Local governments lack
the incentive to protect the environment because economic growth is more
important for their performance. With the information IPE provides, local people are
able to judge environmental quality. It helps focus local government’s attention on
some of the specific local environmental problems. On the other side, the private
companies, especially multinational companies, would be concerned about their
public image if the infraction record were published. In essence, IPE promotes green
practices by using a bottomup approach that complements the relatively weak top
down regulatory system.
IPE’s operational strategy consists of three parts. First, it collects data from accred
ited sources only and makes them public in a nondiscriminating manner. The
accredited sources include central and local government branches across the country
and media reports that cite documents or statements from officials or agencies in
charge. In doing so, IPE has gained the reputation of being fair and neutral. Although
the accuracy and completeness of the governmentreleased data are arguable, because
they come from the government, government officials and private companies would
have difficulty in challenging the validity of the data, greatly reducing the NGO’s
institutional costs.
Second, IPE uses a userfriendly website to house its database. It offers people easy
access to the information and displays the data in an understandable way. Although
the website can reach only those people who have the capability to use the Internet,
it is a better platform than traditional media outlets such as TV and newspapers.
Users can search for environmental information on water quality, air quality, names
and locations of polluters, rankings of regional environment quality, remediation
records, and records of violation. In addition, users can report violators so that IPE
can track the violators down.
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Third, IPE uses its database as an instrument to shift the supply chain toward
greener practices. The database contains the pollution record of the suppliers in var
ious tiers of a supply chain, such as that of WalMart. If a major retailer commits to
purchasing products or services only from those suppliers that achieve compliance
with relevant environmental regulations, databases such as IPE’s make it possible to
track the environmental behavior of suppliers efficiently.
The two most powerful products of IPE are China’s water pollution and air pollu
tion maps (Figure 8). These maps are based on environmental quality data and more
than 40,000 infraction records released by government agencies. There is a user
friendly interface between the raw data assembled by the IPE staff and the public.
Figure 8 Interface of China Air Pollution Map

Source: Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs 2006a

By clicking a specific region on the map, the user can find data on water and air
quality, pollutant discharges by amount and type, and names of violators at the
national, provincial, or municipal level. The user can also rank provinces and
municipalities using information on such indices as industrial wastewater discharge,
industrial waste gas emission, and domestic sewage discharge to find pollution
hotspots. As a successful case, after Hunan Province was ranked first for cadmium
and five other heavy metals and toxics in 2006, the provincial government took
actions to clean it up. IPE has recently added digital geographic information to the
database so that a user can locate the violator on a digital map and determine the
distance of the violator from another point of interest on the map (Figure 9).
The health interface portal explains in simple terms the health consequences of
pollution to the lay public (Figure 10). For each major pollutant, it provides
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definitions, source categories, health hazards, treatment methods, environment
standards, and historical cases of pollution incidents.
Figure 9 Illustration of the pollution map search engine

Source: Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs 2006b
Figure 10 Interface of environment and health

Source: Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs 2006c
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The Green Choice Alliance Program

Based on the thinking that informed consumer choice could affect corporate
environmental behavior, IPE launched the Green Choice Initiative in 2007 along with
20 other local NGOs. It has two main components: one is about enabling informed
consumers to make smarter choices at shops and markets; the other is about
encouraging major companies to factor environmental standards into their sourcing
practice.
Solid progress was made on the responsible supply chain side. A factory’s presence
on the IPE database list as a violator of environmental compliance poses risks to the
reputation of its client company. Large companies aware of such risks, especially
multinational corporations, have begun integrating environmental standards into
their sourcing criteria. The Green Choice Alliance Program (GCA) is designed to help
these companies green their supply chains. A company can request that their
suppliers be removed from the violator list after they have made improvements to
their environmental performance. The improvement must be verified by a third party
(consulting firms or research institutes) under the supervision of local NGOs such as
IPE.
As a mechanism for responsible supply chain management, GCA uses the steps
shown in Figure 11 to influence a polluter's behavior. The central goal of GCA is to
press big retailers and large corporations openly to commit not to sourcing from
polluters for their supply chain. Since its inception, some major companies have
started using it to screen their supply chain system. For example, WalMart has made
a commitment to not sourcing goods from local suppliers with infraction records
related to pollution. Major companies such as GE, NIKE and Esquel are also using the
database to monitor the performance of their suppliers.
Figure 11 Green Choice Alliance program

As Figure 11 illustrates, after the company has made the commitment, it must draft
an action plan to fulfill it. The action plan will be disclosed to the public through the
GCA website. As a GCA member company, it should accomplish a number of steps.
It should first screen its supplier list using the GCA violator database and report the
screening results back to GCA. The second step, supplier verification, consists of a
document review process and an onsite GCA audit. The audit results may indicate
that further environmental remediation measures are needed. In general,
remediation measures are expected to be completed within six months after the
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problem supplier has been identified. A followup audit may be required for the
assessment of the remediation measures. The member company is required to cease
purchasing from the supplier if it is unwilling to achieve or incapable of achieving
compliance with environmental legal requirements (Ma et al. 2008).
The GCA audit is performed by a thirdparty, accredited auditing entity and
observed by the GCA ENGO members, so as to ensure external validity and to
enhance transparency. In order to verify compliance status and the capacity to achieve
compliance, the GCA audit focuses on three aspects: (1) Have the specific violations
identified by environmental agencies been resolved? (2) Does the supplier have an
adequate environmental management system? (3) Does the supplier’s treatment
facility have sufficient capacity to deal with waste discharge? By the end of 2008, the
GCA audit had already been successfully utilized nineteen times. All but one of the
audits resulted in removing the violator from the list.
Lessons from IPE
1

In 2008, there were only five
fulltime staff members at IPE.

IPE owes its success not only to hard work,1 but also to its unique operational strategy.
Unlike some NGOs that deploy confrontational methods, IPE maintains a cordial
relationship with the government at different levels. Its agenda is one of non
activism. Its data come from governmental and accredited media sources, helping it
maintain its neutrality and nonactivist position. In some ways, IPE is an ally of the
central government to achieve its goal of harmonious and sustainable development.
The proactive approach of GCA maximizes the utility of the IPE database. The broad
alliance it has built with other NGOs, companies, and the government provides
incentives to improve environmental performance at the local and firm levels.
IPE recognizes several areas in need of improvement. Local government officials
may have the firsthand data on pollution discharge, but are reluctant to release them.
Data availability is especially problematic in those provinces with low GDP and heavy
pollution loading. Unless the information disclosure regulations are strictly enforced
there, the data availability problem is not going away anytime soon. The GCA
program is not effective in influencing small polluters such as small mines, chemical
factories, and paper mills. Often these polluters are invisible to consumers and make
up too small a portion of companies’ supply chains to feel the pressure from the GCA
member retailers. Most notably, CGA has virtually no effect on small energy
producers since energy is not labeled in the supplychain scheme. That these small
but heavy polluters are not bound by GCA may drag down the enthusiasm of other
betterperforming companies to participate in the audit program.

concluding remarks
China is undergoing rapid economic and social transformation. On the one hand,
economic growth will bring new challenges for environmental management.
Pollution sources will spread from industrialized areas to undeveloped areas.
Emissions from industrial and household pollution will continue, and so will the
depletion of natural resources. On the other hand, social change will bring
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improvement to the management system for the environment: new environmental
laws and regulations will emerge to curb environmental degradation; the
manufacturing system will become more energy efficient and cleaner; and civil
society will see increased participation in environmental policy making. A group of
strong ENGOs is essential to balance these two opposing factors.
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CHAPTER 6

Toward Sustainability: Circular
Economy and Ecocity Development
in China*
Professor Rusong Wang
Chinese Academy of Sciences
Baihai Wu
Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies

chapter summary
This chapter argues that a circular economy approach offers China the best
prospect for meeting its socioeconomic goals during its process of industrialization
and urbanization without disrupting environmental stewardship. It is argued that
the “3r” principle of “reduce, reuse, and recycle” should be replaced by the “3R”
principle of “rethinking, reform, and renovation” as the ecological rationale for a
circular economy.
Within the realm of circular economy are circular industry and ecological cities, or
“ecocities.” Circular industry is the implementation of circular economy strategies
at the firm level or industrial system level. The foundation of circular industry is
industrial ecology, which means that the waste and byproducts of one stage serve
as raw materials for the next stage of the whole product line. Ecocity construction
is the implementation of circular economy principles at the community level. The
concept of an ecocity is based on the belief that cities are the solution to the
challenges arising from urbanization associated with population growth.
Several cases are examined to illustrate the application of the 3R principle at the
firm and city levels. The last section of this chapter presents a summary of the key
points that were discussed after the lecture between Professor Wang and
participating students.
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See (Bulletin on Final GDP
Estimates in China), the
general investigation data of
GDP by National Bureau of
Statistics of China.
2

3

Data collected from China
Statistical Yearbook (2004 to
2007), National Bureau of
Statistics of China.
See Wen Jiabao’s keynote
speech from the United
Nations’ HighLevel Meeting
on the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs),
September 25, 2008. Available
online at: http://www.gov.cn/
ldhd/200809/26/content_
1106073.htm

Over the past thirty years, China has made great progress in socioeconomic
development. China’s gross domestic product (GDP) increased at a startling rate of
9.6 percent per year from 1979 to 2004.1 Its income per capita jumped to $1,489 in
2004 and life expectancy was 72.5 years in 2005.2 The number of Chinese people living
on one dollar per day decreased from 250 million in 1978 to 15 million in 2008, or in
other words, more than 235 million people were lifted out of absolute poverty and
now enjoy living standards above the poverty line.3
These changes, however, have come at the heavy cost of environmental deteriora
tion. China is one of the top emitters of carbon dioxide in the world. Ninety percent
of its rivers through urban areas have been heavily polluted, and 75 percent of its lakes
are in a state of eutrophication. These examples of environmental degradation weigh
heavily on China’s economic development. The Ministry of Environmental
Protection estimated that in 2003, the cost of environmental damage was equal to 15
percent of the nation’s total GDP (Zhenhua 2005).
In general terms, these environmental problems are caused by weak law
enforcement, unhealthy levels of consumerism, and environmentally unsound
technology. They can trace their roots back to industrialization and urbanization. It
is against this backdrop that the principles of circular economy and ecological cities,
or “ecocities,” have come to occupy a central position in China’s efforts to reconcile
economic development with environmental protection. The most attractive aspect of
these principles is that, while reconciling environmental and economic imperatives,
they do not require fundamental changes to the basic ownership arrangements and
the political system. Circular economy and ecocities can work as environmentally
sound mechanisms to respond to environmental challenges arising from
industrialization and urbanization.
The objective of this chapter is to examine the characteristics of and the
relationships among the notions of circular economy, circular industry, and ecocities
in China. Several examples are reviewed in the context of the 3R principle. In the ﬁnal
section, various questions on circular economy and ecocities are explored.

circular economy in china
“Human society is a multiscale, multiattribute, and multiobjective eco
complex bridging man and nature; we call it SocialEconomicNatural
Complex Ecosystem (SENCE).” –Rusong Wang

The notion of “circular economy” is subject to different interpretations. In 1999,
Dr. Tim Cooper ﬁrst explored the concept of circular economy in his article entitled
“Creating an Economic Infrastructure for Sustainable Product Design” (Cooper
1999). In his critique of the existing “linear industry,” he proposed a new form of
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industry, termed circular industry, “in which the ‘throughput’ of energy and raw
materials is reduced,” and “in such [a circular] economy there would be a shift in
activity from the manufacturing sector to service sector activities such as reuse,
repair, upgrading and recycling.” In China, the term circular economy means
different things to different people. For some, it represents a new form of ecological
economy, which is most similar to industrial ecology. For others, it denotes an
integrated ecosystem with a comprehensive range of functionalities related to nature,
economy, and society (Sun 2007). In the recently issued Law on Accelerating Circular
Economy of the People’s Republic of China, circular economy refers to waste reduction,
reuse, and recycling carried out during the processes of production, transportation,
and consumption.
Although circular economy is a trendy term in China now, the practice of circular
economy can actually be traced to ancient China. Thousands of years ago, farmers
raised ﬁsh in ponds, used silt from the bottom as fertilizer for mulberry trees,
collected mulberry leaves to feed silkworms, and used leaf chips left by the silkworms
as a food source for the ﬁsh. This circle is a perfect example of circular economy at
the elemental level. A more recent example is the recycling and reuse of metal and
other materials among different industries in the 1950s, which occurred when China
began its industrialization under a highly centralized planning economy. In another
example, in 1958, the Jiangmen Sugar Reﬁnery reused sugarcane bagasse for
papermaking. At that time, people called this kind of recycling symbiotic use and
applied it to many industries (Sun 2007). Unfortunately, though, these practices were
disrupted by the Cultural Revolution. Since the late 1970s, China’s industrialization
and urbanization have been accelerating at a startling rate. This remarkable progress
is accompanied by the increasing challenge of environmental deterioration. This
environmental cost is forcing China to shift its strategy from an approach that is only
focused on the economy to one that is more sustainable. During this period of time,
the concept of circular economy has been successfully applied in the industrialized
world, especially in German and Japan. Their achievements have rekindled China’s
interest in circular economy.
Circular economy is operated according to the principle of ecological economics,
whose characteristics are totality, coevolution, recycling, and selfreliance. Circular
economy also uses resources very efﬁciently and is in harmony with surrounding life
supporting ecosystems. The ecological rationale for circular industry is not the “3r”
micro principle of “reduce, reuse, recycle,” but the “3R” macro principle of
“rethinking, reform, and renovation” (Figure 1). First, rethinking in this context
requires that the industry change from reductionism to holism, from environmental
exploitation to ecological symbiosis, from openended material cycles to closed
ecological cycles, and from external control to selfreliance. The second “R” in the 3R
principle (reform) means that the industry should change from a chainlink structure
to one of lifesupportoriented vertical and serial coupling, from fragmented and
isolated to foodwebbased horizontal and parallel coupling, from locally
independent to ecosystembased regional coupling, and from a rigid and
nonadaptive structure to a ﬂexible and adaptive production structure. Third,
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renovation requires that we apply the 3r micro principle of “reduce, reuse, recycle” to
institutional and technological development.
Figure 1 Relationship between the 3R and 3r principles
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Reduction

Renovation

Recycling

Reform
Reuse

A wellfunctioning circular economy is driven by a number of factors. The ﬁrst
one concerns energy resources and the research and technology that explore these
resources. The second is related to the ﬂow of capital in the banking and market
sector. The third is power structure, including institutions and governance. The
fourth and ﬁnal factor is spirituality, consisting of culture, education, and tradition.
A key function of circular economy is recycling, which in the broad sense includes
material recycling, renewable energy use, information feedback, regional symbiosis,
longterm sustainability and efﬁcient monetary circulation.
Circular economy in China is constructed at three different levels: the ﬁrm, the
community, and society. At the ﬁrm level, entrepreneurs have almost complete
discretion to use market tools in their daytoday operations. At the community and
society levels, government intervention plays a larger role. In fact, local government
has strict oversight over almost all of China’s industrial parks, in which related
industries are located together. In China, the governmental role is the most distinct
feature of circular economy. The government essentially serves as an “enabler,”
encouraging technological innovation and resource conservation through policies
and regulations. How this “enabling” role interferes with market mechanisms is a
subject of debate (Zhu and Liu 2005).

from linear industry to circular industry
Within the realm of circular economy is circular industry. The notion of circular
industry challenges the traditional idea that negative effects on the environment are

yale school of forestry & environmental studies

toward sustainability: circular economy and ecocity development in china

an inevitable outcome of industrialization and urbanization. Rather, it suggests that
economic development is not incompatible with environmental protection (Wang
2005). On one hand, China’s future economic prospects increasingly depend on
achieving and maintaining high standards of environmental governance, especially
energy conservation. On the other hand, integrating environmental governance with
industrialization can create a transformative kind of industry, that is, circular industry.
One tenet of circular industry is to integrate the 3r principle throughout the entire
industrial process. In this sense, circular industry has nearly the same meaning as
industrial ecology, namely “the ﬂows of materials and energy in industrial and
consumer activities, or the effects of these ﬂows on the environment, and of the
inﬂuences of economic, political, regulatory, and social factors on the ﬂow, use, and
transformation of resources” (Allenby and Richards 1994). Circular industry,
sometimes referred to as ecoindustry, distinguishes itself from traditional linear
industry in several ways. Linear industry converts material into product and waste. It
is inherently unsustainable. In circular industry, production of primary goods,
manufacturing, distribution, consumption, and reuse are physically integrated into
one industrial complex. Production processes are linked like a food web in order to
allow efﬁcient sharing of resources and information and to minimize negative
environmental impacts.
On a regional scale, neighboring communities, major enterprises and small
businesses are integrated into one large industrial ecosystem so that environmental
costs are internalized and wastes are assimilated within the system itself. Such a
system also includes social and cultural components, providing local people with
work opportunities and a chance to participate in the management of the enterprises
and cultivating a harmonious coexistence between the companies and the
community’s culture. An important attribute of circular industry, be it at the complex
scale or regional scale, is that it possesses multiple production functions. In other
words, circular industry is ﬂexible and adaptive; its products are diversiﬁed and can
be easily changed, rather than rigid and specialized. Related to this ﬂexibility is the
capacity to switch from product and proﬁtgenerating—(“hardware”producing)—
industry to serviceoriented industry, whose outputs are “software,” or services, and
“mindware,” or cultural enrichment. A healthy circular industry must enhance
capacity building in the form of R&D (research and development), I&C (incubation
and consultation), S&T (service and training), and E&E (experience and expertise).
Finally, a circular industry is not complete without respect for human dignity. In
circular industry, working is a learning process that fosters innovation, an
opportunity for social interaction, and something that is enjoyable, rather than a
process in which workers are enslaved by machines.
A good example of circular industry is the Guitang Group in Guangxi Province,
China. The Guitang Group is an ecoindustrial park within which the ﬂow of
materials is circular (Figure 2). The Guitang Group is a pillar industry in Guigang
City and sustains the livelihoods of 65 percent of the city’s population. Its principal
business is the manufacturing and sales of sugar, paper, and related byproducts, such
as alcohol (liquor), light calcium carbonate, and waterreducing agents. Since 1995,
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Guitang has been transforming its traditional industry into circular industry with
two key product lines.
In the ﬁrst product line, Guitang plants sugarcane as a raw material for reﬁned
sugar, uses the byproduct of sugar syrup to produce alcohol, and uses the waste
alcohol to make composite fertilizer for the sugarcane plantation. In the second
product line, Guitang creates reﬁned sugar from the sugarcane ﬁrst, and then uses
sugarcane bagasse to produce pulp and paper. During this process, the pulp waste is
used for making alkali, and the byproducts of white lime and mud are used to
produce cement. In both lines, the byproduct from one section is recycled as raw
material for the next section. The transformation to circular industry has increased
Guitang’s productivity, improved the conservation of energy and water, and greatly
reduced its wastewater output.
Figure 2 Circular industry at the firm level in Guitang Group
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Source: Modiﬁed from http://www.guitang.com

The successful application of the circular industry principle by the Guitang Group
depends on a number of factors. As a cityowned corporation, it has broad discretion
to experiment with new concepts and technology. It has also received strong support
from the city government for its circular industry strategy in terms of favorable tax
treatment and ﬁnancial aid.
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an ecocity with chinese characteristics
“[Eco]cities are the solution for humanity’s future, if we can establish an
ecopolis on the basis of the 3R principle of “rethinking, reform and
renovation.” –Rusong Wang

Urbanization is the inevitable outcome of industrialization. In China, rapid
urbanization is also caused by an exponentially growing population. A fastgrowing
proportion of this expanding population now lives in or near cities. China’s urban
population tripled from 13.2% of the total in 1979 to 39.1% in 2002 (Wang 2004). With
the acceleration of urbanization, today the country’s urban population has increased
to 0.6 billion, almost half of total population of 1.3 billion.4 This urbanizing trend is
expected to continue, even though the rates of industrialization and population
growth are projected to slow down.
The urban explosion in China has a profound and negative impact on the natural
environment, the economy, and society. China’s interest in the “ecocity” concept was
motivated by the pressure to reconceptualize the relationship between city and
nature. Hoping to continue its urbanization without disrupting environmental
protection or economic development, China wishes to transform its cities to
ecocities, a sustainable and selfreliant conjunction of nature, society, and culture.
The emergence of ecocities in China is the application of the circular economy
notion at the community level. Professor Wang argues that ecocities are the solution
for humanity’s future if we could establish an ecopolis on the basis of the 3R
principle of “rethinking, reform and renovation.” Thus, cities that fulﬁll the 3R
principle are termed “ecocities.” In the administrative unit of an ecocity, there exists
an economically productive and ecologically efﬁcient metabolism, a socially
harmonious culture, and a physically beautiful and functionally vivid landscape.
A wellfunctioning ecocity should be a SocialEconomicNatural Complex
Ecosystem (SENCE) consisting of three subsystems (Wang 1984). The natural
subsystem of an ecocity is material ﬂow of minerals, biomass, water, energy, and land,
which can be symbolized by the ﬁve traditional Chinese elements: metal, wood, water,
ﬁre, and soil. Its economic subsystem includes the components of production,
consumption, reduction, transportation, and regulation. Its social subsystem covers
technology, institutions, and culture (Wang 2005).
Guiyang City, the capital of Guizhou Province, is an example of applying the 3R
principle at the municipal scale.5 Guiyang’s economy used to depend heavily on
natural resources, namely phosphorus, coal and aluminum ores. Industrial
exploitation produced a great deal of waste and pollution. From 1996 to 2003, the
total amount of all pollutants increased from 3.2 million tons to 4.6 million tons. At
this rate of increase, by 2020 the pollution discharge will be triple today’s amount,
threatening the very existence of the city. In response, in 2002 the central government
added the transformation of Guiyang into an ecocity at the top of its agenda.
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Guiyang’s shift toward circular economy has resulted in great progress in both
economic development and environmental protection. The ﬁrst task Guiyang City
undertook was to use technology innovation to change its linear industry to circular
industry. For example, Kaiyang Phosphorus Ore, one of the three phosphorus mining
operations in China, was once a big polluter with an annual polluted water discharge
of nearly one million tons, solid waste weighing 1 million tons, and air pollution of
0.3 billion cubic meters. Thanks to technological innovation, its phosphorus
production increased from 0.6 million tons in 2002 to 3 million tons in 2008, and its
revenue increased from 2.4 to 8 billion RMB. The recycling of yellow phosphorus
contributed greatly to these increases. Now Guiyang has established a new circular
industry structure covering the agricultural, industrial, tourism, and infrastructure
sectors.
The second task the city embarked on was restoring the ecosystems within the city
and the surrounding environment. The two key ecoprojects were the restoration of
the Nanming River and the reforestation of a greenbelt surrounding the city. Guiyang
City has also reformed its environmental policy and law to support its ecocity
building efforts. Guiyang City was the ﬁrst one in China to create an indicator system
for ecocities and pass a local law on ecocities: the Statute on Ecocity Construction of
Guiyang City.
Guiyang City is one of several ecocity experiments initiated since 2002. Currently
the experimentation is occurring at different scales. At the megalopolis level, Beijing,
Tianjin, and Shanghai are promoting ecocity construction. Twenty other smaller
metropolises and thousands of countylevel cities have received approval from the
government to implement ecocity strategies as well.
Table 1 Advantages and weakness of ecocity development in China

Advantages

Challenges

1. High priority in decision making

1. Low ecological public awareness

2. Efficient land use

2. GDPdominated urban sprawl

3. Long tradition of resource
saving and reuse

3. Weak bottomup activities from
NGOs

4. Fewer slums through diversified
service jobs

4. Strong initiation and weak con
tinuity

5. Decentralized ecoengineering
tradition

5. Fragile natural ecosystem and
limited water resource

6. Strong international
cooperation

Professor Wang cautions that China’s ecocity movement has its advantages but
also faces difﬁcult challenges (Table 1). For example, public awareness of the ecocity
movement is currently weak. Because local ofﬁcials are held accountable by their
superiors, not by private citizens, the public lacks interest in the ecocity initiatives put
forth by these ofﬁcials. Yet active public participation is crucial for the success of
ecocity design and management.
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concluding remarks
China is at a crossroad with respect to industrialization, urbanization, and
environmental reform. As public awareness of environmental deterioration increases,
large numbers of private enterprises, cities, and provinces are taking steps toward the
goal of ecocivilization through an ecologically sound development strategy. The
approaches of circular economy and ecocity development offer the best prospects for
China to reconcile the goal of environment stewardship with those of
industrialization and urbanization.

conversation with professor wang on circular economy and
ecocities
Circular economy
What is the precise definition of circular economy?

Circular economy is deﬁned differently under different circumstances. In Japan, the
concept focuses on recycling by consumers. In Germany, the concept focuses on
recycling of wastes. In China, the concept of circular economy is also described in
various ways, such as a “recyclingbased economy” or an economy that fulﬁlls the 3R
principle as discussed above.
The law on circular economy in China goes beyond the concept of recycling,
requiring a network approach and adaptive strategy to deal with situations including
social, natural, and economic factors. It emphasizes totality, integration, human
adaptation to the environment, and selfreliance. In other words, the legal deﬁnition
appears to focus on technical side (products) and less so on enforcement.
Can the green GDP matrix be applied to circular economy?

In general, green GDP calculations are not compatible with the notion of circular
economy. In Professor Wang’s view, green GDP is a bad concept. Green GDP is a
linear, additive approach to integrating environmental costs with economic beneﬁts.
If all environmental losses are considered, the GDP estimates could be negative.
Negative GDP is not realizable. To avoid negative numbers, people have to restrict
damage calculations to a subset of sectors and ignore other sectors. A better approach
is to deﬁne a polygon of indices. You could combine the indices into one measure or
keep track of how the polygon shape is changing over time.
Related to the calculation of green GDP is the importance of educating average
citizens and decision makers on holistic thinking. Since 1840, the single indicator of
wealth has replaced some traditional values, such as family, and cultural and religious
traditions as the indicator of success and social status. Since the introduction of
economic reform in the late 1970s, China has been using GDP as the sole indicator of
social and economic achievement. More recently, however, increasing concern about
environmental deterioration has led to the reevaluation of this development pattern.
Teachers are promoting environmental conscience in young kids. More education is
needed to inﬂuence decision makers. However, this shift from the existing pattern to
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a new approach is undermined by systemic constraints, in particular the inaction of
local governments. Ecology is a hollow slogan without real substance at local levels of
government. To them, the measure of social and economic success is still GDP
growth.
Ecocities
How do people measure ecocity functionality?

The Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) has developed its own indices that
cover environmental, ecological, economic, and institutional indicators for
sustainable cities on both large and small scales. The applicability of these indicators
varies geographically. For example, some of these indicators are more suitable for the
coastal zone than the interior. Some of the MEP ecological indicators include size of
wetland area and its change over time, green land area and structure (i.e. percentage
of native species), and green roofs (in southern China). These indicators are revisited
every 510 years for updating and adjustment. Changes in leadership at the MEP may
cause the redeﬁnition of these indicators. For example, new leadership has the
tendency to create the impression of a “new direction” by relabeling things.
One point of caution is that an overemphasis on greening the landscape can also
give rise to undesirable outcomes. In some places, in order to “green” the city, big
parks are dotted with large trees transplanted from elsewhere, and historic houses are
replaced by eyepleasing modern buildings. (Aware of the importance of cultural
heritage, the city of Yanzhou, Jiangsu Province, took good care of its local community
and historical buildings. Ironically, though, it was not designated as an “ecocity” by
the MEP because of its relatively low GDP.) In some other cities, rooftops are painted
green to create the impression of green space.
Furthermore, ecocity functionality should be realized by institutional change.
Shanghai is the ﬁrst city to replace its old fragmented sectorbysector management
system with a truly integrated bureau of city management.
At which spatial scale is an ecocity optimal?

In China, ecocities vary in size, from towns measuring several kilometers across to
metropolises like Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin. However, since ecocity is a
buzzword, it is misused in almost every sector. For instance, realtors use this concept
as a marketing tool to make expensive housing more appealing to consumers.
At the larger end of this scale range, the designated ecocity zone must contain a
good mixture of ecological towns, each having different functionalities. Within its
administrative boundary there should be urban land and rural land, each requiring a
different ecological strategy. By necessity, every ecocity should set its own priority for the
purpose of planning. For example, the overriding goal of Beijing is water conservation.
How do ecocities and circular industry relate to one another?

The principle of circular industry should be integrated into ecocity development.
One good example is green building with speciﬁcations for energy conservation. In
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Shenzhen, all new buildings must have solar panels in the real estate business.
Another example is ecological sanitation. In the process of urbanization, use of
human waste by farmers as a source of fertilizer, an old practice in rural China, is
discouraged or totally phased out and replaced with a sewage system. This trend is
being reversed in some local communities. Green microﬁnancing, which is used as a
tool to encourage sustainable development in some developing countries, does not
yet exist in China.
How important is public participation in the ecocity movement?

Public participation is crucial to the ecocity movement. At the moment, the public is
not paying much attention, partly because the government retains tight control over
Chinese society. However, in recent years, NGOs and semiNGOs are playing an
increasing role in public participation. SemiNGOs such as the Ecological Society of
China and other professional societies are gaining inﬂuence. Members of these
organizations are critiquing governmental behaviors, raising the public’s
environmental awareness, monitoring and supervising the business sector. In some
instances, the government deliberately delegates tasks such as certiﬁcation,
environmental assessment, and ecolabeling to these semiNGOs.
International cooperation
How should the international community help China develop its circular economy
and ecocities?

International cooperation can provide an infusion of new ideas and knowledge in the
development of circular economy and ecocities. However, such ideas and knowledge
must be adapted to local situations in China, or else they are likely to fail. For
example, some German companies proposed nice ecocity concepts to Shanghai, but
they were difﬁcult to apply, explaining why the ecocity (district) in Shanghai is slow
in making progress. Another example is that in Tianjin, planners responsible for
ecocity construction are all local, with little advanced knowledge. Foreign help is
needed to inspire them.
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CHAPTER 7

Modern Energy Use and Air Pollution
in China: Challenges and
Opportunities*
Professor Jiming Hao
Tsinghua University
Elaine Yu
Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies

chapter summary
Two main challenges lie at the forefront of energy use in China: (1) diminished
national security due to heightened dependence on foreign oil, and (2) increasing
energy demand and limited supplies. In confronting these challenges, China’s
energy path, which is reliant on heavy industrial processes and fossil fuels, will
increasingly affect air quality on a domestic and global level. Growing vehicle
populations, outdated coalfired power plants and other heavy industries are the
primary sources of increasing sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxide (NOx), particulate
matter (PM), volatile organic compounds (VOC), mercury (Hg), and carbon dioxide
(CO2) emissions. These air pollutants emitted from multiple sources over multiple
spatial scales have led to a complexity of interrelated air quality problems—
primarily acid deposition, photochemical smog, ozone, regional haze and reduced
visibility, global mercury dispersion, and climate change. Strategies to maximize
energy production and abate emissions will require targeting industrial processes
for improvements in energy efficiency and strengthening air pollution regulations.
Professor Jiming Hao offers three policy recommendations: (1) develop a national
air pollution control plan based on World Health Organization air pollution targets,
utilizing a multipollutant control strategy and regional coordination system; (2)
regulate total coal consumption in heavily polluted areas; and (3) enhance vehicle
pollution control in China’s megacities.
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introduction
The country that is home to a quarter of the world’s population has been tied to
economic and industrial development over the last thirty years in an urgent quest to
cultivate better living standards. Rushing to center stage as an economic powerhouse,
China is maintaining the trajectory that modern energy use will fuel the nation’s
material economy. Energy from coal, oil, natural gas, solar, wind, biomass,
hydroelectric dams, and nuclear ﬁssion is transmuted into modern comforts such as
heated buildings, improved health facilities, lighting, refrigeration, transportation,
and electronic communication. Empirical studies from the UN Development
Program show a positive correlation between the human development index and a
country’s per capita energy consumption, as well as a positive correlation between
modern energy use per capita and GNP per capita (UNDP 2005). Pursuing this
trajectory, China will unquestionably expand its energy infrastructure to lift poorer,
rural populations in the nation’s western expanse.
The energy used to fulﬁll China’s dream, however, has come with the sizeable cost
of air pollution. Growing vehicle populations, coalﬁred power plants, and other
energyintensive industries such as cement and steel production produce a spectrum
of pollutants—namely sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and particulate matter. These
are the primary causes of local and regional air pollution problems such as acid rain,
photochemical smog, ozone, regional haze and diminished visibility. In addition,
China’s emissions are going global. Greenhouse gases and mercury emitted into the
atmosphere contribute to climate change and mercury deposition in other countries.
China’s current air quality control measures have yet to overcome these challenges.
However, datadriven analysis brings opportunities to strengthen China’s air
pollution regulations and bolster energy use. In this chapter, we provide a brief
diagnostic of current and future energy challenges that the nation faces. We will also
perform a review of China’s current air quality status, which will be followed by a
discussion of three policy recommendations for air quality improvement. Three case
studies are also included to bring the reader up to date on the status of mercury
pollution in China, multiplecontrol strategies, and air quality during the 2008
Beijing Olympic Games.

energy challenges: national security, increasing energy demand,
and limited energy supplies
In recent years, oil has been a focal point in foreign dependency issues, military
tensions, price shocks, and longterm resource scarcity. The United States, for
example, which has a long history of dependence on foreign oil, must rely on military
and political means to protect access to oil reserves abroad. The connection between
energy use and national security was a talking point in President Barack Obama’s
inauguration speech, as he proclaimed, “each day brings further evidence that the
ways we use energy strengthen our adversaries and threaten our planet.” The reality
of transnational terrorism and the violent disruption of oil supplies have led an
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increasing number of national leaders to look toward domestic and renewable
sources of energy in order to forge greater energy independence.
Oil is increasingly fueling China’s economy. Insufﬁcient oil production capacity in
China has left Chinese companies to pursue oil acquisition overseas. To China’s
beneﬁt, the country’s crude oil comes from a diverse portfolio of twentyeight
countries—as of the end of 2008—to feed petroleum demands and moderate risks
(People’s Daily 2009). However, China is nevertheless a nation prone to oil market
instability. Currently about 50 percent of China’s oil imports originate in the Middle
East, while other oil imports come from transitioning economies in Africa, including
civil warafﬂicted Sudan. The Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) has
further intensiﬁed China’s import opportunities in the Middle East by signing a $2.9
billion contract with Iraq, which will allow CNPC to explore and develop an oil ﬁeld
over the next two decades (People’s Daily 2009). China’s oil partnerships may
improve the economic welfare of petroleumexporting nations and provide promise
for China’s energy future, but China may also risk becoming caught in future internal
conﬂicts. China must also wrestle with the prospect that oil imports may not meet
longterm demands for oil consumption, given the nation’s expected rate of vehicle
population growth. In 2007, for instance, China increased its total foreign oil imports
by 12.4 percent over the previous year, while its vehicle output increased by 22.6
percent (Table 1 and Figure 1).
Table 1 Oil production and vehicle output in China
Production in 2007

Percent increase over 2006

Domestic production

187�106 tons

1.87

Imported petroleum

163�106 tons

12.4

Output of vehicles

6.33�106

22.6

Source: Chinese Bureau of Statistics
Figure 1 Trends of coal, petroleum and gas production and consumption in China
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Aside from oil in the energy matrix, China’s energy efﬁciency also deserves
attention. In 2006, China experienced an 8.4 percent increase in primary energy
consumption, using about 1.7 billion tons of oil equivalent that year, equating to 15.6
percent of primary global energy utilization (China Daily 2007). The rural
population of western China, which has yet to enjoy a lifestyle supported by intensive
energy use and urban infrastructure, can double China’s current energy usage. One
straightforward way to improve energy security is to improve energy efﬁciency.
Advancing energy efﬁciency is often less expensive, less ecologically damaging, and
more feasible than building new energy plants. China has made notable
improvements in energy efﬁciency over the past few decades, but the country’s energy
intensity, which is energy consumption relative to total economic output, still
remains high compared to the global average. In 2006, China’s energy intensity was
2.8 times the world average (Figure 2). China’s industry, comprised of heavy sectors
such as steel, cement, and thermal electricity production, and consuming more than
50 percent of the nation’s total energy production, is a formidable obstacle for energy
efﬁciency improvement. Efﬁciency efforts can be maximized by examining sectorby
sector energy savings potential and engaging in international cooperation with
energy efﬁciency leaders such as Japan via platforms such as the JapanChina Energy
Conservation Forum.
Figure 2 Energy intensity in China and the world. Energy intensity is measured in tons of coal equiva
lent (tce) per unit GDP.

Source: Chinese Bureau of Statistics

current air pollution status in china
Air pollution refers to a complex variety of airborne substances in the atmosphere
that originate from multiple sources. Primary pollutants—pollutants that are emitted
directly from a source, such as exhaust pipes and chimneys—include sulfur dioxide
(SO2), oxides of nitrogen (NOx), carbon monoxide (CO), volatile organic
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compounds (VOCs), and carbonaceous and noncarbonaceous particles. Secondary
pollutants—contaminants formed in the atmosphere through chemical reactions—
include ozone and secondary particulate matter (PM). Fossil fuel burning and
industrial processes are the leading culprits of excess emissions in the environment
that combine to produce an assortment of local, regional and global air quality
problems (Figure 3). For instance, PM contributes to regional haze and plays an
important role in climate change, while NOx contributes to climate change, regional
haze, and regional acid deposition (WHO 2005).
Figure 3 Air pollutant species and their contributions to regional air quality problems
Regional
Acid
Rain

Regional Photochemical Pollution

SO2

NOx

PM

VOCs

CO

NH3

Climate
Sensitive
Species

Regional Fine PM Pollution

Source: Elaine Yu

SO2, NOx, and PM deserve close attention for their large contribution to a range
of environmental effects. Although SO2 and NOx can be formed from natural
processes (e.g., SO2 from volcano eruption and NOx from lighting), in much of China
they are largely products of combustion of coal and petroleum for power generation.
PM, on the other hand, comes from a wide variety of sources, comprising a wide
range of chemical compositions. PM is typically classiﬁed by size, from coarse large
particles such as windblown soil to ultraﬁne particles—under 2.5 mm in diameter—
produced in chemical industries (WHO 2005).
Figure 4 Annual average concentrations of air pollutants in Chinese cities, mg/m3
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In China, SO2 and PM emissions are predicted to decrease and NOx emissions are
expected to rise. Currently, NOx levels in Chinese cities are comparable to those of
developed nations, while SO2 and PM10 (particulate matter with diameter less than 10
µm) concentrations are about 46 times the level in developed nations (Hao 2009;
manuscript in preparation). From 1995 to 2005, nationwide total suspended particles
(TSP) and SO2 concentrations decreased due to the rapid phasing out of traditional
coal combustion technology. NOx levels during that time period remained relatively
constant, except for reported increases in southern China, particularly in the Pearl
River Delta (Figure 4; Chapter 11).
Acid rain is largely a product of SO2 and NOx molecules that combine with
atmospheric water to form sulfuric and nitric acids. Acid deposition damages plants,
soil, ﬁsh, and human health, and causes gradual erosion to buildings and historical
monuments. The Chinese Meteorological Science Institute estimates that acid rain
regions (areas with precipitation pH lower than 5.0) accounted for about 3040
percent of China’s landmass from 1993 to 2006 (Hao 2009). Generally this percentage
has remained steady (Figure 5). Some areas with severe emissions even observe pH
levels declining below 4.5. Although the chemicals primarily responsible for acid
deposition are SO2, NOx, and NH3 (ammonia), air pollutant control measures in
China have mainly focused on SO2 abatement (Hao 2009).
Figure 5 The distribution of precipitation pH values in China for 1993, 1998, 2000, and 2006

Source: Hao 2009

Regional haze is a frequent occurrence in China. Dust, smoke, and other particles
produce a brownish haze that impairs visibility and contributes to respiratory health
problems (Figure 6). PM2.5 (particulate matter with diameter less than 2.5 µm)
contributes the most to regional haze and decreased visibility. The average visibility
diminished at a rate of 0.24 kilometers per year in China from 1957 to 2005—an
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approximate loss of 10 kilometers over about ﬁve decades (Hao 2009). The problem
is severe in northern Chinese cities: their PM2.5 levels are 0.080.10 mg/m3, about 56
times the U.S. ambient air quality standard (0.015 mg/m3). Cities in southern China
are a little cleaner: their PM2.5 levels are at 0.04 – 0.07 mg/m3, but are still above the
U.S. air quality standard (Hao 2009).
Figure 6 Changes in regional haze and visibility. The left panels show visibility and air pollution index
(API) in Beijing. The right panels are satellite images showing the change in haze level in the north
eastern region. The two crosses mark the locations of Beijing and Tianjin.

Source: Hao 2009

Low winds, high temperatures, and an abundance of NOx and hydrocarbons in the
air are recipes for groundlevel ozone (O3) pollution and photochemical smog. The
effects of high ozone concentrations include harm to the human respiratory system.
China’s national ozone standard of 93.3 ppb (200 µg/m3) is frequently violated (Hao
2009). For instance, in Beijing in 2005, about one out of ﬁve days was a non
attainment day (Figure 7). In some cities the maximum hourly average often
surpasses the European alarm levels. The Pearl River Delta and Beijing are particular
hotspots for high ozone levels (Hao 2009).
Global pollutants such as mercury (Hg) and carbon dioxide (CO2) are receiving an
increasing amount of attention from the international community. Mercury is
known for its toxic effects on humans and wildlife, and CO2 for its heavy contribution
to the anthropogenic greenhouse effect. China’s contribution to global Hg deposition
has been substantial, and longdistance transport of mercury may actually hamper
domestic efforts in the U.S. to bring the pollution problem into regulatory
compliance (Steding and Flegal 2002; Seigneur et al. 2004). It is estimated that Asia
exported 21 percent of global mercury to the U.S. in 1998 (Seigneur et al. 2004), and
China’s coal industry comprised 25 percent of total global Hg emissions in 1995
(Pacyna et al. 2002). China will also soon surpass the U.S. as the world’s largest
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greenhouse gas emitter. In fact, in 2006 China emitted about 115 million more metric
tons of carbon dioxide than the U.S. (EIA 2006).
Figure 7 Ozone nonattainment days and hours in Beijing

Source: Hao 2009
Box 1: Mercury Pollution in China

Our understanding of mercury emission intensity is improving, but more
research is necessary. An inventory study estimates that in 1999, 536 (±236)
metric tons of mercury were released in China from anthropogenic sources
(Streets et al. 2005). Nonferrous metals smelting, coal combustion, and other
activities (predominately battery, fluorescent lamp, and cement production)
contributed 45 percent, 38 percent, and 17 percent of the country’s Hg
emissions, respectively. Fiftysix percent of
the emitted mercury was in elemental
form (Hg), 32 percent as gaseous divalent
mercury (Hg2+), and 12 percent as
particulate mercury (Hgp) (Streets et al.
2005). Southwest regions of China suffer
the most from mercury contamination in
local rivers and ecosystems. Areas pro
ducing the highest mercury emissions
include smallscale coal burning plants
lacking pollution control technologies in
Guizhou and metal smelting industries in
Liaoning and Guangdong provinces
(Figure 8) (Streets et al. 2005).
Figure 8 (a) Gridded total Hg emissions for the year
1999 (all sources together, 30 x 30 km minimum
resolution, unit: t yr1 per grid cell). (b) Gridded Hg
emissions from coal combustion for the year 1999.
(c) Gridded total Hg emissions from nonferrous
metals smelting for the year 1999
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making better air quality a reality: policy suggestions,
measures, and targets
Even though China’s pollution problems seem daunting, improvement of air quality
is feasible. In this section, we present a set of strategies and recommendations for how
to move forward. Successful air pollution control management requires a national
call to action. The ﬁrst policy suggestion is to develop a national air pollution control
plan. The plan will require: (1) a study of best methodologies for emissions inventory,
(2) scientiﬁcallybased targets and standards, (3) systemic, realtime air quality
monitoring, and (4) a regional and urban air quality management system.
Professor Jiming Hao is a part of an expert group on the State Council of China
that is focused on climate change, energy savings, and pollution emission control.
According to Hao, the China’s strategy for air pollution control indicates that by the
year 2050, most areas in China should meet the WHO guidelines for public health
and ecological safety. Right now, China is in Phase I of meeting these guidelines. By
2020, 95 percent of cities in China should be expected to meet China’s national class
II ambient air quality standard, with some achieving Phase II of the WHO guidelines.
By 2030, 80 percent of Chinese cities should meet the Phase III targets of the WHO
guidelines. By 2050, most cities would be expected to meet the WHO guidelines. To
fully achieve the directive phase targets, SO2 emissions should be reduced by 60
percent from the 2005 level, NOx by 40 percent, PM10 by 50 percent, and VOCs by 40
percent (Table 2).
Table 2 WHO ambient air quality guidelines, µg/m3
PM10
Annual
average

O3
24hour
average

Phase I

70

150

Phase II

50

100

Phase III

30

75

Directive

20

50

8hour
average

NO2
Annual
average

SO2

Hourly
average

Hourly
average

10minute
average

125
160

50
40

100

200
20

500

Because China suffers from numerous air quality problems over several spatial
scales, the cleanup efforts should go beyond minimizing a few airborne pollutants. In
other words, China will need a multipollutant control strategy and a regional
framework. In particular, heavily industrialized regions, such as the Beijing
municipality, the Yangtze River Delta and the Pearl River Delta, should be targeted for
regional coordination (Figure 9). More details on multipollutant regulation
approaches are provided in Box 2, and a case study for regional harmonization to
meet air quality goals is supplied in Box 3.
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Figure 9 A framework for regional coordination
Implementation

Work Plan and Air Pollution Control Target Development at Provincial and City Levels

Regional Air Quality Steering Committee

Air Pollution Control Targets

Science Center

Monitoring

Air Quality Modeling

Emission Inventory

Box 2 Multiple Control Strategy for Primary Pollutants

Sulfur Dioxide (SO2)

1.

Speed up the application of ﬂue gas desulphurization (FGD)
technologies in coalﬁred power plants.

2.

Implement SO2 emissions control in other heavily polluting industries
such as metals manufacturing, cement production, and chemical
fabrication industries.

Nitrogen Oxides (NOx)

1

Thirtysix percent of all NOx
emissions in China come from
thermal power plants.

1.

Amend The Air Pollution Control and Prevention Law to add a clause on
NOx emission control.

2.

Expand the use of selective catalyst reduction (SCR) systems as soon as
possible.

3.

Increase research on NOx emissions inventory and determine long
term measures for NOx abatement.

4. Target thermal power plants for NOx control. In addition to applying
NOx reduction technologies, thermal power units with high NOx emis
sions should be retired.1
Primary Particulate Matter (PM)

1.

Increase the use of washed coal. Ash contained in coal can be removed
to reduce PM.

2.

Control PM in cement and steel industries.
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●

●

●

●

3.

Increasingly retire manufacturing plants that use outdated produc
tion processes.
Recover waste heat from dry kilns for power generation.
Utilize continuous environmental monitoring systems (CEMS) to
measure pollutant density within production.
Install high efficiency dust removal facility.

Install high efficiency dust collectors in power plants and industrial
boilers.
●

Electrostatic air cleaners (ESP) or fabric filters (FF) can be used in
industrial boilers and power plants. Cleaner fuel for boilers such as
natural gas versus coal can also be utilized.

4. Limit open burning of agricultural biomass such as straw and leaves.
5.

Reforest bare land regions to prevent dust storms.

Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs)

1.

Develop VOC emissions control laws and regulations. This includes
issuing a list of VOCs to be targeted by ambient air quality standards.

2.

Reduce VOC emissions by issuing standards for industrial organic sol
vents.

3.

Increase storage and sealing of organic solvents to reduce VOC escape.

4. Prohibit VOC emissions in open air and residential areas particularly
from spraying, sandblasting, and glass and steel production activities.
5.

Require that petroleum stations adopt sealing technologies for VOC
control.

Ozone (O3) and Fine Particulate Matter (PM)

1.

Strengthen research on regional air pollution control strategies.
Research should be directed to technologies and methods for
monitoring and forecasting air quality, including early warning
systems.

2.

Establish scientifically based standards and targets.

3.

Focus on regional coordination and management systems for ozone
and fine PM.

Mercury (Hg) and Carbon Dioxide (CO2)

1.

Improve research and understanding of mercury emissions to deter
mine its global impact, with special attention to the monitoring of
atmospheric Hg and wet deposition.
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Coal burning units with FDG
technology not only have the
ability to capture SO2, but
also to dissolve Hg2+.
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2.

Develop technologies to capture and control Hg and CO2.2

3.

Develop management systems and incentives to reduce Hg and CO2.

4. Increase international collaboration to manage these pollutants and
share strategies for abatement.

Box 3 Managing air quality for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games

The 2008 Beijing Olympic Games were a defining moment for China. The
world was focused not only on global athletes but also on China’s efforts to
improve Beijing’s air quality. Most of the public media focused on the short
term air pollution reduction strategies such as reducing onroad vehicles by
about 30 percent in Beijing and the closing of some factories during the
Games. However, Beijing’s air quality improvement strategy was extensively
planned.
Professor Jiming Hao notes, “Most people see the shortterm [air pollution
reduction efforts] in July and August . . . but for the Olympic Games, China
had been preparing for ten years.” In 1999, Hao visited prior Olympic Games
sites in Los Angeles, California, and Atlanta, Georgia, with Beijing’s
delegation to learn about their air pollution control strategies. The central
government has taken on four main actions for longterm Olympics
preparation: (1) improving energy use—e.g. fueling cooking stoves and small
heating boilers with natural gas instead of coal; (2) requiring new inuse
vehicles to meet European IV emission standards; (3) moving heavy
industries such as steelworks out of Beijing; and (4) implementing ecological
projects in western China for dust control. Researchers concluded that
without the air pollution abatement efforts of the last decade, China could
not have met air quality standards for the Beijing Games.
Prior to the Games, Hao and his colleagues also predicted that regional scale
pollution transport posed a threat to Beijing’s air quality, the level of threat
depending on weather conditions. The community multiscale air quality
(CMAQ) modeling system predicted that 3560 percent of ozone during high
ozone episodes and 34 percent of PM2.5 at the Olympic Stadium originate
from areas outside Beijing (Streets et al. 2006). Surrounding areas such as
Tianjin municipality and Hebei and Shandong provinces were predicted to
contribute significantly to Beijing’s air quality problems. In response, local
neighboring governments took on special initiatives for the Games as well as
for longterm environmental improvements. For instance, Hebei’s provincial
environmental bureau reported fiftysix pollution abatement projects for the
province’s chemical industries, the installation of thirtyfour FGD systems in
power plants, and the construction of twentythree central heating facilities
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to reduce coal consumption—a combined effort projected to cut 550,000
tons of SO2 in the region (Xinhua 2008).
The capital’s clean air strategy was a success. Air quality was much improved
during the Games. Perhaps more importantly, the strategy highlights the role
of regional coordination in air quality management.
A second policy suggestion is to control coal consumption in heavily polluted
areas. Coal is China’s number one source of energy and a signiﬁcant emitter of air
pollutants. The number of coalﬁred power plants in China grew rapidly from 2000
2005 (Zhao et al. 2008). As a consequence, the SO2, NOx and PM emissions increased
by 1.5, 1.7, and 1.2 times, respectively, during this period. Sulfur dioxide emissions
from coalﬁred power plants are expected to decrease by 2010 due to the widespread
installation of ﬂue gas desulphurization (FGD) devices (Table 2). On the other hand,
NOx emissions from coal plants are projected to rise by 39 percent from 20052010
because of a lack of rigorous control measures. Overall PM concentrations in the
Chinese coal industry will decrease in 2010 due to FGD technology, but PM2.5 will
increase to some extent due to the poor ability of FGD technology to control ﬁne
particulates. There are numerous coalﬁred plants less than 300 megawatts in China.
These small plants have no FDG units installed and low combustion efﬁciency, and
they collectively contribute the most to the total Chinese coal emissions. Future
regulations will need to focus on these small polluters as well as larger coalﬁred
plants.
Two steps are recommended to reduce China’s reliance on coal. In the ﬁrst step, all
coalﬁred units under 25 megawatts should retire by 2010. Under this scenario, it is
estimated that SO2, NOx, and TSP would decline by 2173, 622, and 540 kt, respectively
(Zhao et al. 2008). A second step requires that all new coal plants utilize the latest,
most efﬁcient production technology to maximize energy savings and minimize
pollution. Examples of clean technologies include FGD, coal washing, and
gasiﬁcation.
Table 2 Total Chinese coalfired power plant emissions for 2005 and projected emissions for 2010
(kilotons)

SO2
NOx
TSP
PM10

2005
16,097
6,965
2,774
1,842

2010
11,801
9,680
2,540
1,824

% Change
27
+39
8
1

Source: Hao 2009; manuscript in preparation

A third policy suggestion is to improve vehicle pollution control in megacities. In
2007, the number of vehicles reached 160 million, which is roughly twice the vehicle
population in 2002 (Hao 2009). Vehicle emissions can be controlled through a
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number of options tailored to each city, depending on commuter needs and pollution
levels. One suggestion would be to expand subway systems and other forms of public
transit to reduce congestion, reduce emissions, and save fuel. In this regard, valuable
lessons can be learned from the highly utilized, efﬁcient public transportation
systems in other populated countries such as Japan. For instance, cuttingedge
companies such as East Japan Railway, which currently serves large metropolitan
areas such as Tokyo, have introduced a line of fuelcell hybrid railcars to reduce the
impact of onroad transport and capture energy savings (JR East Group 2008).
China should also improve their fundamental inspection and maintenance
program to control vehicle emissions. Strict emission standards should be adhered.
Sulfur content in fuel oil should be reduced. In addition, China can promote “clean
energy” vehicles using marketbased incentives. For instance, fuel taxes on the
automotive industry or heavy taxes on polluting vehicles can stimulate green choices
and encourage public transportation use. Finally, China can cap the total number of
vehicles in heavily congested cities. Cities suffering the most from air pollution may
want to mimic Shanghai’s vehicle population control policy through a license
auctioning system.

summary
China’s goal of economic development rests on secure energy supplies. Oil is expected
to play a large role in its energy mix for decades to come, but dependence on foreign
oil reduces energy security in the midst of increasing energy demand. Energy
efﬁciency improvements in the industrial sector are vital to reducing China’s energy
intensity and can produce immediate energy savings. Sharing technical expertise
through international coordination will also catalyze China’s energy efﬁciency
endeavors.
In incremental steps, China can begin by codifying its leadership’s commitment to
update environmental policies and creating the organizational capacity to effectively
manage air quality. Given the transboundary nature of air pollutants, a national,
multipollutant control strategy with regional harmonization will be crucial. The joint
efforts among neighboring provinces during the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games
demonstrate the feasibility of action to reduce emissions at a regional scale. For
mercury and greenhouse gases, a global synchronized effort will also be key to tackle
the effects of climate change and mercury deposition. Additional details on this
control strategy are provided in Box 2 above.
Coal will remain an abundant domestic source of energy for years to come.
Retiring coalﬁred power plants with low combustion efﬁciency and those without
FDG control units will signiﬁcantly reduce SOx, NOx and TSP levels. New coalﬁred
power plants should be updated to modern efﬁciency and stringent emissions
standards.
Furthermore, the reduction of vehicle emissions in megacities is vital in the face of
rapidly growing demand for cars. Improved inspection and maintenance programs
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for passenger vehicles, use of energy efﬁcient railway systems, and marketbased
incentive policies are among the measures that could be used to achieve a decline in
onroad emissions.
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CHAPTER 8

Pinning Down the Factors: Energy
Conservation and Carbon Emission
Reduction in China*
Professor Xu Zhao
Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Jiaona Zhang
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chapter summary
Now emitting over 6 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide a year, China is an
industrial powerhouse whose actions affect the entire world. In this chapter, we
examine China’s energy and carbon emission patterns and compare these trends
with the United States and the European Union. We identify increased economic
growth, increased energy intensity, and growth in primary and secondary
industries as the major factors behind increased energy consumption, and change
in energy consumption as the main contributor to increased carbon dioxide
emissions.
After examining these trends in production and services, we focus especially on
trends in households, a sector that now accounts for over a third of China’s indirect
energy consumption. We identify urbanization as the main driver behind increased
urban household energy consumption. Technological progress, on the other hand,
corresponds to a drop in both indirect and urban household energy consumption.
This chapter concludes with the recommendation that China should transition to
marketbased policies to induce reductions in energy use, and stresses the
importance of global collaboration in tackling this energy and emissions problem.
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Energy forms the cornerstone of our economy. Energy commodities provide the fuel
that drives our transportation system, heats our homes and ofﬁces, and powers our
factories. In essence, these commodities are the critical inputs to a wide variety of
production processes that drive modern economies. Yet, while energy plays an
indispensable role in our daily lives and is the force that drives our society’s progress,
it also has the potential to slowly degrade the world we live in.
Over the past generation, we have increased our demands for electricity and fuel.
Instead of working to rein in our own consumption and emissions, we feel compelled
to compete for global resources. This unchecked and selfcentered demand for energy
has serious consequences for the health of our environment.
The world market for energy consumption—with current laws and policies
unchanged—is projected to increase by ﬁfty percent from now to 2030.1 Ninety
percent of the total projected growth in consumption will come from nonOECD
countries, and with China ranked only second to the United States in total energy
consumption, much of this growth will come from China. The combustion of fossil
fuels is the main contributing factor to the release of greenhouse gases into the
atmosphere. Therefore, increased energy consumption will inevitably lead to
increased greenhouse effects. With China consuming more and more coal—the most
carbonintensive of energy sources—growing energy consumption in China will
negatively impact the health of our planet.
This chapter examines China’s energy consumption trends over the past thirty
years and breaks that consumption down by sector. Using decomposition analysis, we
identify the main factors driving increased energy consumption and carbon dioxide
emissions. We then shift our focus to households and energy, identifying the main
drivers of increased indirect household energy consumption and urban household
energy consumption. Finally, by way of conclusion, we discuss mechanisms to
address China’s—and the world’s—growing energy needs.

energy consumption patterns
“To understand what is happening and where we want to go, we need to look
at the data and the trends they exhibit.” – Professor Xu Zhao
Over the past thirty years, energy consumption in China has risen quickly. From 1978
to 1996, energy consumption increased steadily at an average rate of 42 million TCE
(tons of coal equivalent) per year. From 1997 to 2000, energy consumption rose at a
slower average rate of 17 million TCE per year. Then, from 2001 to 2007, energy
consumption increased dramatically. In 2001, energy consumption was at 1.35 billion
TCE, and just six years later, in 2007, energy consumption had almost doubled to 2.65
billion TCE. This translates into an increase of 217 million TCE on average per year, a
much faster rate than the previous rate of increase between 1978 and 1996.
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Figure 1 Energy consumption in China from 1978 to 2006
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What has caused this trend of increased energy consumption? In analyzing the
forces producing this change, we examine the following ﬁve factors: economic
growth, energy intensity, industrial structure, sectoral structure, and urbanization.
While these factors are not exhaustive, together they form a model that reﬂects the
concerns that people typically have in mind. Usually when analyzing industrial
energy consumption, the most common factors that are examined include intensity
and structural effect. Thus, it makes sense to include energy intensity, industrial
structure, and sectoral structure in our model as relevant factors. Additionally, we are
concerned about economic development and population growth and their potential
impacts on energy consumption, and therefore we include them in our model as well.
Throughout this chapter, economic growth is measured in GDP per capita, and
energy intensity is deﬁned as units of energy per unit of GDP. Using 1978 price levels,
we calculated data for real GDP per capita in thousands of yuan and energy
consumption per capita in tons of standard coal. In our analysis, “industrial
structure” refers to the proportions of total output produced by the country’s
primary, secondary, and tertiary industries. “Sectoral structure” refers to the
proportions of output produced by each individual sector within the primary,
secondary, and tertiary industry categories. As deﬁned by Chinese statistical
yearbooks, the country’s primary industries include the following sectors: farming,
ﬁshing, forestry, animal husbandry, ﬁshing, and water conservancy. China’s
secondary industries include mining and quarrying, manufacturing, construction,
and production and supply of electric power, gas, and water. The country’s tertiary
industries include all service sectors. Finally, we measured urbanization using the rate
of population growth in an urban area, which was deﬁned by an increase in the
density of manmade structures in comparison to the surrounding area.
Using a cointegrated regression model, we then analyzed these ﬁve factors and
their relationship with energy consumption. Theoretically, when we regress a time
series variable on another time series variable, we obtain spurious results. Behavior
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would be time dependent, and thus the results we get would be falsely signiﬁcant and
inapplicable in general terms. Cointegration regression, however, allows us to
analyze these nonstationary time series variables. Through this method, the linear
combination of these variables is stationary, and we can cancel out their non
stationary characteristic.
Using our cointegrated regression model, we determined that increased energy
consumption was correlated with economic growth, increased energy intensity, and
growth in primary and secondary industries.2 Out of these three relationships
between energy consumption and our other factors, we found that the greatest
correlation existed between increased energy consumption and increased energy
intensity. Increased economic growth was also highly correlated with energy
consumption. On the other hand, our regression test revealed that there was little
correlation between China’s rising energy consumption and changes in its tertiary
industries or level of urbanization.
After identifying the general relationships between energy consumption and its
contributing factors, we sought to determine the extent of each factor’s contribution
through decomposition analysis, a technique that breaks down the changes in one
variable into the changes in its determinants. We picked Log Mean Divisia Index
(LMDI), a method of structural decomposition that uses a logarithmic mean weight
function and gives perfect decomposition by accommodating zero values in the data set.3
Figure 2 Results of decomposition analysis of factors contributing to increased energy consumption
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Figure 2 displays the results of our decomposition analysis. It shows that economic
growth has the largest positive effect on energy consumption, while declining energy
intensity has the largest negative effect on energy consumption. This means that
China’s energy consumption has primarily increased because of its economic
development, and any decrease in overall consumption was largely caused by a
decline in energy intensity. The results also show that changes in industrial structure
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and population contributed to increased energy consumption, although their
inﬂuence on energy consumption is less than that of economic growth.
Thus, as population has increased, and industrial structure has shifted from
primary industry to a greater focus on secondary industry, energy consumption has
gone up. Meanwhile, change in sectoral structure has corresponded to a decrease in
energy consumption, although its impact on decreasing energy consumption is less
than that of declining energy intensity. Thus, China’s shift from more energy
intensive sectors to less intensive ones, combined with the country’s increased
efﬁciency in production processes has worked to decrease energy consumption.
Knowing that industrial and sectoral structures are large contributors to increased
energy consumption, we move on to examine how energy consumption breaks down
by sector. This understanding of how consumption in each sector contributes to
overall energy consumption gives policy makers an idea of which sectors to target
with regulations and incentive schemes.
Figure 3 Breakdown of energy consumption by sector
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Figure 3 shows the breakdown of energy consumption. Industry has been the
dominant consumer of energy over the years, as industrial energy consumption is
nearly twothirds of total energy consumption each year from 1987 to 2006. Looking
speciﬁcally at 2006, industry occupied 71 percent of all energy consumption. In
contrast, household consumption occupied 10 percent of total energy consumption.
The transportation and telecom sector occupied about 8 percent, and the ﬁnal 11
percent was mainly comprised of construction, retail, agriculture, and ﬁshing.
A more detailed look at trends of energy consumption within speciﬁc sectors
shows that agricultural energy consumption has not changed much over the past
twenty years, while energy consumption in transportation and telecom has exhibited
more dramatic changes. The agriculture and ﬁshery sector has experienced an
average increase of 5 percent per year for the last twenty years. On the other hand,
energy consumption from transportation and telecom exhibited an average increase
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of 20 percent per year over the same period. It is this increase in energy consumption
from the transportation and telecom sector that contributed greatly to China’s total
rise in energy consumption.

carbon emission patterns
China’s rising energy consumption has been accompanied by increased energy
related carbon dioxide emissions. As China’s total energy consumption has risen to
over 2.5 billion TCE, China’s percentage of the world’s total carbon dioxide emissions
has increased from less than 10 percent in 1990 to 19 percent in 2005. Thus, by 2005
China had exceeded all other countries in emissions, with the exception of the United
States, which represented 21 percent of the global total.
Figure 4 Country comparison of energyrelated carbon dioxide emissions
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Figure 4 shows this marked increase in China’s emissions and compares China’s
trend with seventeen other countries: the United States, Russia, Japan, India,
Germany, Canada, the United Kingdom, South Korea, Italy, Iran, South Africa,
France, Saudi Arabia, Austria, Mexico, Spain, and Brazil. From Figure 4, we can see
that all countries—except for China, the United States, and Russia—have consistently
produced 5 percent or less of the world’s total carbon emissions since the 1990s. Out
of the three countries with emissions of over 5 percent of the global amount, China
is the only country whose percentage of global emissions have risen overall from 1990
to 2005. Both the United States and Russia exhibited decreases in total emissions.
The most recent statistics released by the Energy Information Administration
(EIA) show that China has overtaken the United States in total carbon emissions. In
2006, China emitted 6.018 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide, while the United
States emitted 5.903 billion metric tons. To enhance the comparison, Europe emitted
4.721 billion metric tons, and Russia emitted 1.704 billion metric tons, making China
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the clear leader in annual carbon dioxide emissions.4 It is, however, important to keep
in mind that while China leads in total carbon dioxide emissions, this total emissions
amount is largely an effect of China’s immense population. China’s per capita carbon
dioxide emissions are actually less than the European Union as well as the United
States. Per capita carbon dioxide emissions for China, the EU, and the United States
were at roughly about 5, 10 and 20 tons of CO2 per capita in 2004.5
What has led to this trend of increased carbon dioxide emissions in China? In
analyzing the causes of increased emissions, we examine the following three factors:
energy consumption, the fossil energy proportion, and the structure of fossil energy.
These factors were chosen because they are known to be linked to carbon dioxide
emissions. Energy consumption results in the release of carbon dioxide into the
atmosphere, and energy structure also has an impact on emissions, since carbon
dioxide is emitted in varying amounts depending on the source. Again, while these
factors are not exhaustive, they seem the most relevant according to previous
scientiﬁc studies and popular concern.
Using cointegrated regression, we found that carbon dioxide emissions were
positively correlated with energy consumption. Thus, as we would expect, with
increased energy consumption, carbon dioxide emissions also increased. As for fossil
energy proportion and the structure of fossil energy, both were negatively correlated
with energy consumption. The increase of energy consumption corresponded to a
decrease in fossil energy proportion and little change in fossil energy structure.
After identifying the general relationship between increased carbon dioxide
emissions and its contributing factors, we sought to determine the extent of each
factor’s contribution using decomposition analysis. Figure 5 displays the results of
our analysis. Out of the three factors, we can see that increased energy consumption
was the biggest contributor to increased carbon dioxide emissions from 1984 to 2006.
On the other hand, change in fossil energy proportion and structure of fossil energy
had a negative impact effect on emissions. Thus, as the amount of fossil fuels China
used in proportion to total energy sources decreased, emissions went down. These
two factors, however, have had a much smaller impact on carbon dioxide emissions
than energy consumption.
Our examination of the factors contributing to increased carbon dioxide
emissions showed us that energy structure plays a role in the amount of carbon
dioxide we release into the air. Comparing 1978 and 2006, we can see that China’s
energy structure has remained relatively constant. In 1978, the energy structure was as
follows: 71 percent coal, 23 percent petroleum/oil, 3 percent natural gas, and 3 percent
hydro, nuclear, and wind. In 2006, the energy structure was notably similar: coal
occupied 70 percent, petroleum/oil 20 percent, natural gas 3 percent, and hydro,
nuclear, and wind 7 percent. From this comparative breakdown, we can see that the
main difference lies in a shift away from fossil fuels and towards nuclear and
renewable energy; the percentage of coal and oil in China’s overall energy structure
has decreased, while hydro, nuclear, and wind have increased.
China’s energy structure is similar to countries such as the United States and India
in that it is highly dependent on coal and oil. In general, energy structure depends on
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resource endowment and policy. Each country has its unique resource endowment,
which leads to speciﬁc policies and resulting distinctive energy structures across
countries. For example, the EU depends heavily on nuclear power as its source of
energy. China’s change in structure now includes more renewable and nuclear energy.
However, China is still far from adopting energy structures similar to European
countries.
Figure 5 Results of decomposition analysis of factors contributing to increased carbon dioxide
emissions
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household energy consumption
Trends in production and services are not the only patterns of interest. Households
—having exhibited an annual growth rate of 10 percent of total consumption since
1999—now account for over a third of China’s indirect energy consumption.
Therefore, to tackle China’s growing energy needs, we must understand the trends
within household energy consumption.
Household energy consumption (HEC) includes both direct and indirect energy
consumption. Households consume energy either directly through lighting, heating,
cooking, electricity use, and petroleum consumption for personal travel, or indirectly
by consuming goods and services that require energy input in their production. Over
the years, indirect energy consumption has risen in China. Urban households
consume most of their energy indirectly, and as the number of urban households has
increased, total indirect energy consumption has also gone up.
This growth in indirect energy consumption warrants further examination. Let us
ﬁrst discuss the sources of direct versus indirect energy. Rural households consume
more energy directly than indirectly, while urban households consume more energy
indirectly than directly. Furthermore, rural households are the main contributors to
direct energy consumption, while urban households are the main contributors to
overall indirect energy consumption in China. For example, indirect energy
consumption of urban households constituted 78–86 percent of total urban HEC,
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while direct energy consumption of rural households constituted 54–66 percent of
total rural HEC in 2006. Two factors related to urban households have resulted in
increased indirect energy consumption. First of all, China has undergone growth in
its urban centers, and as the number of urban households increases, so does total
indirect energy consumption. The other factor is that urban residents are consuming
greater amounts of products and services that constitute indirect energy
consumption in that they require energy input in their production. Examples of these
products include personal vehicles, cell phones, and electronic equipment.
We need, however, a more rigorous analysis of the factors contributing to the trend
of increased indirect household energy consumption. Again using decomposition
analysis, we analyzed the factors causing change in indirect HEC during the period
from 1997 to 2002. Through our analysis, we found that the major contributors to
change in indirect HEC were technological progress and increased consumption.
Technological progress corresponded to a 37 percent drop in indirect household
energy consumption, while increased consumption corresponded to a 42 percent
increase in indirect household energy consumption. Additionally, indirect household
energy consumption rose with the increased proportion of urban household
consumption.
Digging deeper, we use structural decomposition analysis to identify the forces
driving the change in urban household energy consumption. Through our analysis,
we ﬁnd that urban HEC was largely caused by urbanization and technological
change. Urbanization acted as a positive driving force, while technological change
acted as a negative driving force. This analysis is important, because based on
expected trends in urbanization we can predict the direction of future changes in
urban household energy consumption. We expect urbanization to continue as the
income of Chinese residents grows and more people move into the cities. This
income growth will also increase the size of the urban elite, a group that currently
makes up about 10 percent of the Chinese population but consumes more than 20
percent of total indirect HEC. Thus, with this income growth and rapid urbanization,
we expect urban HEC and total indirect HEC to increase in the years to come.
There is hope, however, for the expected increase in indirect energy consumption
to taper off. As people spend their increased income on more products, indirect
energy consumption is expected to increase. However, if people allocate their money
to ﬁnancial markets—abstract entities that consume less direct and indirect energy—
urban households will consume less energy overall. Thus, if consumption structure
shifts toward products offered in the tertiary industry, we may see trends in energy
consumption that ameliorate the expected rise.

discussion
Economic growth and carbon emission reductions: Mutually exclusive?

“So is there a tradeoff between growth and conservation?” –Professor Xu Zhao
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When we decomposed the factors contributing to increased energy consumption, we
saw that economic growth was the biggest positive force. Then, when we decomposed
the factors contributing to carbon dioxide emissions, we saw that increased energy
consumption was the most important contributor. Thus, all else equal, economic
growth is positively correlated with carbon emissions. Knowing this relationship, it
may seem like we face a tradeoff between economic growth and energy conservation.
Thus emerges the resistance that developing countries such as China exhibit toward
potential emission reduction mandates, for they believe that it will come at the cost
of hindering their economic growth. However, a tradeoff between growth and
conservation assumes that we cannot do anything to inﬂuence the other
determinants of energy consumption and carbon dioxide emissions. Our analyses
revealed that increased energy efﬁciency and sectoral shifts also have an effect on
energy consumption. Therefore, by creating policy that shapes the other
determinants of carbon emissions, we do not have to slow down growth in order to
protect our environment.
Transforming China’s energy structure: Expected resistance

“Shifting the energy structure in China will be met with resistance.”
–Professor Xu Zhao
A country’s energy structure depends on its energy endowment, and China’s resource
endowment discourages shifting toward sources other than coal and oil—sources that
would result in reductions in carbon dioxide emission reductions. Since China has an
abundance of coal, shifting the energy structure toward more solar, wind, hydro, and
nuclear power—or any other component that is not coal—will face both resource
constraints and political resistance. One key to reducing emissions in China is
changing attitudes. We need to help people understand that there is not always a one
toone tradeoff between growth and emission reductions, and we also need to think
of creative ways to overcome energy endowment constraints, and, most importantly,
the political and social attitudes resistant to changing China’s energy structure.
Marketbased policies

“We want to use energy price to adjust industry behavior.” —Professor Xu Zhao
China’s current policies induce action through compulsory, rather than incentive
based, measures. Yet, these compulsory policies retain inefﬁciencies that would
otherwise be eliminated by market forces. For example, the Chinese government sets
too low a fee for pollution, and only by letting the market determine the fee can we
internalize these externalities. Thus, the best way for China to reach its goal of lower
energy intensity may be through marketbased measures. Potential strategies include
price mechanisms, taxes, emission trading, and contracting energy management.
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Price mechanisms include releasing current price caps on goods, e.g. oil, and
allowing prices to ﬂuctuate to reﬂect the accurate market price—the price where there
is equilibrium between demand and supply. Taxes include carbon taxes and
environmental taxes, where polluters must pay a fee for emitting carbon or other
pollutants that damage the environment. Emissions trading entails determining
standards for emissions, allocating carbon credits, and creating a carbon market.
Finally, contracting energy management involves hiring foreign companies that
specialize in overseeing and allocating energy resources to work with Chinese
companies, or to train the domestic labor force in energy management practices.
As for the ﬁrst tool, price mechanisms, there exists the risk of social instability. If
the central government released its cap on energy prices, the cost of fuel will go up
and inputs that rely on fuel will become more expensive. As input prices increase, the
price of most goods will go up. Currently, China has price caps on many goods, from
electricity to water, medicine, and public transportation. The Chinese central
government, which prioritizes maintaining a “harmonious society,” is averse to
releasing these price caps because of the social instability that will ensue in response
to these increased prices. Further research needs to be done on this topic to determine
the effects of letting energy prices ﬂuctuate with the market. The hope is that the
release of energy price will adjust industry behavior, thus contributing to lower
energy consumption and a reduction in carbon emissions.
Taxes can also be an effective tool. In administering a carbon tax, one
recommendation is to tax carbon in the coal, oil, and gas extraction and mining
sectors. By levying the carbon tax upstream of the industrial production chain, we
reduce the administrative cost of imposing such a tax. The cost will automatically
carry through in the products of downstream industries, such as chemical and
manufacturing industries that use coal or oil. Furthermore, this type of carbon tax
would have the added beneﬁt of increasing environmental consciousness in these
downstream industries. These industries will learn to factor the carbon content of
different fuels into their decisions, and they may shift toward cleaner substitutes.6
Finally, as for emissions trading, there have already been some efforts in China to
employ this tool. In 1999, China’s State Environmental Protection Administration
collaborated with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and started pilot
programs to reduce SO2 emissions. Two cities were chosen as the ﬁrst stage: Nantong in
Jiangsu Province, and Benxi in Liaoning. Later on, Shandong, Shanxi, Jiangsu, Henan,
Shanghai, Tianjin, and more cities also joined the program. The results so far have been
mixed. One barrier this program faces is that there is not a national standard in place,
even though there are provincial or municipal level legislations and regulations. A
second barrier is a lack of enforcement of these regional caps on emissions. Finally,
there has been a conﬂict of interest between the goal of economic growth at the
provincial level and the emission reduction target. Under this program, emission
reduction is only a “nice” thing to have, whereas “economic growth” is the primary
criterion for evaluating provincial governments. As a result, environmental goals are
often sacriﬁced for the sake of economic growth. The shortcomings of these efforts
contain important lessons for future emissions trading systems. These pilot programs
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have demonstrated the importance of setting a national standard, having good
enforcement mechanisms, and internalizing environmentalism in incentive schemes.
Moving forward, we face the question of whether a tradable carbon emission
permit would be effective, and if so, how to properly design this mechanism. From
our examination of the mechanism, we see that the key to effectively designing any
marketbased mechanism is to have an accurate estimate of the marginal social cost
and marginal social beneﬁt. If the price of energy is artiﬁcially low, then the cost of
using one more unit of energy is going to be lower than the true cost, and people will
overconsume energy. Thus, it is imperative to the success of any marketbased tool
that the price is set such that marginal cost equals marginal beneﬁt.
The global effort

“This is a global problem, and collaboration is key.” –Professor Xu Zhao
China’s energy consumption has reached 19 percent of the world’s energy
consumption. Environmental issues in China are now more than just a domestic
issue—they have become a global problem.
Domestic efforts and goals can be summarized by the FiveYear Plan, which aims
to reduce emissions by 20 percent in 2010. Last year, China did not reach its goal to
reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 4 percent, and it seems that these plans are more
of an aspiration than a manageable reality. The transfer of manufacturing from
foreign countries to China may be aggravating this problem, as multinationals pursue
cheaper labor costs in the great China region. While we do not know the exact impact
of this shift—and it is another topic for further research—it is likely that it has a
negative impact on the decline of energy intensity, as it brings highenergy operations
to the mainland. Thus, with international actors on and inﬂuencing the scene,
emissions reduction in China requires a globally coordinated effort.

conclusion
In this chapter, we examined China’s energy and carbon emission patterns. We saw
that increased economic growth, increased energy intensity, and growth in primary
and secondary industries have been major contributors to increased energy
consumption, and change in energy consumption has been the biggest driving force
behind increased carbon dioxide emissions.
We especially looked at energy consumption trends in households, as this sector
now accounts for over a third of China’s indirect energy consumption. Similar to
trends in the industrial sector, we found that increased indirect household energy
consumption (HEC) has been mainly caused by increased consumption. However,
households also diverge from industrial sector trends in a couple of ways. For
example, urbanization was a key driver behind increased urban HEC, as well as
technological progress, which corresponded to a drop in both indirect and urban
household energy consumption.
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This chapter concludes with the recommendation that China transition to market
based policies to induce reductions, and we wish to stress the importance of global
collaboration in tackling this energy and emissions problem that is without borders.
Identifying the key factors that have an impact on energy consumption and carbon
dioxide emissions in China has pointed out the direction of future efforts to reduce
energy consumption and emissions. The best path to ﬁx these problem areas is still
an uncertain road ahead, but it is one that we now know must be navigated hand in
hand through more research, program trials, and most importantly, with open minds
and a greater concern for the wellbeing of our future world.
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CHAPTER 9

Wildlife Conservation in Western China*
Professor Richard Harris
University of Montana
Alison Hoyt
Yale College

chapter summary
Eastern and western China have very different climates, population densities, and
livelihoods. As a result, distinct conservation models are appropriate in these two
regions. Pastoralism (herding and grazing animals) is the primary livelihood in
China’s west. This extensive land use allows humans and wildlife to coexist. This
chapter explores current Chinese views toward wildlife as a basis for
understanding Chinese conservation, and then addresses the current state of
wildlife management in western China. Finally, it makes recommendations for the
future of wildlife conservation.

overview of western china
Geography, culture, and wildlife vary dramatically from eastern to western China.
The two regions are separated by their climates, population densities and livelihoods.
To the east, high rainfall and a moist climate make agriculture possible. To the west,
arid highlands make agriculture difﬁcult even with intensive irrigation. As a result,
pastoralism is the dominant livelihood in the west.
It is appropriate to design and implement distinct conservation models in eastern
and western China to reﬂect the different land usage in the two areas. China’s
population is densely concentrated in eastern China’s agricultural regions. High
population densities mean that the only way to protect eastern wildlife, such as
pandas, is to set aside clearly delineated reserves. Western China, on the other hand,
is characterized by relatively sparse pastoralist populations. Unlike eastern China’s
intensive agriculture and dense population centers, this form of human land use does
not necessarily preclude having wildlife on the land as well. Many wild species are
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capable of dealing with some level of human involvement. Their survival is not
limited to clearly delineated reserves. This has a profound impact on the types of
wildlife conservation that are possible in western China.
Figure 1 Map of mainland China, showing precipitation isopleths (shading) and highly concentrated
areas of human population. Areas north and west of the solid line cannot support agriculture in the
absence of irrigation, and therefore meet Harris’s definition of western China.

China is home to a diverse range of biomes and an enormous number of species.
It is considered a “megadiversity” country, ranking second worldwide in its number
of mammal species and fourth in its number of reptile species (Harris 2008). China
boasts much greater species diversity than North America. Arid western China has
less biodiversity than the east, but is still home to an impressive array of terrestrial
vertebrates. It has a wealth of bird species, from hawks, falcons, and eagles to upland
birds such as the whiteeared pheasant and the Himalayan snowcock. Western China
has an especially unique wealth of large mammals (Figure 2). Four species of gazelle
roam the alpine meadows (Figure 3).
Figure 2 Tibetan wild asses (for Latin names of species in this chapter, refer to Harris 2008)

Photograph courtesy of Milo Burcham of Cordova, Alaska
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Figure 3 A young male Przewalski’s gazelle

Photo credit: Richard Harris

Figure 4 A wild yak bull

Photograph courtesy of Milo Burcham of
Cordova, Alaska

Wild yak (Figure 4) and argali, or wild sheep, are impressive grassland species. The
chiru, an antelopelike goat, stands as the emblem of the Tibetan Plateau. Blue sheep,
Himalayan tahr, and Asiatic ibex are comfortable along the rocky cliffs. Snow
leopards are still present in many mountain chains. Today, this diverse fauna suffers
from increasing population and development pressures.

“There is, put simply, quite a lot to conserve, and put more darkly, quite a lot
at risk.” –Richard Harris
Much like the geography of the two regions, the people of western China are
different from the people of eastern China. Han Chinese are a minority in western
China, and there are many Tibetans, Mongolians, Kazakhs, and people of other ethnic
groups. While Chinese is still the dominant language, many other languages are also
spoken. The political system in the area operates just like the rest of China.
The predominance of pastoralism in western China has implications for grassland
preservation and species conservation. Traditional practices form a foundation for
sustainable use. However, due to increasing market pressures, rangeland degradation
has become a growing problem (Figures 5 and 6). Although overgrazing is clearly
recognized as the primary cause of rangeland degradation, the drivers of overgrazing
behavior are not fully understood. Traditionally, subsistence pastoralists faced with a
market economy have been susceptible to overgrazing pressures. While they receive
increasingly higher prices for the products they trade, they have no feedback
mechanism built into their society to deal with overgrazing. As a result, overgrazing
has caused changes to grassland species composition in many areas, and most species
whose habitat needs overlap with human needs are generally doing poorly. In contrast,
some species whose habitat needs have little overlap with humans continue to thrive.
The “Great Opening of the West,” a national strategy to prioritize the development
of China’s poor rural western regions, also has signiﬁcant implications for wildlife.
This development has focused on building infrastructure such as bridges and
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highways, although mining has also been encouraged in the area. While some believe
this plan was conceived strictly for poverty alleviation, others see it as a government
strategy to exert more control on these farﬂung regions. This view is based on the
concept that those who are currently enjoying a standard of living closer to what is
available in eastern China are less likely to rebel or complain about their lifestyles.
Whatever the motivation for the development, the impacts on wildlife are clear. A
more crowded, motorized, and industrialized society makes life for wildlife much
more difﬁcult. Regions that were previously protected by their remoteness are losing
that sense of security. As a result, future wildlife management will need to more
actively balance the increasingly overlapping needs of humans and wildlife.
Ecological values are emphasized in the Great Opening of the West and highlight the
region’s pristine waters and open grasslands. However, the development strategy is
worrisome for wildlife. Propaganda often addresses wildlife as something to be done
away with, promoting an idealized picture of the west that resembles eastern China.
However, in order to preserve the unique wildlife of China’s west as an asset for the
future, alternative models of development will need to be considered.
Figure 5 Jianshe Township in Aksai County, Gansu, shows the effects of excessive livestock use on arid
rangelands

Photo credit: Richard Harris

chinese perceptions of wildlife
“Now is the time for more purposeful management.” –Richard Harris
To best understand the future of wildlife conservation in China, it is important to
understand the dominant views of wildlife in Chinese society. Conservation does not
exist in a cultural background in China. The dominant view toward wildlife among
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Chinese is a utilitarian one. Wildlife has historically been used for food and compo
nents of wildlife for traditional Chinese medicine. As Chinese culture continues to
change, fewer people are interested in these practices. However, this shift is a gradual
one, as evidenced by the Chinese government’s supportive policies toward consump
tion of wildlife products. Demand for wildlife products continues. However, it is ille
gal to kill or otherwise exploit these animals in the wild. As a result, there has been a
shift toward captive breeding to produce animal products. Rather than reducing
demand for wildlife products, many originally wild species are now being farmed to
meet demand for wildlife products. Wild counterparts can then be left untouched in
protected nature reserves.
The utilitarian perspective on wildlife often evokes a negative reaction among
North Americans, who have historically prided themselves on eliminating demand
for wildlife products. However, use of wildlife products in China is deeply rooted in
the culture. Unlike in North America, medicinal uses of wildlife have a strong
historical and cultural presence in China. While many North Americans disapprove
of the utilitarian approach to wildlife, the utilitarian perspective in itself does not
mean that Chinese people view wildlife in a negative light. Rather, it is simply a
reﬂection of the attitude that wildlife products can be put to many human uses. Quite
the opposite of a negative view toward wildlife, this utilitarian attitude offers a strong
basis for conservation.
There is a subordinate mode of appreciating wildlife among many Chinese which
is classiﬁed as dominionistic or aesthetic (Harris 2008).1 This is a positive, but
paternalistic attitude toward wildlife. For example, many Chinese view wildlife as
something soft and cuddly. This attitude is apparent in propaganda encouraging
people to love, learn about, and care for wildlife. One such poster shows a girl holding
a tiger cub, an image which resonates among many Chinese. While the idea it
represents is unrelated to conservation of wildlife in the wild, it has inﬂuenced
Chinese wildlife conservation policy. Current policy focuses a large percentage of
funds on captive breeding programs to protect wildlife species for future generations
within breeding centers (Harris 2008).
“There is a tendency to view wildlife as something we want to cuddle and
take care of as opposed to something we appreciate for its ability to take care
of itself in its own natural environment.” –Richard Harris
Confucian Optimism and Unity are two concepts prevalent in Chinese society.
According to these beliefs, educated citizens can communicate and will eventually
come to agreement. Harris views Chinese governance as a reﬂection of these beliefs.
He feels that part of the reason the autocratic system has remained in China is
because citizens feel that wise leaders will know what is best for everyone.
These concepts of Confucian Optimism and Unity are also apparent in Chinese
wildlife conservation. “Protecting wildlife is really just protecting mankind itself ” is a
common mantra among wildlife conservationists in China. This reﬂects the Chinese
view that wildlife is beneﬁcial to humans. While this sounds good, it is not necessarily
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true, except for over very long timescales and very broad geographic areas. Wildlife
conservation is fundamentally about compromise between wildlife’s needs and
humans’ demands. In western China, these tensions play out as pastoralists’ herds graze
on limited grassland resources shared with wildlife and as pastoralists protect their
herds from attack by wolves. Wildlife conservation is a balancing act between these two
groups. Often their conception of Unity makes Chinese unwilling to admit that wildlife
conservation involves allocation of resources to one group at a cost to another.
Pastoralist minority cultures have very different views of nature than Han
Chinese. These pastoralist cultures depend on their livestock and the meadows they
graze. This direct dependence on natural resources for survival provides a historical
and cultural basis for sustainability. Many Americans and Europeans view Tibetan
Buddhists as the pristine protectors of nature. While their lifestyle does rely on
ecological wisdom, few Tibetan pastoralists are the idealized vegetarians and
conservationists that westerners imagine. Quite to the contrary, hunting wildlife,
killing of their own herd for food, and use of other natural resources are fundamental
aspects of the pastoral livelihood (Huber 1991). There is also a basis for sustainable
use among Kazakh and Muslim pastoralists, as the Koran instructs them to use
resources wisely and not to overuse.
Figure 6 Grasslands in Gouli, Dulan County, Qinghai

Photo credit: Richard Harris

chinese wildlife management today
The Chinese government has taken many important steps to manage wildlife and its
habitat through the implementation of various laws and programs. For instance, the
National Wildlife Law of 1988 is the primary law that regulates and provides legal
protection to wildlife, and it is popularly quoted in all books on the subject. An
extensive network of nature reserves has also been created to protect wildlife habitat,
while captive breeding centers have allowed rare species to reproduce in a protected
environment. However, these many efforts lack the cohesion and structure which
would allow them to function as a uniﬁed wildlife management system.
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The National Wildlife Law provides two lists of critical species, and killing of these
species is strictly prohibited. Scientiﬁc use is one exception. However, even in this case
it is difﬁcult to obtain a permit. Many have drawn parallels between the two lists of
species included in China’s National Wildlife Law and those of the U.S. Endangered
Species Act. However, Harris sees many differences between the two documents, and
believes that any similarities, such as the two lists, are accidental (Harris 2008).
The fact that the law prohibits the killing of any listed species seems to have the
best interest of wildlife at heart. However, this uniform ban across all species may in
fact have detrimental effects on wildlife. Harris argues that while total prohibition is
necessary for species such as a tiger or panda, some species on the lists are abundant
enough to tolerate some level of sustainable use. While bans on hunting sound good,
they may be a mixed blessing for conservation. By prohibiting use of these relatively
abundant species, local people are completely shut off from their traditional use of
wildlife and lose their stake in wildlife conservation. The result is a law that tends to
disenfranchise local people rather than involve them.
“This blanket national ban simply alienates people who have a tradition of
using those species.” —Richard Harris

Figure 7 Yeniugou, an important area for Tibetan Plateau wildlife in the Kunlun Mountains

Photo credit: Richard Harris

The National Wildlife Law thus provides some strict regulations. However, it is not
accompanied by the resources necessary to create a system of enforcement. For
example, the law has no mechanisms to reduce poaching. There is no funding in place
for general enforcement, or for a corps of wardens to patrol. Most importantly, the
law focuses on protection in the narrow sense and does not have mechanisms for
habitat protection.
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China’s extensive network of nature reserves is another central component of the
country’s current wildlife management. Currently, an impressive 1.4 million square
kilometers of nature reserves account for 15 percent of China’s total land area (Harris
2008). However, like the National Wildlife Law of 1988, they lack the structure
necessary for management and enforcement of regulations. They have few staff and
are severely underfunded. For example, in Qinghai Province, which is twice the size
of Montana, there is only a single wildlife biologist (Figures 7 and 8). Others are
supposed to address wildlife at the local level, but no funding exists for this work.
While funding is a serious issue for nature reserves today, it is not necessarily the
largest impediment to creating a successful management system.
“Most people simply view it as a situation that is underfunded or under
enforced. I disagree with that. I think there are some fundamental issues that
need to be thought about before wildlife conservation, particularly in China’s
west, will succeed more than it does now.” –Richard Harris
Nature reserves do not form a sufﬁcient foundation for habitat conservation in
China’s west. This is not because the rules are not sufﬁciently protective.
Paradoxically, it is because they are too protective. This problem stems from the fact
that regulations governing nature reserves often fail to take into account onthe
ground realities.
China’s nature reserves are structured in a threetier system. The innermost
sanctuaries, called “core zones,” do not allow human visitors. While humans are
allowed to visit other areas, tourism is only allowed in the outermost “experimental
zone.” Economic activity that requires extraction of natural resources is forbidden in
all nature reserve zones. This restriction effectively forbids people from living within
the conﬁnes of nature reserves, as the pastoral livelihood is dependent on the land.
This mandate becomes a serious problem when taking into account the fact that
nature reserves were established only after people had been living in these regions for
years. Today, the nature reserve system lacks an effective mechanism for dealing with
this clash between strict preservation and existing human inhabitants. To this day,
millions of people continue to live within these supposedly strictly protected areas.
Draconian preservation restrictions form a system that is very difﬁcult to enforce.
Such extreme regulations confuse managers responsible for enforcement. It is
impossible for them to obey regulations without sacriﬁcing the livelihoods of the
millions living inside the protected areas. These managers do not have a set of
management guidelines to follow that are relevant to their reserves’ situations in
reality. Harris has observed, “As a result, they ignore the regulations and manage them
on an ad hoc basis instead.” This leads to complex negotiations between nature
reserve authorities and other prevailing systems. On the ground, there is no clear
agreement that land inside nature reserves will be managed according to some
alternative land management system. Regulations become a continuous compromise.
Harris says, “There are two systems. And yet one does not supplant the other, they
simply live on top of each other. These two competing mandates, on the one hand
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limiting human use in favor of nature conservation and on the other economic
development, just sit there uncomfortably, one on top of the other.” As a result, nature
conservation is only a bit better within the reserves than outside of them (Liu et al.
2001). Because the county ultimately has to agree every time a rule is to be enforced,
the nature reserve system is fairly weak, despite its enormous size and breadth.
While China’s nature reserves protect vast tracts of land, China lacks a
comprehensive wildlife protection and management program. Though there are
enormous areas that are currently under nature reserve titles, they do not form a true
system because there is no common framework among them. This is partly a result
of the fact that there is not a comprehensive national nature reserve agency in China,
nor is there any other potential analog to the U.S. National Park Service. Thus, there
is no national backbone of support for individual reserves. While China’s State
Environmental Protection Agency plays a nominal role, there is a lack of policy and
guidance at the national level. Within individual reserves, there is also no system for
drafting a management plan. As a result, most reserves do not have one. Most are the
reserves that are in place are underfunded and understaffed with employees who are
improperly trained. In many cases, these underpaid staff exploit the resources of the
reserves they are supposed to be protecting.
Figure 8 Yeniugou, an important area for Tibetan Plateau wildlife in the Kunlan Mountains, Qinghai.
Note Harris’ campsite

Photo credit: Richard Harris

the future of wildlife management in china
In order to create a successful system of wildlife management in the future, China
must recognize and balance the needs of both humans and wildlife. It will need to
acknowledge conservation as a way to limit human behavior, which may entail
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sacriﬁces for people. Currently, western China views conservation as a biological and
technical endeavor, however, much of wildlife conservation is actually about
managing humans. To create a successful system of wildlife management, China must
increasingly involve local people. There are many ways to do this. For example,
allowing subsistence hunts and more local control of trophy hunting would beneﬁt
local communities. To take advantage of the potential of China’s nature reserve
system, regulations should be reformed to allow humans to live within them.
Additionally, universities should be encouraged to conduct applied wildlife research.
Population studies would allow more knowledgeable management of the reserves.
Finally, principles of conservation should be expanded to outside the reserves as well,
building a strong foundation for a comprehensive wildlife management system.
“While there are biological and technical aspects, I think of wildlife
conservation as primarily a human endeavor.” –Richard Harris
Allowing subsistence hunting in China would give local pastoralists a stake in the
natural resources of China’s west, laying the groundwork for a dialogue about
conservation. This would allow local people to continue their traditional lifestyles
(Figure 9). It would also lay a foundation for discussing aspects of pastoralist
behavior that are hurting certain species, such as argali and wild yaks. At the moment
there is no system for sustainable harvests and no hunting is allowed. As a result, there
is no one working with wildlife, and local people are not receiving a share in the
resources they are being asked to protect. The current system creates unnecessary
antagonism, as it is difﬁcult for local people to understand why they should limit
themselves in deference to wildlife if they are not receiving anything in return.
Figure 9 Tibetan woman milking a yak

Photo credit: Richard Harris
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Figure 10 A small group of blue sheep. An adult female is followed by a lamb, a yearling, and a
subadult male

Photograph courtesy of Milo Burcham of Cordova, Alaska

Limited subsistence hunts would allow people to make use of certain species. Blue
sheep (Figure 10), for example, are abundant enough to sustain a limited subsistence
hunt. Currently there is a fear in China that allowing any hunting at all will lead to
complete decimation of all wildlife. Pastoralists would be able to successfully limit
themselves if they had a vested interest in wildlife populations. Subsistence hunts
would only be allowed for speciﬁc species and would be managed within relatively
small areas. Within these areas, a biologist could collect information on population
sizes and communities would be in communication about how many animals had
been taken each year. This would only be possible by a common agreement, under
which some communities would have to make sacriﬁces each year. Harris believes this
could be successful because most local people would be happy to have some and to
limit themselves.
“Of late, the problem is not so much underregulation as overregulation.
Many wildlife species have been put off limits to people for consumptive use to
the point where people are alienated. People are seen as the enemy, and they
see government as the enemy. There is very little opportunity for community
management under the current system.” –Richard Harris
Many factors inﬂuence a species’ ability to be hunted sustainably. Population
density, renewal rate, strength of the indigenous conservation system of limiting
resource use, and degree of integration with the market economy all factor into the
probability of the hunt leading to sustainability or overharvesting. It is important to
consider the multiple dimensions of the problem. For example, chiru now number in
the thousands. Some people believe that if poaching were controlled, Tibetans could
take some for sustainable use. However, chiru is a migratory species. This means that
their range is so large that no single population area can take responsibility for their
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habitat. Thus, their migratory nature disqualiﬁes them from sustainable use. Musk
deer, on the other hand, are a sedentary species. They could be harvested sustainably
if a community would take responsibility for their habitat in return for the rights to
harvest a few individuals each season.
Figure 11 A group of adult male argali in Yeniugou

Photograph courtesy of Milo Burcham of Cordova, Alaska

Trophy hunting, in which wealthy foreigners come in to kill a large male and take
its head home, is another scheme that has the potential to increase local involvement
with wildlife. The revenue generated from hunting would be an incentive for
communities to protect populations of that single species. In order to save these
populations, communities would need to protect wildlife habitat. This would have
cascading beneﬁts for other species. In this way, trophy hunting provides indirect
incentives for wildlife habitat conservation.
Currently some trophy hunting is allowed in western China, and an international
hunter may pay $21,500 for a single argali (Figure 11). However, little of this money
makes it to local communities, and as a result the incentive structure is not operating
as hoped (Harris and Pletscher 2002). Money is paid to foreign outﬁtters,
import/export taxes, and forestry bureaucracy at the national, provincial, prefecture,
and county levels. The only money left for the local hunting authority covers the cost
of outﬁtting the hunt, and very little money is left to compensate people for limiting
their behavior.
In the future, trophy hunting systems should be restructured to provide stronger
incentives for local people. However, even in its current state, trophy hunting offers
the beneﬁt of providing employment that is actively involved with wildlife. People
managing hunts tend to love their jobs and become interested in animal preservation.
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Harris believes, “At this stage, it is a huge asset to have anyone on the ground whose
job is something related to wildlife.”
China should be proud of its extensive nature reserves. These areas offer extremely
high potential for habitat protection. However, in their current state, the nature
reserves do not offer the comprehensive wildlife protection that they might.
Currently regulations are unrealistically strict. As a result, enforcement is impossible.
If regulations were actually implemented, a large portion of western China would be
dispossessed. Thus, reform of nature reserve policies is necessary to make them more
reasonable and to provide provisions for humans to live within them. Two different
reform scenarios might be effective. One possibility is to adapt regulations to be more
realistic and not completely limit humans from living in the areas in which they are
already present. The other possibility is to retract boundaries in order to focus on the
natural areas where humans are not currently present.
There are several smaller changes that would signiﬁcantly beneﬁt nature reserves
as well. First, it is important to get more people involved with wildlife, both through
hunting programs and by working as reserve staff. More people working with wildlife
will increase knowledge of and concern for wildlife. Second, greater value should be
placed on keeping wildlife wild. A smaller percentage of conservation budgets should
be spent on captive breeding centers, and increased emphasis should be placed on
protecting habitat and monitoring wild populations. Third, universities should be
asked to help with this monitoring task. Currently there is a focus on theoretical
research in China. When people begin to ask questions about wildlife populations,
applied wildlife research in China will grow.
“These changes would build a foundation for consideration of wildlife outside
of the nature reserves as well, which ultimately is where we need to go.”
–Richard Harris
In the long run, China’s west should aim to make conservation a priority even
outside nature reserves. In eastern China, population pressure demands a sharp
delineation between what is inside and outside of nature reserves. However, in
western China land use is much more extensive, allowing both wildlife and
pastoralism to coexist. The ideal wildlife conservation system in western China would
place value on wildlife both inside and outside of nature reserves. It would also have
strong mechanisms for habitat preservation. This would be possible with a network
of core protected areas linked by a matrix of secondary zones, where management
plans could be designed to balance human and wildlife needs. With a few key
changes, western China has the potential for a highly effective conservation system in
which compromises from both humans and wildlife allow them to coexist.
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Impact of Increasing Feed and Meat
Demand on China’s Agriculture and
Environment*
Professor Laixiang Sun
University of London
Yi Luo
Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies

chapter summary
Chinese agriculture produces a significant amount of food. To address the future
challenges that the Chinese agriculture sector may face, a stateoftheart decision
support tool, the Chinagro simulation model, was developed by two EUfunded
projects. This chapter applies this model to simulate the supply and demand
dynamics of agriculture products and their impacts under several scenarios of
farmland and population change, nonagricultural growth, and world food prices.
The results of the baseline scenario indicate that China will be able to feed itself
with grain, but will need to import meat and livestock feed from the world market
to satisfy its new demand for protein. Under this scenario, income disparity
between rural and urban people will continue to grow, raising the possibility of
social instability. Under an alternative scenario in which China becomes more self
sufficient in meat, China will need to import a higher amount of livestock feed, and
farmers will get paid for raising more livestock. The concern for both scenarios is
the increasing environmental risks from excessive fertilizer use and possible
mishandling of manure. A third scenario shows a choice between economic
efficiency and environmental concerns: moving the livestock production from
highly populated areas to relatively remote areas will reduce environmental risk
but increase the cost of production.
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background
About ten years ago, when the Chinese population broke the 1 billion mark, the world
started to worry about how to feed the Chinese people. It was a reasonable concern,
since such a huge population could have created unbearable pressure on the country’s
agriculture sector, as well as a mammoth amount of demand in the international food
market. Fortunately, with good planning and improved technology, starvation did
not become an issue.
However, while the rest of the world starts to feel less concerned about food
security in China, the Chinese are still worrying. This is because the population is no
longer satisﬁed with being fed by carbohydrates alone. They want protein, or in other
words, meat. This creates a new concern: Who will feed Chinese livestock, and how?
In this chapter, we will ﬁrst provide an overview of the status of the Chinese
agricultural sector. Next, we will evaluate scenarios in which China would be able to
provide sufﬁcient meat, either domestically or by import, to meet the demand. The
tradeoff between producing livestock domestically and importing meat or livestock
feed from the international market will be discussed. An objective of this exercise is
to quantify the environmental impact of different meat production scenarios. The
agricultural sector is labor intensive. Its future changes will have farreaching impacts
on farmers’ living standards, and its massive fertilizer use and manure waste
production are major environmental concerns.
The assessment provided in this chapter is based on the results of two research
projects. The ﬁrst one is Chinagro, which aimed to provide policy decision support
for sustainable adaptation of China’s agricultural to globalization. Chinagro was an
EU Fifth Framework Program International Scientiﬁc Cooperation (INCO) project
and ran from October 2001 to January 2005. Team members came from six
institutions in China and Europe.
The second project is Catsei (Chinese Agricultural Transition: Trade, Social and
Environmental Impacts). This project is supported by the EU Sixth Framework
Special Targeted Research Project (STRP) program. It began in January 2007 and will
continue through December 2009 (Fischer et al. 2007). Professor Laixiang Sun has
served as a leading scientist on both projects. The fact that the same team received
backtoback support from the EU highlights the importance of China’s agricultural
sector to the global community.

chinese agriculture then and now
Chinese agriculture follows a high input, high output pattern. While its
production per hectare is among the highest in the world, its fertilizer and
human power input are also among the highest. Therefore, it raises concerns
about farmer’s income, sustainability of food supply when food prices
fluctuate, and the environmental impacts of food production—mainly
fertilizer use and manure disposal. –Professor Laixiang Sun

yale school of forestry & environmental studies

impact of increasing feed and meat demand

123

In China, more than twenty kinds of food crops are cultivated on large scales. The
dominant species are rice, wheat, corn, sorghum, soybean, millet, and potato. Of
these, rice, wheat, and corn are the three most widely cultivated crops, yielding 86
percent of the whole country’s grain production. In 2007, China’s grain production
was 501.5 million metric tons, equaling about 25 percent of the world’s total
production (China Statistical Yearbook 2008; Wei 2008).
Except for a few purely pastoral areas, almost all counties in China cultivate cereal
crops. However, the different food production portfolios are variable, since soil and
climate conditions vary from county to county. The area to the south of the Qinghai
Tibet Plateau (
), Wulate (
), and Wushen
(
) produces 96 percent of China’s grain. Each grain species also has
its major production regions. In the area to the south of the QinghaiTibet Plateau,
Qinling Mountain (
), and the Huaihe River (
), rice is the major crop.
Wheat, rapeseed, soybeans, and peas are also cultivated as winter rotation crops. The
multicropping index (MCI, a measure of number of crops grown in one year) can
reach two or three on a yearly average base in this area. North of the line between the
QinghaiTibet Plateau, Qinling Mountain, and the Huaihe River, and south of
Liaoning Province, winter wheat is the major crop. Corn, millet, potato, peas, and
beans are cultivated as secondary crops during the summer. The MCI is 1.0 or 1.5 in
this region. In Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning (
)
provinces, corn, soybean, sorghum, millet and wheat are cultivated in rotation. The
MCI is 1.0 in these areas. On the QinghaiTibet Plateau itself, the major crops are
barley, peas, and spring wheat. The MCI is less than one on the plateau.1
Livestock production is another element of the agricultural sector. Historically,
both industrialized intensive livestock production and smallscale household
backyard livestock production exist in China. In recent years, more and more large
scale production sites have emerged. In 2005, China’s ofﬁcial statistics put the total
meat production at 69 million metric tons, equal to 25 percent of the world total
(China Statistical Yearbook 2008).

1

http://www.hudong.com/
wiki/

Figure 1 Agricultural output per capita, 19552005

2

Note: Meat production is
measured by carcass weight
and represents total production
of pork, mutton, and beef.
Official meat production data
are adjusted downward in
accordance with the procedure
in Ma et al. (2004).

Source: Naughton 20072
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Figure 1 shows the time trends of agricultural production per capita. Food
production, which includes grain and meat, has greatly increased over the past ﬁfty
years. Although the increase of China’s per capita grain production was not
signiﬁcant and often ﬂuctuated between 300kg/year to 400kg/year, the total amount
of grain produced tripled over this period due to the near tripling of the Chinese
population from 500 million to 1.3 billion.
Unlike the grain ﬁgures, per capita meat production and consumption climbed
rapidly during this period. The production was around 6 kg/year in 1955 and rose
steadily to 38 kg/year in 2005. Considering the signiﬁcant population growth from
500 million to 1.3 billion people, the growth of total production and consumption is
remarkable. The production of edible oil also shows an impressive growth trend: per
capita production grew more than four times, and the total amount produced in 2005
was six times that of 1978 (China Statistical Yearbook 2008).
The growth in China’s agricultural productivity was supported by increased use of
resources (Figure 2). China’s fertilizer use increased rapidly from 1952 to 2004. The
national total fertilizer use climbed from virtually zero in the 1950s to 46 million tons
in 2004. The amount of irrigated area followed this trend, growing from about 20
million hectares in 1952 to 54.5 million hectares in 2004. Growth in both of these areas
led to a signiﬁcant increase in yield. Additionally, Chinese scientists succeeded in
creating highyield crop varieties by crossbreeding, further enhancing the land’s
productivity.
Figure 2 Fertilizer use, irrigation, and mechanical power

Source: Naughton 2007

Power input in the Chinese agriculture sector also increased rapidly over the years.
Machine power use grew from almost zero in 1949 to 640 million kilowatts of
machinery in 2004. Farmers traditionally use machines mainly for irrigation and
transportation. However, recently some have started to use them for cultivation,
contributing to the improvement in productivity. Use of draft animals grew at a
modest rate, from 50 million heads in 1949 to 150 million heads in 2004.
Table 1 shows a comparison of the agricultural input and output among China, the
United States, and global averages. China’s per hectare crop yield is disproportional
to its fertilizer and manpower input, even though it is above the world average. For
example, China’s rice yield averages 6.2 metric tons per hectare, higher than the world
average of 3.9 metric tons per hectare. China’s wheat and corn yields are also higher
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than the world averages. However, these high yields are largely a result of China’s huge
fertilizer and manpower inputs to farmland. Chinese farmers lead the world in
fertilizer application, using 271 kg chemical fertilizers per hectare—three times the
amount of the world average, and 2.5 times the U.S. amount. Similarly, China’s labor
input, as measured in the number of farm workers per 100 hectare, is also very high,
at more than 150 times the U.S. level and 4 times the world average. This number is
only matched by India, which is also a highly laborintensive country. China’s
percentage of irrigation area, a measure of water consumption, is also higher than the
world average and the U.S. level. With these numbers, it is reasonable to conclude that
the total factor productivity (TFP) of Chinese agriculture is low, that farmers’ proﬁt
margin is small, and that the pressure on the environment is inevitably greater than
in other countries.
Table 1 Comparison of yields and inputs, 1997

Production per hectare
Rice, paddy
Wheat
Corn
Soybeans
Fertilizer use per hectare
Farm worker per 100 hectare
Land irrigated
Tractor per 1,000 hectare

Unit

China

World

US

Tons
Tons
Tons
Tons
Kilograms
Number
Percent
Number

6.2
3.7
4.6
1.7
271
310
40
7

3.9
2.7
4.3
2.2
94
82
18
18

7.0
2.8
8.6
2.6
111
2
13
27

Source: Gale 2002

the chinagro model
Overview

Chinagro is a spatially explicit general equilibrium model that comprehensively
depicts China’s farm sector in 2,433 counties, while connecting them through trade
and transportation ﬂows. The model was ﬁrst developed in 20022005 as a part of an
EUfunded Fifth Framework Program project. It was then reﬁned in 20062007
under a bridging project funded by the Netherlands Ministry of Agriculture, Nature
Management, and Food Quality, and further developed in 200709 under a followup
project funded by the EU in its Sixth Framework Program. Eight institutes have
contributed to the development of the model: the International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria; the Centre for World Food Studies, Vrije
Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands; the Center for Chinese Agricultural
Policy, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing; the Institute for Geographical Sciences
and Natural Resources Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing; the China
Agricultural University, Beijing; the School of Oriental and African Studies of the
University of London, UK; the International Food Policy Research Institute,
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Washington D.C., USA; and the Agricultural Economics Research Institute, The
Hague (Fischer et al. 2007).
The model simulates the interactions between farmers and consumers of
agricultural products based on the most plausible assumptions of current and future
social, economic, and political situations. It seeks to answer the questions of how
farmers allocate labor and other inputs according to changes in food price and how
consumers behave in response to a given market situation. On the supply side of the
model, parameters for 2,433 counties, or all counties with agricultural production in
China, are deﬁned, including land use type, cereal crop cultivated, and livestock
production system. On the demand side, consumers are grouped by whether they are
from urban or rural areas, as well as by income levels (Van Veen et al. 2005). The
model structure is discussed in Keyzer and van Veen (2005). The year 1997, for which
a complete data collection is available, is used as the baseline year. The year 2003 is
used for validation of the model performance. Scenario simulations are conducted
for three selected years (2010, 2020, 2030).
Baseline scenario

In the baseline scenario, the following assumptions are made: First, there will be
sustained high economic growth in the nonagricultural sector—in other words, the
industry and service sectors—over the next twenty years. The growth is assumed at
67.5 percent per year. Second, there will be moderate population growth to a total of
1,460 million in year 2030. Third, urbanization will continue so that 60 percent of the
population will live in urban areas in 2030, which will create further land use
demands, cause environmental pressures in areas of high population density, and
most importantly, move a huge number of people from rural to urban areas. Fourth,
there will be a 7 million ha loss of cropland, primarily in regions of rainfed
agriculture, in response to the “Grain to Green” policy. Fifth, technical progress will
continue and contribute to a yield increase of 0.51.0 percent per year. An increasing
number of large livestock farms are anticipated, since the capacity of backyard
feeding is anticipated to decline as a large proportion of the rural population moves
into cities. Sixth, trade liberalization will continue, including a reduction over time of
tariffs and nontariff barriers, farm taxes will be abolished, and an average subsidy
rate of 5 percent to support grain production will be introduced. Finally, the model
assumes that world agricultural prices will follow the FAOOECD projections.
According to the baseline simulation, China will be able to feed itself with grain,
vegetables, and fruit, and even export part of its grain production. However, China
will have to import feed for its fastgrowing livestock production, and eventually
import meat. This is because the demand for meat will rise rapidly when people’s
incomes rise. Furthermore, this increase in income will result in an increase in the
cost of labor, which will raise the cost of domestic meat production.
The simulation indicates that in 2030 China will be able to export 3.5 million tons
of rice (2.6 percent of its production), 3.9 million tons of wheat (4.5 percent), 12.7
million tons of vegetables (4.6 percent), and 3.0 million tons of fruit (3.9 percent). At
the same time, it will need to import 7.3 million tons of pork (12 percent of its
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demand) and 3.6 million tons of poultry meat (20 percent). It will also need to import
5.8 million tons of maize feed (5 percent), 15.7 million tons of other carbohydrate feed
(16 percent), and 30.2 million tons of protein feed (29 percent).
The baseline simulation also calculates an increase in farmers’ earnings at 4.0
percent per year for cropping, 5.5 percent per year for livestock, or a combined 4.6
percent per year for all farming activities. These numbers look impressive by the
world standard. However, Chinese farmers’ incomes will still be below non
agricultural income, which is projected to increase at 6–7 percent per year. Therefore,
agricultural income will lag signiﬁcantly behind nonagricultural income, leading to
extended income disparity between farming and nonfarming activities. As a result,
concerns about the urbanrural income distribution will continue.
Table 2 provides detailed information on projected income changes by land use
type. The most noticeable feature is that the value added per person is higher for the
livestock sector than for the cropping sector, especially for intensive livestock
production.
Table 2 Value added per farm worker (in 1997 prices in RMB) by land use type
1997

2003

2010

2020

2030

3820

4127

6552

8632

10584

Irrigated cropping

4135

3863

6893

9157

11237

Rainfed cropping

3244

4231

5997

8041

10040

Cropping Sector

Tree cropping

5148

6173

7545

8197

9013

Livestock Sector

4028

8578

12841

20968

29800

Draught animal system

6605

4939

5778

6323

5813

Grazing ruminant farm

8715

12415

14585

18319

25969

Trad. ruminant farm
Intens. dairy farm

544

5462

6104

8621

13924

24800

25730

24509

25183

26821

Trad. nonruminant farm

5438

8898

12512

18950

24829

Intens. nonruminant farm

14315

21344

28946

42830

56000

Average

3852

4908

7736

11288

15153

Source: Fischer et al. 2007

Another important issue concerns the environmental pressures of the agriculture
sector, especially related to intensive fertilizer use and the disposal of manure from
livestock production. Since 1981, China has been the largest consumer of fertilizer in
the world and has accounted for more than 90 percent of the growth in global
fertilizer use (Liu and Diamond 2005). Although it is possible to increase the
efﬁciency of fertilizer use, the demand for fertilizer will be signiﬁcant in the coming
years (Figure 3). In 2003, fertilizer application was already quite high, at an average of
330 kg chemicals and 70 kg organic nutrients per ha. In 2030, it is estimated that
China will use 376 kg chemicals and 74 kg organic nutrients per ha. The manure
generated from livestock production amounted to approximately 114 kg nutrients per
ha of cultivated land in 2003 and will increase to 136 kg in 2030. Figure 3 indicates that
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areas with high fertilizer use density are usually those with high population density.
Similar spatial patterns exist for manure production. The disposal of unused manure
and unabsorbed fertilizer will be serious environmental concerns, as they add
nutrient pressure in water bodies and increase health risks. In 2003, for example, only
47 percent of the manure was applied to cropland.
Figure 3 Fertilizer use in kg/ha, 2003 and 2030

Alternative scenario

In an alternative scenario, more livestock would be produced domestically than in the
baseline scenario. This scenario seeks to address the following question: Would it be
better to produce more meat inside China than to import it? In order to answer this
question, it is assumed that from 2020 onward, pork and poultry production from
largescale intensive farms will be 30 percent higher than the baseline, specialized
dairy production will be 20 percent higher than baseline, and meat ruminant (beef
and mutton) sector production will be 10 percent higher than the baseline due to
further intensiﬁcation.
Table 3 summarizes meat and feed imports projected for 2030. According to this
alternative scenario, to reduce meat imports, China would need to increase feed
imports by a large amount. For example, maize feed imports would rise to 24.6
million tons, or four times the baseline prediction. Other carbohydrate and protein
feed imports would be 60 percent higher than the baseline predictions. In order to
transport such huge amounts of feed at a reasonable cost, China would need to locate
livestock production near the harbor.
As a result of the enhanced domestic production capacity, meat prices in 2030
would go down somewhat in comparison to the baseline projection and consumers
would gain 5 kg more meat per year. However, the average farm value added would
stay virtually the same. Income discrepancy between urban and rural areas would still
be a critical social problem.
In this alternative scenario, the national average of manure generated per ha would
be 3 kg lower than the baseline prediction. This is because the most intensive livestock
production would be concentrated in areas close to harbors, and the production
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would be more efﬁcient due to economies of scale. However, since harbor areas are
also highly populated, mishandling of manure can lead to disease and pollution,
imposing risks to human health on a larger population. In Figure 4, the red and dark
red areas show where manure discharge is more than 10 kg pure nutrition per ha of
agricultural land.
Table 3 Meat and feed imports in millions of tons, year 2030

Baseline scenario

Alternative scenario

Beef, mutton

0.0

0.0

Pork

7.3

2.3

Poultry meat

3.6

1.2

Maize feed

5.8

24.6

Other carbohydrate feed

15.7

23.8

Protein feed

30.2

47.1

Figure 4 Manure discharge in kg/ha, 2030

China faces a tough choice. Importing meat that meets China’s demand for protein
appears to be more environmentally friendly than importing feed because it leaves
the environmental pressures associated with production outside the country.
However, it may be risky to rely heavily on the world market when demand would be
so high. If China imports feed to raise more livestock domestically, it will improve its
selfsufﬁciency with respect to meat but will increase its dependence upon the world
feed market. It will also create livestock “hotspots” near the harbor areas, which
would cause health concerns.
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spatial livestock production planning under risks and
uncertainties
The tradeoff between the two scenarios prompts us to look more closely at how
livestock production should be spatially planned. One important question is whether
there are alternatives for locating the livestock production away from harbors. In
order to address this issue, new scenarios have been developed to estimate the
probabilities. Speciﬁcally, we are interested in two scenarios. The ﬁrst represents a
“business as usual” approach of intensiﬁcation driven by easy access to consumers,
and the second is a plausible alternative that may give attention to both economic
efﬁciency and environmental sustainability (Fischer et al. 2009).
S1. DemandDriving Scenario: The “business as usual” practice is to allocate
intensive livestock production in areas with convenient access to consumers, high
demand, and high population density.
S2. Sustainable Scenario: In this scenario, a tradeoff is made between pure
economic efﬁciency and environmental risk aversion. The goal is to ﬁnd a balancing
point. To achieve this, socioeconomic, demographic, sustainability, and
environmental risk indicators are speciﬁed. Locationspeciﬁc conditions and
limitations, such as water and land scarcity, livestock density, and urbanization level
are speciﬁed as constraints on livestock production. The amount of livestock
production in a region is allocated based on the individual “weight” of each indicator
of the area. Allocation of livestock beyond the speciﬁed constraints may lead to
disastrous consequences related to water and air pollution, increasing the chance of
either livestock disease outbreak or threats to human health, both of which would
incur high costs.
The degree of urbanization and population density are considered critical
constraints in this model. For example, it is considered excessively risky to build up
intensive livestock sites if more than 80 percent of the county’s population is urban,
but safe if less then 10 percent of the population is urban. Similarly, if more than 50
percent of the area is built up, meaning that more than half of the land area is already
occupied by buildings and roads, it would be excessively risky to practice intensive
livestock farming there. However, it would be safe to do so if only 25 percent of the
area was already built up. If an area is in between what would typically be considered
“safe” and “unsafe,” the area’s suitability of livestock operation is measured by
compromise curves as shown in Figure 5.
Nutrient level is another critical constraint. Similar to urbanization level, if
nutrient supply—mainly fertilizer use—is more than 150 percent of the crop’s
nutrient uptake, it is considered highly risky. However, if only 90 percent of the
needed amount is supplied, it is considered perfectly safe. If 110 percent of the
nutrient uptake is applied, the risk is considered moderate, since the soil can also
digest some nutrients. Between those numbers, there is a compromise curve as shown
in the left panel of Figure 6.
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Figure 5 Constraints on intensive livestock production (urbanization). Here R1 and R2 indicate the level
of risks for counties with different degrees of urbanization.

The compromise curve for livestock biomass, the fourth constraint, is shown in
the right panel of Figure 6. If more than 1.1 tons of animal biomass is produced per
hectare of cultivated land, the model considers the production to be risky. However,
0.3 tons of livestock biomass to per hectare land is considered safe.
Figure 6 Constraints on intensive livestock production (nutrients)

Using the constraint functions deﬁned above, the model generates a comparison
between the two scenarios (S1 and S2) with regard to the number of people exposed
to different categories of environmental risk. The results are summarized in Figure 7.
On the left side is S1, the business as usual scenario. On the right side is S2, the more
sustainable scenario, where livestock production plants are moved away from highly
populated areas. In the ﬁgure, the color scheme is such that the degree of risk
increases in the order from grey, dark green, bright green, white, yellow, pink, to red.
As demonstrated by Figure 7, in most regions it is not surprising that moving
intensive livestock production to remote areas helps reduce the environmental risk.
However, in the south, where farmland parcels are populated with nearly equal
density, there are fewer choices for livestock production locations. Therefore, moving
livestock production sites would not help relieve environmental pressures in all
regions.
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Figure 7 Relative distribution of population according to classes of severity of environmental pressure
from livestock production in 2030. In color scheme, degree of risk increases in order from grey, dark
green, bright green, white, yellow, pink to red.

concluding remarks

3

Cow and horse manure have
been in use by farmers in
northern China as a heating
source in the winter for many
years, but not on a large scale.

Intensiﬁed livestock systems will play a critical role in meeting China’s increasing
demand for meat in the future. Pig, broiler, and layer stock in intensiﬁed systems are
expected to increase by at least 2.5 times between 2000 and 2030. The “business as
usual” scenario suggests a high correlation between the geographic distribution of
animals and population density. Unused animal manure and leaching of chemical
fertilizers will imply serious environmental and health hazards. To reduce these
hazards, this chapter reports a method for spatially explicit planning of production
levels in given locations. The method is based on a rebalancing algorithm and takes
into account “weighted” combinations of criteria for sustainable livestock production
and intensiﬁcation.
This research highlights an urgent need for a technological breakthrough in
manure management. It calls for a new third generation of biofuel technology. The
ﬁrst generation of biofuel technology relied on maize, beans, and sugar. The second
generation uses nonfood crops. We hope that the third generation will start to use
manure. If manure can be directly converted into biofuel on a large scale, it would be
a blessing for China.3
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Air Pollution Status and Challenges
Ahead in the Greater Pearl River
Delta Region*
Professor John Chuenyu Chan
Sun YatSen University
Xin Zhang
Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies

chapter summary
This chapter describes current air pollution conditions in the Greater Pearl River
Delta (GPRD) region and illustrates how urbanization and industrialization have led
to dramatic air quality degradation. In addition, it shows how the longdistance
transportation of ozone precursors along the East Asian coast and from the
Southeast Asian subcontinent contributes to ozone enhancement in the GPRD.
Limited air quality data in the GPRD has become the main obstacle for scientists
addressing air pollution problems there. Also, the unclear interpretation of the Air
Pollution Index in the Chinese mainland conceals the urgency of these problems
from the public.

introduction
The Greater Pearl River Delta (GPRD) is located on the southeast coast of China and
includes nine cities in Guangdong province (Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Foshan,
Jiangmen, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Huizhou, Zhaoqing), Hong Kong, and Macau.1
The GPRD is one of the most developed regions in China. These nine cities in
Guangdong have been recognized as the Pearl River Delta (PRD) economic zone
since 1978, and it is now one of the most important manufacturing centers in the
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world. From 1980 to 2004, the annual GDP (gross domestic product) growth rate in
the PRD was 16.24 percent, which was about 70 percent more than the growth rate of
the rest of China.2 Since the 1970s,3 Hong Kong has surpassed Shanghai as an inter
national financial center. It now has the secondlargest stock market in Asia and ranks
eleventh among the world’s trading economies.4 Relying on tourism, Macau’s GDP
per capita reached $28,436 in 2006, ranking first in the GPRD.5
Along with the growth of GDP, the GPRD has seen substantial increases in
population, energy consumption, and the number of vehicles on the road. Within
only 42,648 km2, four major cities—Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Hong Kong, and
Macau—coexist with more than 54 million permanent residents and a huge inﬂux of
migrants. With the dramatic industrialization and urbanization of the past thirty
years, environment degradation in the region is signiﬁcant. Air pollution, as the most
observable and crucial environmental problem in the GPRD region, is a concern for
local people, government ofﬁcials, entrepreneurs, and even the global community.
High pollutant concentration and low visibility have been affecting local people’s
living conditions and health.
These challenges are even more difﬁcult to address because three different
governments with separate institutions coexist in the GPRD region: the People’s
Government of Guangdong Province; the Government of the Macau Special
Administrative Region; and the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region (HKSAR). This unique situation makes the allocation of responsibilities and
cooperative policymaking more complex. In addition, increasing emissions in the
GPRD are possibly affecting downwind areas over the Paciﬁc Ocean, including the
West Coast of the United States, so the GPRD’s emissions are a concern for countries
far beyond China’s borders.
This paper will address the current air pollution status in the GPRD and explore
its afﬁliation with regional and global pollutant emissions. The aim is to provide a
comprehensive scientiﬁc background for policymakers to address air quality
degradation in the GPRD.

air pollution status in gprd region
The air pollution status in the GPRD region is quite complex and very different from
most U.S. and European cities. Because the GPRD region has had a relatively short
but intensive developmental history, Londontype smog problems, mainly caused by
coal combustion, and photochemical smog problems, mainly caused by vehicle
emissions, coexist in this region (Wang et al. 2005). In addition, industrial emissions,
biomass burning, and biogenic emissions in rural areas add more complexity to air
pollution control. These conditions make it necessary to research the many reactions
among different pollutants while exploring emissions of each pollutant individually.
Particulate matter

Particulate matter is considered to be the most crucial air pollution problem in the
GPRD region because of its high concentration and great impact on human health.
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Particulate matter has very broad health effects for all populations, but the
respiratory and cardiovascular systems are predominantly affected. Finer particles
tend to have a stronger impact on health. Particles with diameters less than 10 µm
(PM10) can enter the respiratory tract and increase respiratory symptoms and disease,
while particles with diameters less than 2.5 µm (PM2.5) can more easily penetrate the
lungs, decrease lung function, alter lung tissue and structure, and even lead to
premature death (Zheng et al. 2000). In the GPRD, PM2.5 accounts for a very high
percentage of particulate matter, up to 70.4 percent of PM10 (Cao et al. 2003).
Guangzhou has the one of the highest annual average PM10 concentrations in this
region, ranging from 73 to 99 µg m3. Even though this range is below the Chinese
National Ambient Air Quality Standard of 100 µg m3 for urban and residential areas,
it is still much higher than the standard of 20 µg m3 that is suggested by the World
Health Organization’s air quality guidelines (AQGs) (WHO 2006). Shenzhen and
Hong Kong have lower annual average PM10 concentrations—around 50 µg m3—
which are still more than double the concentration suggested by AQGs.
Some components of particulate matter, such as toxic metals, can have great health
impacts on humans, but this data is generally not available for the GPRD beyond Hong
Kong. While Hong Kong’s annual average of toxic metals in PM10 was under the safety
limits (Lee et al. 1999), more research should be done for the rest of the GPRD region.
Ozone

Since 1990, ozone concentration in Hong Kong has continued to increase (Figure 1),
while little data is available for the rest of the GPRD region. In October 1995, daily
average ozone concentration exceeded 80 ppbv (parts per billion by volume) for at
least ﬁve days (Zhang et al. 2008b). The highest hourly ozone average in the GPRD
increased from 142 ppbv between October and December 2001 to 179 ppbv between
October and November 2004 (Zhang et al. 2008a). In the downwind southern PRD,
the 8hour mean ozone concentration reached 116±16 ppbv in 2004, which is higher
than 100 ppvb suggested by the WHO AQGs (WHO 2006).
Figure 1 Trends in major air pollutant concentrations in urban Hong Kong (central/western, 19902007)
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The yeartoyear change in ozone concentration also depends on weather patterns.
For example, when rainfall was very low in 2004, ozone concentration soared
dramatically. Ozone concentration also has obvious seasonal patterns: fall and spring
always have higher ozone concentrations (Wang et al. 1998). Anthropogenic VOCs
(volatile organic compounds) and NOx are also important control factors (Huang et
al. 2005), and onroad vehicles and power plants are reported to be the main sources
(Chan et al. 2002; Lee et al. 2002).
VOCs

6

http://www.airquality.co.uk/
archive/standards.php

As the precursors of ozone on the ground level, VOCs are critical air pollutants,
especially in urban areas (Liu et al. 2008). From 2001 to 2006, the composition of
VOCs in the GPRD region changed dramatically: propane concentration increased to
nearly 50 percent in both urban (Guangzhou) and rural (Dinghu) areas; isoprene and
ethyne decreased by 47 percent and 78 percent, respectively; and benzene
concentrations in cities (Guangzhou) reached 20 ppb due to industrial emissions,
compared to 16.25 µg m3 (about 5 ppb) by the UK Air Quality Objectives.6
The change in VOC composition at different sites provides vital insight into the
sources of pollutants. For example, the similar changes in VOC spectrum for urban
and roadside atmospheres indicate that VOC emissions in the city are mainly due to
fuel combustion in vehicles. VOC composition can further indicate the fuel structure
of vehicles: ethylene, acetylene, and other light alkenes are attributed to local
emissions from gasolinepowered vehicles, while propane is mainly contributed by
Liqueﬁed Petroleum Gas (LPG) fuel (Box 1).
SO2 and acid rain

Since 1999, few trends could be observed for acid rain in most of the GPRD region.
Guangzhou, which is located at the center of the second largest acid rain region of
China, has been suffering from frequent and intense acid rain for several decades.
From 1999 to 2005, acid rain accounted for 63 to 91 percent of rain days every year,
with the annual average pH values ranging from 4.4 to 4.8. The occurrence of acid
rain in Hong Kong remains steady, with the annual average pH around 4.6. Acid rain
occurrences in Shenzhen have increased from 33 percent in 1999 to 81 percent in 2005,
while the annual average pH values have decreased from 5.1 to 4.6 (Chan and Yao
2008). These acid rain events are mainly caused by the oxidation of SO2, though the
ratio of another acidic species, NO3, has been increasing.
To deal with the acid rain problem, the government of Guangdong province has
taken efforts to reduce SO2 emissions, especially emissions from power plants, which
account for 32.9 percent of SO2 emissions (Wang et al. 2005). An execution plan for
desulfurizing power plants in Guangdong Province was promoted in 2003, and a
slight decrease of SO2 concentration in Guangdong and Shenzhen was observed in
2005 (Chan and Yao 2008). However, the SO2 concentration in Guangzhou, 77 µg m3,
was still higher than the Chinese National Ambient Air Quality Standards for urban
and residential areas. SO2 concentration in Shenzhen and Hong Kong are around 27
µg m3, much lower than the standard.
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Box 1: A Lesson from LPG Fuel

In 2003, in order to reduce dust emissions from vehicles and improve urban
air quality, the Guangdong government started to encourage replacing diesel
light buses and taxis with LPG versions by offering incentives.a
With 2 billion RMB invested by the government, LPG was quickly adopted
by switching the engines of existing vehicles. By the end of 2007, about 6,400
buses and 16,000 taxis had been changed to use LPG, which accounted for
80% of buses and 100% of taxis in Guangzhou.b However, the many prob
lems that came to light during this dramatic change have revealed that LPG
is not necessarily an economical, environmental, and safe way to improve
urban air quality.c
LPG in Guangzhou faces the dual challenge of high economic costs and
limited fuel resources. Even though the government has spent a lot on the
transition to LPG vehicles and subsidized the LPG fuel price, most of the bus
corporations have been suffering from debts since they adopted LPG. In
addition, LPG fuel in Guangdong is highly dependent on imports. With the
drastic increase of LPG in the vehicle fuel structure from nearly zero percent
to 14.2 percent within only five years,d pressure will increase on the limited
LPG resources, as well as the price.
In addition, without careful design, new engines are not efficient enough to
burn all of the LPG. Sometimes the fuel can be seen leaking out of the
vehicles. As a result, even though onstreet dust has been reduced, propane—
one of the reactive VOC species—has been found in increasing amounts,
which could potentially lead to even more serious O3 problems in the region.
a

Key points of the Pearl River Delta Regional Air Quality Management Plan.
www.epd.gov.hk/epd/english/environmentinhk/air/prob_solutions/files/plan_english.pdf.
b http://www.ycwb.com/200801/16/content_1757848.htm
c http://house.people.com.cn/GB/6779543.html
d 20002006 Almanac of Guangzhou

Visibility deterioration

Deterioration of visibility in the whole GPRD region is the most observable air
pollution problem among the general public. The number of hazy days—visibility
less than 10 km and relative humidity less than 80 percent—in Shenzhen has soared
from 6 in the 1980s to 164 in 2006. In Hong Kong, the percentage of hours with low
visibility—visibility less than 8 km and relative humidity less than 80 percent—has
increased from about 4 percent in the 1990s to about 15 percent in 2006. Although the
number of hazy days in Guangzhou decreased from 1997 to 2001, the number
increased signiﬁcantly from 65 in 2001 to 144 in 2004 (Wu et al. 2007).
This deterioration is caused by the coexistence of multiple pollutants, which also
makes it difﬁcult to determine the key control elements. Extremely hazy days are
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associated with high concentrations of aerosols, which are the solid or liquid form of
particles suspended in the atmosphere (Wu et al. 2007). However, a multiple linear
regression analysis, which was conducted to determine the relations between
pollutant concentrations and monthly reduced visibility in Hong Kong, shows
different results: monthly reduced visibility has little relation with PM10, which is
supposed to be the main cause of visibility degradation. Meanwhile, monthly
reduced visibility is highly correlated with SO2 and O3. Thus, the complex chemical
composition of the atmosphere in the GPRD region requires further research to
understand the internal mechanisms and determine a control strategy.

emissions and air pollution: regional and global
As the variety and emission intensity of air pollutants increase continuously, the
impact of emissions is no longer limited to a local area. The longdistance
transportation of pollutants and precursors has enlarged the impact radius of local
emissions to a regional and even global scale. Consequently, in order to improve air
quality in the GPRD effectively, it is not enough to just understand the association
between local emissions and pollution conditions. Rather, more attention should be
paid to the regional transportation of essential pollutants and precursors.
The Hong Kong paradox

The Hong Kong government has been putting a great deal of effort into controlling
regional smog and streetlevel air pollution, and local emissions of sulfur dioxide,
nitrogen dioxide, and PM10 have been dramatically reduced (Figure 2). In 1990,
annual emissions of SO2, NOx, and PM10 were about 140,000 tons, 180,000 tons, and
12,200 tons respectively. After sixteen years, the emissions have been reduced to
70,000 tons, 100,000 tons, and 6,000 tons, respectively.
After cutting local emissions almost in half, better air quality should be expected.
However, the impact of these drastic reductions was rarely reﬂected by the local air
pollutants concentration (Figure 1). On the contrary, the percentage of poor visibility
days even actually increased dramatically since the 1990s (Figure 3). If not local
emissions, what is dominating the continuous degradation of air quality in Hong Kong?
Could it be attributed to emissions from Guangdong Province? Though many
researchers and Hong Kong citizens complain about this, it is not necessarily true.
The GPRD region is dominated by East Asian monsoons, and about 70 percent of the
winds in Hong Kong are from the ocean or the northeast part of Guangdong, which
is less industrial than the PRD. In fact, the wind blew directly from
Guangzhou/Shenzhen—a highly developed region in Guangdong—to Hong Kong
for less than ten days out of the year. Thus, even though the airmass from
Guangzhou/Shenzhen is full of pollutants, the direct transportation of this dirty
airmass to Hong Kong is infrequent.
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Figure 2 Trends in pollutant emissions in Hong Kong (19902006)

Figure 3 Trends in reduced visibility at the Hong Kong Observatory (19682007)

Source: Chan and Yao 2008

“In terms of air pollution, if you just conduct local control you will not be
successful.”
–John C.Y. Chan
Even if the impact from Guangdong Province is included, the dominant factor for
air degradation in Hong Kong is still missing. To identify it, air mass transportation
on a continental scale should be considered. With this reasoning, the increasing ozone
concentration along the East Asian coast indicates that the impact of emissions from
continental scale may be a crucial factor.
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Ozone increases along East Asian coast

If the landmass upwind of Hong Kong is considered, all of the East Asian coast could
be included in the source area. According to backward trajectory calculations, about
21 percent of the airmass is from the east coast pathway. Correspondingly, obvious
increases of ozone concentration along the East Asian coast, such as Taiwan and
Japan, have been reported (Chou et al. 2006; Lee et al. 1998). The annual average of
daily maximum 1h ozone concentration increased about 2.6 percent yr1 in Taiwan for
the period of 19942003 and increased 2.5±0.6 percent yr1 at Okinawa, Japan, for the
period of 19891997 (Chou et al. 2006).
A possible hypothesis is that ozone precursors are transported and accumulate
from north to south along the East Asian coast. Under this hypothesis, two factors
could be explained: (1) the fastest rate of ozone increase was observed upwind of the
GPRD region. This may be caused by the transportation of ozone precursors from the
north. (2) when the airmass is transported from north to south, the higher ozone
concentration tends to be formed in Hong Kong than that in Taiwan and Japan
because of the higher temperature and radiation in Hong Kong.
Biomass burning in Southeast Asia

7

http://earthobservatory.nasa.
gov/Features/BiomassBurning/

In Hong Kong, most ozone enhancement cases occur from February to early May,
which corresponds to the period when biomass burning is most intensive in
Southeast Asia. Biomass burning includes forest ﬁres, grassland ﬁres, agricultural
waste burning in the ﬁeld, and domestic biofuel use for cooking and heating. These
ﬁres are often initiated by humans, such as burning vegetation for land clearing, but
biomass burning may also start naturally, such as the case of ﬁres induced by
lightning.7
The amount of burning is highly related to the location, season, and human
activities. The severity of forest and grassland ﬁres initiated by natural causes is
determined by lightning, precipitation, and temperature. Crop residue burning, on
the other hand, is determined by agricultural practices (Streets et al. 2003). India,
Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam are the major contributors of biomass
burning in Southeast Asia, and these burning activities show obvious seasonal
patterns. For example, in 1998 and 1999, the number of ﬁres gradually increased
starting in January, reached a peak in March, and then dropped dramatically in May.
This period accounts more than 80 percent of the total ﬁres annually.
During the same period, huge enhancement of ozone and aerosols could be
observed in South China, even in the Tengchong, a remote mountain site in Yunnan.
In addition, the enrichment of a biomass burning tracer, CH3Cl, could be observed in
the ozonerich airmass (Chan et al. 2003). The results from a tenday backward
trajectory model show that before reaching the GPRD region, the airmass traveled
across Southeast Asia from west to east, passing through regions with intensive
biomass burning activities, such as India, Myanmar, and southwest China (Figure 4).
Therefore it is believed that ozone enhancement in the GPRD in spring results from
the intensive biomass burning activities in the Southeast Asia subcontinent.
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Forward trajectories (Figure 5) also suggest that the emission of air pollutants in
GPRD could affect the air quality on the other side of the world in a short time. In
fact, pollutants from biomass burning in Southeast Asia, enhanced by local emissions
from the GPRD region, can make the journey across the Paciﬁc Ocean and reach
North America within ten days. Thus, the transcontinental transportation of air
pollutants makes it possible for local emissions to have a drastic impact around the
world.
Figure 4 Tenday (a) backward air trajectories reaching Hong Kong and (b) forward trajectories
departing from Hong Kong at 4 km during ozone enhancement events from October 1993 to
September 1999

Source: Chan et al. 2003

data availability, data quality, and interpretation
Even though the world has been paying close attention to China’s air pollution issues,
few people can get access to detailed air quality data. Data availability, as well as data
quality, has become the biggest barrier for scientists and the public to understand
China’s air pollution problems.
The Chinese government has tried to be more open with information on the
condition of China’s environment, especially since the “Regulation on Government
Information Openness” was approved in 2007. Daily air quality forecast data for
sixtynine important cities has been available online since 2005. These forecasts
include the maximum and minimum Air Pollution Index (API), primary pollutants,
air quality levels according to China’s Ambient Air Quality Standards, and
descriptions of the “Air Quality Situation.”8 In addition to the data published online,
citizens can request more information by submitting application forms to the
environmental protection agency within the local or central government, and the
agency should respond within ﬁfteen workdays.9
Some provincial governments have also launched initiatives to establish regional
monitoring networks and publish the results online. In the case of the GPRD, the
Guangdong Provincial Environmental Protection Monitoring Centre (GDEMC) and
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the Environmental Protection Department of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region (HKEPD) have been working together to establish a PRD Regional Air
Quality Monitoring Network since 2003. In this network, sixteen automatic air
quality monitoring stations, including three regional stations, measure SO2, NO2, O3,
and PM10 continuously. The measurements are controlled by a set of quality
assurance and quality control (QA/QC) operating procedures developed by the two
governments. Monthly maximum and minimum hourly averages for all of the
network’s monitored pollutants have been reported to the public since 2005.10
Box 2: Manufacturers: Move or Stay?

In order to improve air quality in the GPRD, emissions regulations in the
region became much tougher than in most parts of China, especially more
remote areas such as southwest China. Thus, many heavily polluting
manufacturers could not afford to survive in the GPRD and moved to
southwest China, where they have been welcomed in order to help with the
development of the local economy.
By moving some of the most heavily polluting manufacturers to southwest
China, local pollutant emissions within the GPRD could ideally be better
controlled. However, the impact of the pollution from those manufactures is
far from being eliminated. Through the same pathway demonstrated in
Figure 4(a), emissions from southwest China can still affect the air quality in
the GPRD. As a result, the situation in the GPRD may actually get worse,
since southwest China has a strong desire for a booming economy and little
incentive to control pollution, and thus emissions there tend to be much
more severe. In addition, as manufacturers are scattered in remote areas, it is
becoming more difficult to impose regulations on them.
However, detailed air quality monitoring data is still difﬁcult to access in most
parts of China, especially less developed areas. Without the permission of the local
and central governments, data related to air pollution cannot be accessed, used, or
published. Most of the local governments still treat air quality data as conﬁdential
and regulate it strictly. Thus, although more observation sites have be established
nationwide, data from these sites still cannot be easily accessed by citizens, scientists,
or even the other governments in the region. These restrictions might quell public
blame temporarily, but they have killed initiatives and regional cooperation on the air
pollution problem. Lack of information makes it very difﬁcult for researchers to ﬁnd
an effective air pollution control strategy, especially in the context of increasing
impacts from regional emissions.
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Figure 5 Spatial distribution of the PRD Regional Air Quality Monitoring Stations

Figure 6 The monthly variations of PMAPI in four different API systems in a general station of Hong
Kong (20052007)
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Most data published online is rough and veils the severity of the air pollution
situation in China. For example, API values that are reported are usually not bad at
all. Why does China’s API provide a better image of China’s air quality than what is
happening in reality? Two facts are usually overlooked: (1) China has a very different
API calculation system from those used in Korea and the United States. With the
same air pollutant concentration, the PMAPI numbers from different calculation
systems do not match (Figure 6). The results from the Chinese mainland and Hong
Kong systems are much lower than the results from the American and Korean systems
(Figure 6); (2) The interpretation methods of API values in the Chinese mainland are
different from those used in Hong Kong and the United States. The interpretation of
the API number in the Chinese mainland is called the “Air Quality Situation,” with
categories such as Excellent, Good, Light Pollution, Lowlevel Pollution, Severe
Pollution, etc. Hong Kong interprets API as “Air Pollution Level,” while the United
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States interprets it as “Levels of Health Concern.” Hence, with an API number
between 50100, the interpretation in the Chinese mainland is that the Air Quality
Situation is “good,” while the rating would be a “high air pollution level” in Hong
Kong and “moderate health concern” in the United States.
Table 1 Interpretations of the API in Hong Kong, the Chinese mainland, and the United States
API system of HK
API

Air Pollution
Level

025

Low

2650

Medium

51100
101200

API system of Chinese mainland

API system of U.S

Air Quality Situation

Levels of Health
Concern

050

Excellent˄Ӭ˅

050

Good

High

51100

Good˄㡃˅

51100

Moderate

Very High

101150

Light pollution

101150

Unhealthy for
Sensitive Groups

151200

Unhealthy

201300

Very Unhealthy

301500

Hazardous

˄䕏ᖂ∵ᶧ˅
151200

Lowlevel Pollution

˄䕏ᑺ∵ᶧ˅
201500

Severe

201250

Mediumlevel Pollution

˄Ёᑺ∵ᶧ˅
251300

Medium Levelsevere
Pollution

˄Ёᑺ䞡∵
301500

Severe Pollution

˄䞡ᑺ∵ᶧ˅

Even if all the air quality data could be accessed freely, the quality of the data is
another crucial concern. Because air pollution has not been included in the top issues
on most local governments’ agendas, and most of the detailed data is concealed from
the public, there is little incentive for monitoring stations to stick to or improve
quality assurance and quality control operating procedures. In addition to the
absence of public oversight, ﬁnancial support for more advanced equipment and
experienced technicians is also urgently needed. In short, the Chinese government
still has a long way to go to improve the quality and availability of data for the general
public.
Technicians are considered “blue collar” workers. Few welleducated people are
willing to become a technician for their permanent job.
–John C.Y. Chan
In closing, though many measures have been taken to tackle air quality
degradation, the GPRD region still faces great challenges. How can they provide
enough energy for ongoing industrialization and urbanization while preventing the
public from exposure to toxic air pollutants? How can they evaluate the impact of
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local and upwind emissions? How can they collaborate with upwind provinces and
countries to limit emissions of ozone precursors? These tough problems still remain
in this region.
In order to tackle these challenges, scientists must work closely with governments
to build a highquality, longterm monitoring network, determine the critical areas
and pollutants for a cohesive control strategy, and evaluate the appropriateness of
control measures proposed by the government. Meanwhile, entrepreneurs, NGOs
(nongovernmental organizations), and citizens should be encouraged to participate
in these efforts. Increasing air quality information transparency should be the ﬁrst
step for the government to move forward.

discussion
In the lecture, current scientiﬁc ﬁndings on the air pollution situation in the GPRD
were summarized, and some lessons and experiences from previous and current
pollution control practices were discussed. The questions of how to make good use of
current knowledge and how to move forward to improve air quality in the GPRD
region became the key points in the discussion session.
In order to tackle these questions, scientists and policy makers should work
together. This cooperation requires efforts from both sides. On one hand, scientists
should state the scientiﬁc facts clearly and comprehensively to draw the attention of
policymakers, while applicable scientiﬁc research should be conducted to develop
and evaluate solutions. On the other hand, policymakers should learn to live with
both the ﬁndings and occasional uncertainties of science. Uncertainties are inherent
to science and can make science difﬁcult for policymakers to utilize. However, that
should not be used as an excuse for denying suggestions for vital policymaking.
Strategies with a longterm vision should be made based on risk analysis. Strategies
without vision and careful analysis may lead to another situation like the LPG fuel
dilemma in Guangzhou. One of the practical ways to encourage cooperation is to
have more scientists involved in policymaking procedures.
Public participation should also be encouraged to help with environmental
protection. Environmental protection used to be the obligation of the government,
but that is no longer the case today. Citizens and corporations have been increasingly
affected by environmental degradation. For instance, children’s health has been
threatened, and real estate corporations have lost customers. In other words, there are
many stakeholders besides the government who have an incentive to support and
work for environmental protection. They should be used more effectively.
Government should gradually increase the transparency of air quality data and policy
making procedures to build up public conﬁdence and encourage public participation
in decision making.
Finally, regional cooperation is vital because the impact of transboundary
transportation has become increasingly important. It is no longer possible to control
the degradation of air quality in Hong Kong by restricting local emissions. Although
Hong Kong and Guangdong Province have initiated cooperation on air pollution
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monitoring, there are more challenges ahead for this process in other ﬁelds and on a
larger scale: (1) For most governments, the priority of air pollution control is still very
low, so the incentive for intergovernmental cooperation is not strong enough, unless
economic beneﬁts are provided. (2) The obligations of pollution control are difﬁcult
to determine. Research on transboundary transportation is still preliminary; reliable
and quantitative analysis is expected. At this point, although people are drawing
attention to the impact of transboundary pollution, few effective rules have been
established. More actions should be taken to foster a more constructive conversation
between governments, allowing them to tackle their air pollution issues together.
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chapter summary
“Shocked” is the best word to describe the reaction of people who come back to
Lake Taihu today after visiting years ago. The lake’s previous reputation for glorious
beauty has been ruined by frequent algal blooms in the summer. Human activities
are widely recognized as the most important forces driving this change.
This chapter gives an overview of the main humaninduced causes of Lake Taihu’s
decline. The most radical changes in the lake have occurred during the period from
the 1950s to the present. Flood control projects, wetland reclamation and pollution
inputs are the three primary causes of the lake’s degradation, all resulting from
human development. Major management efforts to restore the lake to its pre
1950s condition include algae cleanup, discharge regulations, Yangtze River water
transfer, wetland protection and restoration, and demonstration farming zone
construction. Thanks to these restoration efforts, recent years have seen some signs
of recovery, such as temporary water clarification and reduced risk of flooding.
However, scientific understanding of the human and biotic drivers of the lake’s
eutrophication status is far from comprehensive, and more research needs to be
done.

introduction
Lake Taihu receives enormous public attention in China. Located in a depression in
the center of the Lake Taihu catchment, it is the third largest freshwater lake in China
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(Figure 1). The lake is 1.9 m deep on average and has a total surface area as large as
2,425 km2. The lake catchment is 36,900 km2 in size, located at the middle to lower
reaches of the Yangtze River basin. With a high drainage density (>3 km/km2), the
lake basin produces the huge volume of 16.3 � 108 km3 water every year. At a distance
of 60100 km from the East China Sea, the catchment is dominated by a subtropical
monsoon climate, resulting in a relatively high temperature (annual average 1517°C)
and abundant precipitation (1,180 mm/yr). The basin is made up of highlands (16
percent) in the southwest, ﬂoodplains (68 percent) in the northeast and intermittent
water areas (16 percent) distributed around the lake.
Figure 1 Topography of Lake Taihu

1

Taihu Basin Authority, 2007.
Taihu Basin & Southeast
Rivers Water Resources
Bulletin 2007, Ministry of
Water Resources

The Lake Taihu catchment holds a unique place in China’s political economy. The
basin contains administrative divisions that belong to Jiangsu Province (52.6
percent), Zhejiang Province (32.8 percent), Anhui Province (0.6 percent) and
Shanghai City (14 percent) (Figure 2). Accounting for only 0.4 percent of China’s land
area, the catchment contains 3.7 percent of the country’s population and 11.6 percent
of its gross domestic product (GDP). GDP per capita in this area exceeded US$8,000
in 2007, over three times the country’s average level. Additionally, the catchment’s
economic yield per unit of land is 57 times the national average.1 In 2005, the
urbanization rate in the lake basin exceeded 70 percent. In the past, the lake has
provided multiple services, such as municipal water supplies, ﬁsh stocks, irrigation,
and tourism. These uses demonstrate that Lake Taihu plays a crucial role in the social
and economic development of China.
Recent years have seen increased stress on the quantity and quality of water in Lake
Taihu. The notorious bluegreen algal bloom in the summer of 2008 resulted in
serious drinking water shortages in Wuxi City, the most economically developed city
in Jiangsu Province, and sounded a loud alarm bell for the government, scientists, and
citizens. Two principal natural factors are thought to be responsible for the problem.
First, as a result of global warming, the winter of 2007 was unusually warm, failing to
kill most of the residual algae left from the preceding summer. In the summer of
2008, the extremely hot weather was ideal for algal growth and hastened the algae’s
decomposition, the product of which was the direct source of water pollution.
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Second, since Lake Taihu is an adlittoral lake (or a shallow water body near the shore),
its shallow depth makes the pollution very difﬁcult to diffuse. However, human
development, which has resulted in a large amount of agricultural, industrial, and
municipal waste discharge, as well as construction that disturbs biochemical cycles in
the basin, is an equally important cause of the problem.
Figure 2 Location of Lake Taihu in China

Source: Wikipedia. Revised by Ranran Wang

In this chapter, we will focus on the principal humaninduced drivers of Lake
Taihu’s development. First, in a historical overview, we will brieﬂy discuss the
development of human impacts and synchronous conditions at Lake Taihu. This is
followed by an examination of the major actions designed to aid in the lake’s
recovery. In the third part, we will discuss several new problems uncovered in the
course of recent lake restoration efforts. Finally, we will propose some suggestions for
future improvement.

humaninduced drivers of the development of lake taihu
Before 1 AD

The origin of Lake Taihu is a subject of debate. There are four main hypotheses about
the lake’s formation and evolution. Inspired by the lake’s unique circular basin
structure (Figure 1), one hypothesis suggests that the lake was formed by a meteor
impact dating back to more than 70,000 years ago (Wang 2002). The second
hypothesis holds that Lake Taihu was once a lagoon created by sealand interactions
6,000 to 3,500 years ago and was then desalinated by freshwater from mountain rivers
(Wang et al. 2001). A third hypothesis, based on plate tectonics, proposes that, just
like many other great lakes in the world, the basin of Lake Taihu was a result of land
subsidence associated with tectonic movement (Sun and Mao 2008). The fourth
hypothesis is that the lake was a gathering of three rivers that were blocked at the
basin, perhaps due to sea level receding (Sun and Wu 1989).
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During this long historical period, several remarkable ancient civilizations
emerged in the basin: the Majiabang (偀ᆊ⌰) Culture (7000 BP), the Songzhe
(⎲⋑) Culture (60005300 BP) and the Liangzhu (㡃⏮) Culture (52504150 BP),
followed by an unexplained cultural gap until the Song Dynasty (ᅟᳱ) Culture (1048
AD). Characterized by low social productivity, human disturbance in the lake area
was negligible during this period. Rather, the lake formation and the subsequent
expansion were mainly caused by natural forces.
From 1 AD to the 1950s

Development in this period can be divided into three phases: before the East Han
() Dynasty, from the East Han Dynasty to the Tang () Dynasty, and from the
Tang Dynasty to the 1950s. These three phases are distinguished by different levels of
human development.
Before the East Han Dynasty

During this phase, the Lake Taihu catchment was much less developed than the
Yellow River Valley to the north. The primary human activities included primitive
reclamation, crude ﬁshery and crude organic agriculture. Towns in the lake area
developed at a slow rate. Anthropogenic impacts on Lake Taihu were insigniﬁcant.
From the East Han to the Tang Dynasty

The ﬁrst southern migration in the history of China, caused by civil wars, happened
at the end of the East Han Dynasty. This big population movement brought both
labor forces and advanced technology to the Lake Taihu catchment, and stimulated
unprecedented economic development. Numerous towns were built throughout the
following 400 years. By the end of the Tang Dynasty, this area had become an
important national economic region. In this period, human activities expanded to
include extensive land reclamation, organic agriculture, crude ﬁshing and early
urbanization. Human inﬂuences started to play a role in the lake’s development.
From the Tang Dynasty (618 AD) to the 1950s

As national economic development gradually transferred to the south, development
in the Lake Taihu catchment experienced rapid growth. Political disorder in the north
resulted in China’s second and third southern migrations, which further enriched the
labor resources in the catchment. Relying on natural advantages (e.g. sufﬁcient water
supply) and social advancement, industries like textiles and breweries began to
ﬂourish. This period was marked by intensiﬁed human activities. Population growth,
agricultural reclamation and industrial construction exerted measurable pressure on
the lake’s development. From the South Song (फᅟ)Dynasty (11271279 AD) onward,
the central government prohibited all reclamation for fear of aggravated ﬂood
disasters brought on by river blockage, but the burden of an evergrowing population
was hard on the land. Thanks to the lake’s great natural buffering capacity, however,
there was still no record of major environmental havoc caused by humans. Strong
winddriven currents in the lake may have overcome the lake shrinkage due to human
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reclamation by facilitating shoreline erosion and sedimentation transformation (Pu
1987; Su and Wu 1989). The lake area kept expanding and peaked at 2,550 km2 in 1950
(Figure 3).
Figure 3 Area change of Lake Taihu in the past 2,000 years

Since the 1950s

The abrupt decline of the lake area in the last 50 years occurred in parallel with the
degradation of water quality. The local sayings in Table 1 present a lively description
of water quality degradation in Lake Taihu. These profound transformations were
driven by anthropogenic impacts from three main categories: (1) ﬂood control
projects; (2) wetland reclamation; and (3) pollution inputs.
Table 1 Local sayings about water quality degradation in Lake Taihu
Era
1950s

Local Saying
Cleaning rice and vegetables

1960s

Washing clothes

1970s

Becoming dirty

1980s

Losing fish and shrimp

1990s

Causing human injury

Flood control

Flood threats in the Lake Taihu catchment come from two main sources: “plum” rain
in June and July, controlled by the Paciﬁc subtropical high pressure system, and
hurricanes from August to October originating in the Paciﬁc. Prolonged and intense
precipitation can cause waterlogging in the catchment’s ﬂat topography. The
intrusion of sea tides makes water drainage difﬁcult. Flooding will result in high
social and economic costs in this wealthiest area of China. In order to control ﬂood
damage over the years, local people have built 20 medium to large reservoirs, 540 km
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of sea walls and river banks, 270 km of embankment around the lake, 25 dredged
riverways, and 28,000 km of polder dikes. Indeed, some beneﬁts have been achieved.
For the three largest ﬂoods since the 1950s (1954, 1991, and 1999), although the
absolute economic cost increased with each ﬂood, the ratio of the economic cost of
the ﬂoods to GDP actually decreased (Mao 2000). However, these human
interventions will eventually disturb the biochemical cycle in the aquatic ecosystem.
For example, by blocking the transport of nutrients, dams will result in nutrient
accumulation in the lake basin and lead to lake eutrophication, reducing dissolved
oxygen (DO) levels and disrupting the ﬁshery. With the waterways blocked by the
ﬂoodcontrol structures, populations of migratory ﬁsh species such as Coilia ectenes
and Anguilla japonica, as well as semimigratory ﬁsh species such as
Mylopharyngodon piceus and Ctenopharyngodon idellus, will inevitably be reduced.
Wetland reclamation

Wetland reclamation is another contributor to the degraded ecosystem health of Lake
Taihu. Known as the kidneys of the earth, wetlands play an important part in
ecosystem functioning. Wetlands in the Lake Taihu basin consist of lakes, reservoirs,
ponds, rice paddies, and bogs, and account for 65.9 percent of the basin’s territory.
They serve as habitat for a large number of animal species, including zooplankton (79
species), zoobenthos (59), ﬁsh (106), amphibians (9), reptiles (25), mammals (36),
birds (173), and hydrophytes (75). They also provide ecological beneﬁts in the form of
ﬂood diversion and storage, water clariﬁcation, eutrophication prevention, regional
climate adjustment, and ecotourism. Since the 1950s, the everincreasing demand for
land, owing to continuous population growth, has led to a large amount of wetland
reclamation for farming and building construction. From 1950 to 1985, a total of 160
km2 lake area was reclaimed. East of Taihu Lake, an area of 3,200 km2 was utilized for
ﬁsh breeding even though the quota set by the central government was only 1,000 km2.
These disturbances have resulted in a dramatic species decline. From the 1960s to the
1990s, the number of ﬁsh species in Lake Taihu declined from 106 to 60. Additionally,
when the wetlands suffered from human reclamation, the lake’s capacity for water
puriﬁcation and eutrophication prevention was greatly weakened. The combined
effects of ﬂood control projects and wetland reclamation have radically changed the
trophic status and ﬁsh populations in Lake Taihu over the last 60 years.
Pollution input

Along with the booming human population, which has led to rapid industrialization
and urbanization, pollution discharge to the lake has been increasing since the 1950s.
During the 1960s and 1970s, the pollution mainly came from farmland fertilizer use
and household sewage, in fairly low amounts. Vigorous water circulation provided by
strong currents in the lake helped maintain a reasonably high DO level (>7 mg O2/L)
even at the bottom of the lake as measured in the 1970s (Chang 1996). The high DO
was able to oxidize much of the organic matter that had entered the lake and keep the
lake generally oligotrophic or mesotrophic. It was not until the 1980s that the rate of
pollution discharge was considered to be detrimental.
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Pollutants emitted by agriculture, industrial facilities, and households in the lake
basin have increased substantially since the 1980s. In 2000, 80 percent of the water had
been polluted by emissions containing 491,500 t (metric tons) COD (chemical
oxidation demand), 14,400 t TP (total phosphorus) and 130,000 t TN (total nitrogen).
These efﬂuents are responsible for the lake’s drastic change in eutrophication status
and the sharp decrease in water quality. Table 2 shows the changes of several
biochemical indices for water quality (CODMn, TN, TP, Chl a, TSI), the water quality
index, and trophic states from 1960 to 2005.
Table 2 Water quality and trophic state changes in Lake Taihu
CODMn

TN

TP

Chl a

Year
1960
1981
1987
1988
1990
1992
1993
1994
1995
1999
2000
2003
2005

TSI
mg/L
1.90
2.83
3.30
4.20
3.90
3.70
4.05
4.12
4.48
4.99
5.28
4.59
4.99

mg/L
0.05
0.900
1.543
2.772
2.349
2.870
2.350
1.730
3.140
2.570
2.540
2.850
2.950

mg/L
0.020
0.020
0.029
0.032
0.058
0.080
0.080
0.130
0.133
0.105
0.100
0.078
0.074

mg/L
ND
0.4
7.0
12.0
43.0
12.0
30.0
13.0
19.0
ND
23.0
14.4
10.2

34.97
43.60
54.08
63.69
69.05
66.50
68.70
65.13
71.01
69.61
70.01
67.60
66.92

Water
Quality
Index
III
II
IIIII
IIIII
IIIII
IIIII
III
III
IIIIV
IV
IV
IV
IV

Trophic
States
Oligotrophic
Oligotrophic
Mesotrophic
Mesotrophic
Mesotrophic
Mesotrophic
Eutrophic
Eutrophic
Eutrophic
Eutrophic
Eutrophic
Eutrophic
Eutrophic

1. CODMn: A measure of the oxygen demand for oxidation of all the organics in solution through the strong
oxidizing agent potassium permanganate (KMnO4).
2. TN: A measure of all the forms of nitrogen found in water solution.
3. TP: A measure of all the forms of phosphorus found in water solution.
4. Chl a: C55H72O5N4Mg, an essential molecule in algae for photosynthesis; it is a good indicator of lake
primary productivity.
5. TSI: Trophic state index, a measure of water trophic states.
6. Water quality index: Based on the national standard for surface water in China, surface water quality is
categorized into 5 classes. With the index running from Class I to V, water quality decreases.

From 1981 to 2005, COD increased from 2.83 to 4.99 mg/L. TN and TP increased
to more than three times the original values. Water quality deteriorated from Class II
to IV. The trophic state transformed from oligotrophic, meaning relatively low
concentrations of plant nutrients and high concentrations of DO, to eutrophic,
meaning relatively high concentrations of plant nutrients and low concentrations of
DO. All other variables in Table 2 also indicate chemical deteorioration of Lake Taihu
in this period.
Biological changes in terms of species composition were also alarming (Figure 4).
In the 1980s, when the lake was still oligotrophic, bacillariophyta was the dominant
phytoplankton species. Cyanophyta, which has an exceptional capacity for N
assimilation, was the second largest group. From 1985 to 1995, when the
concentrations of TN and TP greatly increased, the lake’s trophic states changed from
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mesotrophic to eutrophic and cyanophyta replaced bacillariophyta as the principal
species.
Figure 4 Variations of phytoplankton species composition with TN and TP increase in the water col
umn of Lake Taihu since the 1980s

Source: Fan, 1996; Li et al. 2006, revised by Ranran Wang

During this period, the population of cyanophyta was relatively stable while those
of the other three species (bacillariophyta, pyrrophyta, and cryptophyta) ﬂuctuated. So
far in the 2000s, the role of cyanophyta has been so overwhelming that the other
species have almost gone extinct. Now cyanophyta is known to be the prime culprit
in the eutrophication in Lake Taihu.
Fertilizer overuse in farmland is a major force driving the water quality
degradation. In recent years, fertilizer use intensity in the Lake Taihu basin has been
578 kg/km2, 41 percent higher than the national average. While fertilizer use continues
to go up, crop yields only show a moderate increase that is not proportional to the
increase in fertilizer use. The excess fertilizer will be carried by runoff into the lake,
contributing to the lake eutrophication problem. However, given the importance of
agriculture, the pollution impacts of fertilizer use have been ignored by the
government.
The water degradation in Lake Taihu also results from mounting releases of
industrial and municipal wastes. In the mid1990s, 0.54 billion m3 of industrial
efﬂuents and 0.32 billion m3 of municipal efﬂuents were discharged to the basin every
year. In 2000, industrial efﬂuents rose to 5.33 billion m3 and municipal efﬂuents to
3.24 billion m3. While the decreasing trends of TN, TP, Chl a and TSI since 2000 are a
positive sign from restoration efforts (Table 2), the clockworklike boom of
cyanophyta in recent summers reminds us that we are still a long way from fully
restoring the health of the lake.

restoration and management
Since the establishment of the Taihu Lake Basin Administrative Bureau in 1984,
multiple actions have been taken with regard to the lake’s management, restoration,
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and protection. Some of them are more effective than others. In the following section,
we will provide a brief summary of these actions.
Action 1: Algae cleanup

Algae cleanup is the most direct way to limit algae spread. In the early years, this was
done manually by employing professional salvage crews. Because of the high algae
propogation rate, dozens of workers were needed for continuous work every day. In
recent years, mechanical salvage boats have replaced the traditional manual labor and
thus have sped up the cleanup in some lake areas. Several largescale mechanical
removal methods are in the development stage, which will integrate physical
separation with puriﬁcation by special detergents based on biochemical technologies.
If successfully put into use, the removal efﬁciency will be greatly enhanced. However,
it is a challenge to ﬁnd good places to dispose of the massive amount of algal residue
salvaged from the water without causing more pollution in the future. Obviously,
algae cleanup cannot cure the root of the problem.
Action 2: Discharge regulation

Since the mid1990s, the State Council and local governments have launched a series
of discharge regulations for Lake Taihu. The “Zero o’clock Pass” action called for
chemical industries, livestock farmers, hotels, and restaurants along the lake to
achieve the national emission standards before midnight on January 1, 1999.
Subsequently, local governments launched movements like “Turning the Lake Clean
in 2000” and “Shutting Pollution off before the 21st Century.” Unfortunately, despite
these efforts, the water continues to deteriorate. In 2005, 84.4 percent of water
resources in the basin were listed as Category III or worse, and 34 percent of drinking
water sources were polluted to varing degrees. In January 2008, the provincial
government of Jiangsu put a new set of sewage discharge standards into effect, the
toughest ever in China, for sewage treatment plants in the Lake Taihu basin. For
plants built before 2008, the regulatory release limit for COD in efﬂuents was changed
from 60120 mg/L to 5060 mg/L, NH3N from 15 mg/L to 58 mg/L, and TP from 1
mg/L to 0.5 mg/L. TN was added as a new index, with the regulatory limit of 1520
mg/L. Sewage treatment plants constructed after 2008 must meet the lower limits of
these emission ranges. Once the 169 sewage treatment plants along Lake Taihu have
achieved the upgraded standards, it is possible that the COD emission will be reduced
by 50 percent, TN by 60 percent and TP by 50 percent.
Action 3: Yangtze River water transfer

This operation uses the existing river channels and ﬂood gates to ﬂush the lake with
water from the Yangtze River. It is based on the idea of “conquering the unmoving
with the moving, diluting the polluted with the clean, supplementing low ﬂow with
ample ﬂow” to improve water quality. Two experimental trials were conducted. In the
ﬁrst trial in 2002, 784.38 million m3 of water was transferred through ﬁve
experimental diversions (January 1 to April 3, August 7 to 12, September 26 to October
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11, October 19 to 31, and December 5 to 9). In the second trial, 1.109 billion m3 of water
was transferred between August 6 and December 17, 2003 (Hu et al. 2008; Figure 5).
Six days after the water transfer in both experiments, notable abatement was seen in
the density of phytoplankton and the concentrations of TN and chlorophyll a.
However, ten days after the transfer, water conditions returned to their original state.
No reduction was ever observed in TP, which is a key determinant of the lake’s
eutrophication. The limited success of the water transfer operation is a result of
sediment resuspension by scouring and pollutant accumulation in the sediment.
Figure 5 Main routes of water transfer

Source: Hu et al. 2008. Revised by Ranran Wang.

Action 4: Wetland protection and restoration

Natural wetlands, while accounting for only 3.8 percent of land area in China,
contribute 54 percent of the total services provided by all natural ecosystems (An et
al. 2007). The natural wetlands lost in the past ﬁfty years would have provided the
capacity to purify 150 percent of the TN and 60 percent of the TP discharges in China
in the year of 2000 (An et al. 2007). In order to improve water quality and rebuild the
ecological functions of Lake Taihu, great efforts have been invested in wetland
protection, restoration, and construction. According to one scenario constructed by
the government for improving Taihu water quality, 14.79 billion RMB will be invested
in ecological renovation by the Ministry of Water Resources, a big part of which will
be spent directly on wetland protection. The local government also plans to provide
funds for wetland construction. In Jiangsu Province, a wetland park in Suzhou City
has been built, and a project to build lakefront wetlands is underway around Wuxi
City. With a growing awareness of the importance of wetlands, restoration and
protection are likely to receive more attention.
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Action 5: Demonstration farming zones to control agricultural pollution

Nonpoint pollution from agricultural activities is a major cause of eutrophication in
Lake Taihu. To improve water conditions in the lake, these nonpoint sources must be
carefully controlled. Demonstration farming zones are proving to be an effective way
to control this kind of pollution (Figure 6). In these zones, any efﬂuents ﬂowing into
the village must go through the “predam control area” and be treated in the “pre
dam removal” facility. Pollutants from agricultural activities, such as fertilizers and
pesticides, are treated by the “agricultural pollutant control” facilities around the
farmland. Household sewage is delivered into the “decentralized sewage treatment”
facility for pretreatment and then to the “centralized sewage treatment” facility for
further treatment. “Garbage treatment” facilities are designed for collection of other
domestic wastes. Riverways in the village are protected by the “water puriﬁcation and
ecological restoration” facilities. “Lakefront ecological restoration” and “estuary
pollution control” are achieved through physical barriers that prevent pollution from
ﬂowing into the lake. These demonstration zones can be found in Jiangsu, Zhejiang,
and Anhui Provinces. At present, they are receiving a great deal of attention and
support from the government, the scientiﬁc community, and the public. Their fate is
unclear in the future.
Figure 6 An illustrative map of a demonstration farming zone for controlling nonpoint agricultural
pollution

summary
The Lake Taihu Basin is one of the most important economic and cultural centers in
China. Formed thousands of years ago, the lake has provided for shipping, ﬁsheries,
irrigation, drinking water, and tourism for a long period of time (Figure 7). Since the
1950s, human activities have placed a growing stress on the lake’s development. Flood
control projects, wetland reclamation, and pollution input are the three major human
drivers responsible for the lake’s degradation. Although huge restoration efforts have
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been made toward restoring the basin, no obvious recovery has been noticed so far.
More research is needed for a complete understanding of the biogeochemical cycles
in the basin. Environmental regulations and engineering projects should focus more
on the root of the problem by controlling pollution sources rather than focusing on
cleanup operations.
Figure 7 The traditional Chinese character “Su” appears in the name of Jiangsu Province where Lake
Taihu is located. It depicts a landscape of fish, rice paddy and natural vegetation. Professor Shuqing
An hopes that the Taihu Catchment will be restored to this harmonious coexistence of humans and
nature.

Calligraphy by Xin Zhang
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Synthesis: Ways to Move Forward*
Xuhui Lee
Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies

In this chapter, we wish to synthesize the most important aspects of the semesterlong
seminar course on China’s environment that forms the basis for this book. The
course was offered in the fall semester of 2008 at the Yale School of Forestry &
Environmental Studies and included public lectures by eleven invited experts as well
as discussion sessions with the guest lecturers and Yale students and faculty.
In the course, we discussed a set of diverse and seemingly unconnected topics. Our
speakers were asked to deliver their perspectives on the topic of their choice, and not
to focus too much on crosscutting issues. Listening to their lectures, reading their
background papers, and interacting with them during reception events, we have
gained a tremendous appreciation for the complexity of China’s environmental
challenges. At the same time, a number of coherent themes have emerged out of the
complexity. The purpose of this synthesis exercise is to distill these themes into
constructive recommendations, in the hope that they may help policymakers to move
forward with China’s environmental reform.

* This chapter was written by
Professor Lee with
contributions from the
student authors of chapters
212.

pollution dispersion: local interest versus regional coordination
Protection of local interests occurs in response to various political and regulatory
pressures. During the 2008 Olympics, “yellow cars” – cars that were built before 1999
and did not meet the EU1 emissions standards – were kept outside Ring Road 6, in
an effort to improve air quality in Beijing. In Guangdong Province, policies that
promote the change of its industrial structure toward the service and high tech
sectors have caused polluting textile factories to relocate to the lessdeveloped
neighboring provinces such as Guangxi. For some factories, relocation to regions
with cheaper labor is also a matter of survival as the new labor contract law1 increases
their costs of operation. In the wake of the 2008 Lake Taihu algal boom, the central
government shut down thousands of chemical factories in the lake catchment, only
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to ﬁnd that many of them reopened elsewhere. Because of the lack of national and
regional coordination, such instances of pollution dispersion appear widespread.
Pollution dispersion also occurs in subtle ways. The Olympics cleanup efforts
involved importing clean natural gas from southwest China. As a result, people in that
region were left with dirtier fuels for domestic and industrial use. Clean air in Beijing
came at the cost of deteriorated air quality elsewhere.
Pollution dispersion matters because a pollution footprint is not conﬁned to any
political boundary. In principle, the performance of government ofﬁcials is evaluated
against not only GDP growth but also emission reductions and energy savings
targets, but attention to these environmental goals varies across the country. In the
lessdeveloped interior regions, GDP growth still dominates the social and economic
agenda, so much so that some county and provincial ofﬁcials would disregard
environmental regulations in order to recruit polluting enterprises. Yet locations that
see polluters moving away may not actually enjoy improved environmental quality.
For example, relocating textile factories from Guangdong to Guangxi could even
degrade the water quality of the Pearl River in Guangdong. This is because with less
stringent regulations, these factories can discharge more waste water into the West
River, a large tributary of the Pearl River. In the case of air quality management,
consideration of the pollution footprint is equally important. Only by shutting down
factory operations and tightening road trafﬁc in its neighboring provinces did Beijing
see improved air quality during the Olympics (Chapter 7).
Clearly, regional coordination is necessary in order to improve environmental quality.
One recommendation we discussed is to utilize industrial parks as an effective solution to
the dispersion problem. In these parks, pollution regulation is more stringent,
environmental monitoring more comprehensive, and enforcement capacity stronger than
if pollution sources were dispersed to remote locations. By conﬁning industries in a small
area, recycling of solid waste, heat, and waste water becomes costeffective (Chapter 6).
One downside is that most of the industrial parks in China are located in population
centers, so that special attention must be given to human exposure to air pollution.
A second idea we discussed is ranking ecological service zones according to their
carrying capacity. Some zones must be protected for water quality and others for
wildlife conservation. These ecological attributes determine where pollution sources
should be placed. Practicing ecological principles, however, requires holistic thinking
beyond one single performance measure. The “GraintoGreen” program is a
successful example of national coordination to protect marginal land in China’s west
(Chapter 4). The burden of food production is now shifted to more fertile lands in
the east, sometimes with unintended consequences. In the Lake Taihu catchment, the
pressure to maintain high crop yields means that curbing fertilizer use, which
degrades the lake’s water quality, becomes difﬁcult (Chapter 12).

special experimental environmental zone
Progress toward environmental objectives is hampered, in our view, by the mismatch
between the simplicity of environmental policies and the complex reality on the
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ground. Environmental laws in China often lack enforceable details. Policy directives,
such as the 11th FiveYear Plan, contain goals that are more aspirational than binding.
In the case of wildlife conservation, the blanket ban against hunting may actually hurt
conservation objectives because it removes incentives for local people to participate
(Chapter 9). As one student puts it, prohibition is easy to legislate, though not
necessarily easy to enforce.
One way to move forward is to create special environmental experimental zones
(SEEZs). Like the special economic zones that spurred the economic reform in the
1980s, the SEEZs are designed for experimenting with bold, forwardthinking
environmental measures. They are test grounds for trying out concrete methods
being used in the developed countries for regulation, monitoring, and capacity
building. The mindset of learning from experimentation also provides real hope for
breaking the ideological gridlock that otherwise would be insurmountable at the
national scale. The lessons learned would then propagate from these zones to the rest
of the country, much like the way the economic reform policy did in the 1990s. To
paraphrase Deng Xiaoping, China would be practicing environmental regulation
with Chinese characteristics.
Some environmental experiments are already happening. In ecocities, new
technology and concepts are being tested that will minimize resource consumption and
waste output (Chapter 6). The trial SO2 emissions trading program is an attempt to
learn from the success of acid rain abatement in the U.S. (Chapter 5). In Shanghai, a new
land credit system allows real estate developers to gain development rights if they restore
enough degraded wetland elsewhere (Professor Shuqing An, personal communication).
One feature that distinguishes the SEEZ from these ongoing experiments is the necessity
to think big geographically. Without coordination over a large enough geographic area,
ecocities cannot improve the quality of life because they are merely green dots in a
landscape inundated with brown smog and fouled by polluted water.
In the spirit of experimentation, we should challenge the widelyheld view that it
is publicizing the damage of pollution, not the pollution problem itself, that may
trigger social unrest. In the SEEZ, efforts should be made to ensure that not only data
on environmental quality, but also data on human health, are easily accessible to the
general public. Even simple maps of morbidity and mortality, when analyzed together
with air and water pollution maps (Chapter 5), can send powerful messages to
policymakers and entrepreneurs about the real cost of economic development.
Another experiment for consideration in the SEEZ is to privatize the work related
to environmental monitoring. An obstacle in China’s environmental reform is the
lack of manpower in the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA; now
Ministry of Environmental Protection, or MEP). As noted by Prof Jianguo Liu2, SEPA
employed only oneeighth the number of workers of the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency even though China’s population was three times that of the U.S.
The elevation of SEPA to a full ministry has changed the power dynamics, as MEP
leaders can now participate in cabinetlevel meetings. However, the size of the MEP
workforce remains essentially unchanged. Because the government uses a rigid quota
system for hiring public servants, a drastic increase in the MEP size is not going to
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happen anytime soon. In recognition of this reality, private ﬁrms should be allowed
to shoulder some of the workload. Environmental monitoring is a technical ﬁeld,
with welldeﬁned parameters and technology. It is a good candidate for the
privatization experiment.
Forwardthinking should be an important hallmark of the SEEZ. So far, air quality
management has focused on sulfur compounds and particulate matter. Ozone and
mercury, two other pollutants at the center of regulatory activity in the developed
countries, have received little attention. Rather than handling one set of pollutants at a
time, policymakers should be encouraged to think beyond the present time frame and
anticipate the harm ozone and mercury will continue to cause in the future. Similarly,
the SEEZ should lead the way in experimenting with effective strategies for reducing the
carbon footprint of economic development (Chapter 8). Experiments of this type could
be an impetus for transforming China into a society in true harmony with nature.

environmental education and human resource development

3
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The need to build environmental capacity, especially human resource development,
was an issue repeatedly brought up by our guest speakers. Professor Richard Harris
offered a sobering example: only one wildlife biologist was engaged in the
management of a wildlife reserve in China that is twice the size of Montana (Chapter
9). The reasons for the low capacity are manifold. Wildlife education and research in
China are very theoretical and are not well connected to managing wild species in
open habitats. More generally, environmental monitoring is a bluecollar, technician’s
job with low social status and little prospect for career advancement (Chapter 11). In
universities and government laboratories, SCI publication3 counts are an overriding
factor in job performance evaluation. People are not rewarded for painstaking work
on data collection and on the solution of practical problems.
New incentives generated by the privatization experiment discussed above can
operate in parallel to the academic performance matrix. They allow market
mechanisms to value the service technical people provide to the society.
University education plays a vital role in capacity building. Environmental degree
programs in Chinese universities have a relatively short history of ten years or less.
They place a strong emphasis on technical training related to some focused aspects of
the environment. In comparison, the U.S. environmental programs emphasize
rounded education, with a mode of training akin to that of the MBA degree. Students
study not only technical skills, but also environmental law and policy, environmental
economics, and statistical analysis of environmental data. At graduation, they are
knowledgeable about the critical issues concerning pollution, resources, conservation,
and environmental regulation, the four pillars of effective environmental manage
ment. Such a model of environmental training could be of value for China.
A related, but broader question is whether people with more advanced education
will have a smaller environmental footprint. Professor Jianguo Liu made a convincing
case that investment in education is a viable solution to making the Wolong Panda
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Reserve a better system. This is because with good education, young people in the
reserve can ﬁnd employment elsewhere, thus reducing the pressure on local
ecosystems. On larger scales, how education shapes personal consumption habits is
poorly known. Quantitative studies are needed to establish evidence that links better
education to greener consumption choices.
Several speakers emphasized the increasing role of executive training in capacity
building. Tsinghua University, Professor Jimin Hao’s home institute, has been
collaborating with the Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies on an
environmental education program targeted at city mayors. Professor Zunyu Chen’s
university has launched a training program for the municipal government of
Shenzhen, to which mandatory attendance is required of its top ofﬁcials. These
speakers believe that executive training is much more effective if social, economic and
technical lessons are brought to bear on the analysis of speciﬁc cases rather than
theoretical lectures on environment 101.
Lake Taihu, the third largest freshwater lake in China, is an excellent candidate for
such a case analysis. According to Professor Shuqing An, there are 103 lakes with a size
greater than 1 km2 in the Yangtze River Basin. All but three are now isolated from the
Yangtze for ﬂood control, land reclamation, and ﬁsh horticulture. By the end of 2009,
Lake Puoyang, China’s biggest freshwater lake, will likely be blocked by dams. (Lake
Dongting, the second largest lake, seems safe at the moment because the nature of the
surrounding geography requires that the river water runs though it.) There is an
urgent need for local ofﬁcials and business leaders to learn lessons from Lake Taihu’s
management so that the ecological problems that have occurred in its catchment are
not repeated elsewhere.

international collaboration
China’s environmental woes are also those of the world. The developed countries are
partially responsible for environmental degradation in China: They import factory
products from China but leave behind hazardous wastes (Chapter 4). It is also important
to note that some of the pollutants are dispersed globally so that their damages are not
conﬁned to China’s national boundaries. It is imperative that the international
community play an active role in helping China meet its environmental challenges.
Mr. Ma Jun’s lecture emphasized the unique role of business leaders of
multinational companies (Chapter 5). By forming partnership with domestic NGOs,
these companies can inﬂuence business practice in China. Some of them mandate
that their suppliers adhere to stringent international pollution standards. Domestic
companies on their own pay less attention to being blacklisted on Ma Jun’s pollution
map, but are more likely to clean up if their polluting behavior is hurting the brand
name of the multinational that purchases their products. Over time, this bottomup
pressure should lead to positive changes in Chinese corporate culture.
In our discussion with the speakers, we have identiﬁed several barriers to
international collaboration that deserve further attention. The ﬁrst one concerns
intellectual property rights. Technology transfer, especially the transfer of green
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technology, has the potential to produce tempting lowhanging fruit. Although
Chinese laws on intellectual property have been streamlined since China joined the
WTO, enforcement of these laws is still weak. Strengthened protection will remove
the fear of some entrepreneurs that their intellectual property rights may be infringed
upon should they use their latest invention in China. It will also stimulate the
emergence of new technology that can cope with China’s unique situations. For
example, there is an urgent need to ﬁnd ways to dispose of the massive amounts of
manure waste being produced by livestock farming. Scientists are challenged to
convert the manure to either chemically balanced fertilizer or a new generation of
biofuel (Chapter 10). Foreign talents are likely to take on these challenges if they are
assured that their research results will be strictly protected.
A second barrier is the lack of transparency in bilateral collaborations. Many
government agencies and universities have environmental programs that engage
partners in China, but they are not fully informed of what others are doing. The lack
of multilateral dialogues may stem from the desire to protect trade secrets, or more
likely from different incentive structures for their work with China (Chapter 2). We
believe that programs that target a speciﬁc problem can induce nations to work
together. For example, South Korea, Japan and the U.S. all feel the impact of mercury
emissions in China. Having this problem orientation should help streamline the
incentive structure toward a common goal for these countries.
A shortage of bilingual professionals is identiﬁed as the third barrier that hinders
international collaboration. In Dr. Gary Waxmonsky’s division at the U.S. EPA, fewer
than a handful of people are proﬁcient in Chinese. According to Professor Alice
Newton, language difﬁculty is a big obstacle that plagues the direct dialog between
small businesses in the EU countries and their Chinese counterparts. She also notes
that EU’s capacity building efforts bear the legacy of its colonial past: Spanish
researchers prefer to work in Mexico and Portuguese scientists in Brazil, in large part
because of convenience of communication. Language immersion programs, such as
the twoway ErasmusMundus where western students receive intensive language
training in China, could facilitate better collaboration in the future (Chapter 3).

checks and balances
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The power balance in China’s environmental regulation is played out vertically
between the central government and those at the provincial and county levels. In
western democracies, environmental regulations are negotiated among elected
government ofﬁcials (who represent citizens’ concerns), industrial groups, and
environmental NGOs4. In China, the interests of various actors are intertwined. For
example, enterprises in the energy, auto and construction sectors are the backbone of
the booming economy and also the main culprit in the smog problem. A majority of
these enterprises are stateowned. Some government entities serve the dual role of
polluter and pollution regulator. There is little oversight from NGOs and private
citizens of how these regulators regulate themselves. Only their superiors in the
vertical chain of command have the real power to hold them accountable.
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The central government, with good intentions and policies, often relies on
environmental incidents as leverage for action. Immediately after the chemical spill
in the Songhua River in 2005, the Minister of Environmental Protection was removed
from power. The Lake Taihu algal boom cut off water supply to millions of residents
in the Wuxi municipality, and more than 3000 chemical plants were shut down. In
response to the severe water shortage in the lower reach of the Yellow River, a strict
water quota system was enforced in provinces in the upper reach of the river basin5.
The governmental response is decisive when people’s lives are threatened or
conditions are causing social unrest.
Environmental degradation differs by degree. If the situation does not reach the
point of crisis, it usually does not get attention at the top. Even if it does, the shortage
of enforcement manpower does not guarantee prompt action. This is a gap that non
governmental actors can ﬁll. Through streamlining the accessibility of environmental
pollution data, NGOs can generate pressure on polluting enterprises and even on
local governments (Chapter 5). With the backing of the central government,
professional societies, such as the Ecological Society of China, are now taking on the
added responsibility of environmental monitoring, auditing and ecolabeling.
Scientists, especially prominent ones such as members of the People’s Congress and
the Science Academy, are playing an important role in the power balance. We have
seen good examples: Professor Xu Zhao is a consultant to the government of
Shanghai; Professor Jiming Hao played a critical role in shaping the air quality
regulations for the Olympics; Professor Zunyu Chen has been organizing
environmental training for the government of Shenzhen.
The relationship between NGOs and the government is unique in China. In the
opinion of some guest speakers, for these actors to be effective, it is essential that they
do not have a hidden agenda, that their motives are in line with the social and
economic goals of the central government, and that their actions support rather than
undermine the socialist state of governance.
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The quota system, together
with the “GraintoGreen” pro
gram, produced a successful
solution to the transbound
ary water problem. The river
stopped running dry about 5
years ago. Jinan, the capital of
Shangdong Province located
at the end of the river, no
longer needs groundwater to
meet its water needs. Natural
spring fountains – the “spirit
of the city” – have returned to
numerous tourist attractions
in the city.
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Xuhui Lee (李旭辉)1
我们就中国环境问题开展了为期一学期的研讨。十一名环境专家应邀到耶鲁大学
与师生交流讨论，讨论的一系列问题从表面看来似乎不相关联。专家们自己选择
题目，发表观点，而不是过分强调相互交叉的问题。通过他们的演讲、阅读背景
文章、并在招待会上与他们进行交流，我们认识到中国环境挑战的复杂性。同
时，一些条理分明的主题从这一复杂性中突显出来。本章的目的是将这些主题提
炼成建设性意见，希望能对决策者推进中国环境改革有所帮助。

造成地方利益保护的根源是各种政治和制度的压力： 2008年奥运会期间，为了
改善北京空气质量，“黄标车”——即 1999年前生产没有达到 EU1排放标准的车
辆——被禁止在六环以内行驶。广东省推出了促进工业向服务业和高新技术产业
转变的政策，使得污染较重的纺织业向欠发达的邻近省区（如广西区）转移。
由于新劳动合同法 提高了运营成本，一些工厂为了生存而向劳动力较便宜的地区
2
转移。
随着2008年太湖蓝藻爆发，政府关闭了流域内几千家化工厂，但是其中很多

化工厂又在其它地方重新开工。由于缺乏全国和地区的协调，这类污染扩散的事
件普遍发生。
污染扩散还以隐蔽的方式发生。奥运会减排措施之一是从中国西南部引入天然
气。结果是，那里的居民和厂家只能用排污重的燃料。有人认为，北京的蓝天是
以部分牺牲其它地区的空气质量换来的。
污 染 扩 散 之 所 以 重 要 ， 是 因 为 污 染 的 影 响 范 围 (footprint)并 不 局 限 于 任
何 行 政 边 界 。 原 则 上 ， 政 府 官 员 政 绩 的 评 价 标 准 不 应 只 是 GDP的 增 长 ， 还
应该包括节能减排目标的实现。但是全国各地对环境保护的关注程度不尽
相 同 。 在 欠 发 达 的 内 陆 地 区 ， GDP在 社 会 和 经 济 发 展 的 议 程 中 仍 占 主 导 地
位，这种主导性是如此之强，以致于一些市县和省级官员为了吸引污染企

1
2

肖薇译
劳动合同法，2008年 1月生效，使得雇主很难终止雇佣合同。
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业宁愿忽视环境条例。而那些将污染源移走的地区也不见得能真正享受到环境质量
的改善。例如，将纺织厂从广东转移到广西，可能使广东境内的珠江水质更加恶
化。这是因为环境管理变得没有那么严格，这些工厂可能会向珠江的一大支流西江
排放更多污水。而对于空气质量管理的问题，考虑污染影响范围同样很重要：奥运
会期间是因为在邻近省部分关闭工厂和限制车辆的运行，才使北京的空气质量有了
很大的改善（第 7章）。
显然，为改善环境质量，区域合作是十分必要的。有一种观点提倡利用工业园
区来有效解决污染扩散问题。相对于将污染源分散到边远地区而言，这些园区的污
染政策更加严格，环境监测更加全面，执政能力更加强大。将各种工业限制在小范
围内，使得固体废物、废热和废水能低成本地回收再利用（第6章）。但不利的方
面是中国的大部分工业园区都位于人口中心，所以需要特别关注空气污染对居民健
康的影响。
我们讨论的第二个观点是根据生态服务区的承载力将其分级。为了水质要保护
一些区域，而为了野生动物要保护另外一些区。这些生态特征决定污染源的安放位
置。不过，生态学原则的实施需要超越单一性能的度量，进行整体思考。“退耕还
林”计划是国家范围协调的成功范例，对保护西部土地贫瘠的生态系统起了决定性
作用（第4章）。但粮食生产的重担被转移到土地肥沃的东部地区，有时会造成出
乎意料的结果。在太湖流域，化肥是湖水水质恶化的原因之一，但作物高产的压力
使得控制化肥使用变得十分困难（第12章)。

环境政策的简单性与实际情况的复杂性不匹配，从而阻碍了环境改革的进程。中国
的环境法律通常缺乏可执行的细节。政策规划，如“十一五”规划，涵盖的目标
号召性强但约束力弱。关于野生动物保护，100%禁猎可能实际上破坏了保护的目
标，因为它打消了当地群众参与的积极性（第9章）。正如一位学生所讲的，禁止
容易立法，但不见得容易实施。
创建环境试验特区可以打破这种不匹配局面。就像20世纪80年代刺激了经济改
革的经济特区一样，环境特区是一个做试验的舞台，旨在对有魄力、前瞻性的环境
政策进行试验。在环境特区内，可以引进那些发达国家在环境法规、监测和能力建
设中已经采用过的具体方法。做试验就不怕走弯路，也敢于冲破根深蒂固的政治观
念和条条框框。这种实验精神在国家范围难以做到，但在小范围可以实现。在特区
学习到的经验可推广到其他地区，就像20世纪90年代的经济改革政策从经济特区向
外推广一样。按邓小平的说法，中国将进行有中国特色的环境管理。
目前有一些环境试验正在进行中。生态城市正在对一些新技术和新概念进行试
验，以达到减少资源利用和污染输出的目的（第 6章）。试行 SO2排放交易项目，
试图吸取美国控制酸雨的成功经验（第7章）。上海市建立了一个新的土地信用制
度，如果房地产开发商在其他地区恢复足够多的退化湿地，他们就可以获得土地开
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发的权利（安树青教授，个人交流）。但特区与这些正在进行的试验的区别是必
须考虑较大的地理范围。没有足够大的地理区域上的协调，生态城市仅仅是淹没
在棕色烟雾中的景观中的绿点而已。
目前被广泛接受的观点是，引起社会不安的因素是对污染危害的曝光，而非污
染问题本身。我们应从试验的角度对这一观点提出挑战。在特区内，需要确保公
众不仅容易获得环境质量资料，而且还能获得公共健康资料。一张简单的发病率
和死亡率的地图，在与空气和水污染地图一起分析时（第5章），就能为决策者和
企业家提供强效的信息，使他们认识到经济发展的真正代价。
另外一个特区试验是将环境监测工作私有化。中国环境改革的一大障碍就是
国家环保总局（SEPA，现名环境保护部或MEP）的人力资源不足。如刘建国 教授
指出的，虽然中国人口是美国的三倍，但是SEPA职员数量仅为美国国家环保局的
3
SEPA提升为部级单位使得权利动态有所改变，因为MEP领导可以参加
八分之一。

部级会议。但是MEP工作的规模基本没变。由于政府雇佣公务员受名额限制，所
以短期内MEP规模不会剧增。面对这一现实，就应该允许私人企业分担一些工作
量。环境监测是属于技术领域，监测参数和技术都很规范，很适合进行私有化试
验。
超前思维应

该是特区的重要特点。迄今为止，空气质量管理的重点是硫化物

和颗粒物。而目前发达国家重点治理的另外两种污染物——臭氧和汞——并没有
受到应有的关注。环境治理不应局限于影响API最大的一两种污染物，而应超越当
前时间框架进行思考，预先考虑臭氧和汞长久的危害性。另外，在特区内应该率
先对减少碳排放的有效策略进行试验。通过这类大胆的尝试，才可能推动中国转
型为真正与自然和谐的社会。

应邀的专家反复提到一个问题，就是环境管理能力建设特别是发展人力资源的必
要性。Rich Harris教授列举了一个值得深思的例子：在西部一个相当于Montana面
积两倍的野生动物保护区，只有一个野生动物学家在从事管理工作（第9章）。人
力资源不足的原因很多。中国的野生动物教育和科研还局限于理论上，与野外野
生动物管理的实际联系不密切。更普遍的情况是，环境监测是蓝领技术工作，社
会地位低，没有升职前景 (第11章)。在大学和政府的实验室中，SCI论文4发表数量
是工作评估的最重要的指标。数据采集和解决实际问题的辛苦劳动并不能使工作
者们获得应有的回报。
上文讨论的私有化试验将产生的新奖励方法，可以弥补与学术绩效评估的不
3

4

Jianguo Liu and Jared Diamond (2008) Revolutionizing China’s environmental protection. Science
319: 37-38.
ISI Web of Knowledge 科学索引系统收录期刊的论文。
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足，用市场机制来评估技术人员对社会的贡献。
大学教育在人力资源建设中起着重要的作用。中国大学的环境学位课程开设的
历史相对较短，一般不超过10年。这些课程着重强调专业技术培训。相对而言，美
国的环境课程强调全面教育，培养模式类似工商管理(MBA)学位。学生不仅学习技
能，还学习环境法律政策、环境经济和环境数据的统计分析等。毕业后，他们对环
境管理的四大支柱——污染、资源、生物保护、环境政策——的关键性问题有足够
的了解。这种环境管理教育模式对中国是有参考价值的。
有人提出一个与教育有关的问题：是否受教育程度越高的人环境脚印就越小？
刘建国教授列举了一个有说服力的例子，表明投资教育是改善卧龙熊猫保护区的切
实可行的方法。原因是有了良好的教育，保护区里的年轻人就可以在外地就职，这
样就减小了对当地生态系统的压力。在更大的空间尺度上，教育模式如何塑造个人
消费习惯还知之甚少。受教育程度是如何影响个人绿色消费行为的问题还需要进行
定量化研究。
几位报告人提到了领导培训学习 (executive training) 在能力建设中的重要作用。
郝吉明教授所在的清华大学已经与耶鲁大学森林与环境学院合作，面向市长进行环
境管理教育。陈尊裕教授所在的中山大学对深圳市政府开展了环境工作培训项目。
这些专家认为，更有效的培训方法是通过案例分析社会、经济和技术方面的经验教
训，而不是单纯讲授环境科学理论。
太湖就是案例分析的优秀范例。安树青教授指出，长江流域中面积超过1 km2的
湖泊有103个。为了防洪、土地开垦和养鱼业的需要，目前除了3个湖以外，其他所
有湖泊都已与长江隔离。2009年末，中国最大的淡水湖鄱阳湖可能会被大坝围堵。
（受地理条件的影响，第二大湖洞庭湖目前似乎不会隔离）。迫切需要地方政府和
企业领导学习太湖管理的经验，从而避免在太湖流域已经发生的生态问题在其他地
方再次发生。

中国的环境问题也是世界的问题。发达国家对中国的环境恶化应负部分责任：他们
从中国进口工业产品，却把有害垃圾留在中国 (第4章)。另外，一些污染物会在全
球扩散，所以其危害并非局限于中国境内。国际社会有义务和必要帮助中国克服环
境的挑战。
马军先生强调了跨国公司的独特作用（第5章）。其中一些公司与国内NGO形
成合作伙伴关系，在影响中国的商业运作。它们要求其供应商遵守严格的国际污染
标准。国内企业自身并不在乎被马军列入污染地图的“黑名单”，但是如果他们的
污染行为危害到购买他们产品的跨国公司的品牌，他们就很可能会进行清理改造。
长此以往，这种自下而上的压力会引导中国商业文化向积极的方向转变。
在与专家们的讨论中，我们发现几个阻碍国际合作的因素，值得进一步关注。
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第一个是知识产权。技术转让，特别是绿色技术转让，可以很快见效。尽管自中
国加入WTO以来，中国的知识产权法律已经逐渐完善，但是执法力度仍旧薄弱。
一些企业家担心如果将最新的发明转到中国使用，知识产权会受到侵害。如果能
加强对知识产权的保护，就可以消除这一顾虑。知识产权的保护也可以激发那些
能应对中国特殊情况的新技术开发。例如，目前迫切需要找到方法处理畜牧业产
生的大量粪便。能否将粪便转化成成份均衡化肥或新一代生物燃料是一个技术难
题（第10章）。如果能确保外国科学家的研究结果被严密保护，他们很可能会迎
接这一难题的挑战。
第二个障碍是双边合作缺乏透明度。很多政府机构和大学都有与中国建立合作
伙伴关系，但是他们并不完全了解其他人在做什么。缺乏多边对话的原因可能是
因为要保护商业机密，但是更可能是因为他们在中国工作的出发点不尽相同。我
们认为，以具体问题为中心的合作可以促进多边交流。例如，韩国、日本和美国
都受到中国汞排放的影响，这一问题定位可能有助于这些国家互相合作。
阻碍国际合作的第三个因素是缺少精通两种语言的专业人员。在美国环保局
Gary Waxmonsky博士工作的部门，只有极少几个人精通汉语。Alice Newton教授
指出，语言是个很大的障碍，阻碍了欧盟国家和中国中小企业之间的直接对话。
她也指出欧盟的能力建设工作受到其殖民历史的影响：西班牙研究者倾向于在墨
西哥工作，葡萄牙研究者倾向于在巴西工作，这很大程度上是为了语言交流的方
便。全浸式语言培训可能会推动未来更好的合作。如双向Erasmus-Mundus交流项
目中，西方学生可以在中国接受强化语言培训（第3章)。

中国环境治理中的权利制衡主要是一种中央与地方政府的垂直关系。在西方民主
国家，环境法规是由选举产生的政府官员（代表民意）、工业团体和环境NGO
5
互相制约“三位一体”的结果 。
在中国，权利平衡的参与者们的利益是很难分离

的。例如能源、汽车和建筑部门是经济增长的主力，同时也是空气质量恶化的主
犯。这些部门的大部分企业属政府所有。一些政府实体扮演着双重角色，既是污
染者，又是污染治理者。NGO和老百姓对这些治理者是如何治理他们自己的监控
程度有限。只有他们的上级领导才有真正的实权控制他们的行为。
中央政府具有良好的意图和政策，通常将环境事件作为行动的杠杆。2005年松
花江化学品溢漏事故后，环境保护部长被立即免职。太湖藻类爆发导致无锡市几
百万居民的水供应被切断，超过3000个化工厂被关闭。为了解决黄河下游严重缺
6
水的问题，黄河流域上游的省市被强制执行一套严格的水配额制度 。
当人民的生
5

Revesz RL (1997) Foundations of Environmental Law and Policy. Foundation Press.

6

与“退耕还林”计划一起，定额制度成功地解决了跨界水问题。几年前黄河不再干涸。位于
黄河末端的山东省省会济南市，不再需要地下水来满足用水需求。作为“城市灵魂”的天然
泉涌重新出现在很多旅游景点内。
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命受到威胁，或问题开始引起社会不安时，政府的反应是十分果断的。
环境退化的程度各有不同。如果情况不够危急，通常很难获得高层的关注。即
便得到上层的关注，由于执政人员不足，也很难确保迅速处理。而非政府人员可以
填补这一空缺。通过收集公布环境污染资料和促进污染信息交流， NGO可以向污
染企业甚至地方政府施压(第5章)。以中央政府为后盾，目前一些专业学会（如中
国生态学会）正在负责环境监测、审核和生态标识等工作。科学家们，特别是人大
代表和科学院院士等突出科学家，在权利制衡中起着重要作用。我们看到了一些很
好的范例：赵旭教授是上海市政府顾问，郝吉明教授在奥运会空气质量治理中起到
了关键作用，陈尊裕教授组织了深圳市政府的环境培训课程。
在中国，NGO与政府的关系是很特别的。一些专家认为，NGO要想起到真正的
作用，必须满足一些基本条件：他们不应有隐藏行为，动机必须与中央政府的社会
经济发展目标一致，他们的工作必须是支持而不是暗中破坏社会主义制度。

Xuhui Lee本科和硕士毕业于南京气象学院 (现更名为南京信息工程大学)，1992
年获加拿大University of British Columbia大学土壤学博士，1994年进美国耶鲁大学任
教，2002年被批准为耶鲁大学终身教授。现任耶鲁大学森林环境学院全球变化事务主任，中
国环境问题讲座系列负责人，是国际专业杂志《Agricultural and Forest Meteorology》
主编。曾任美国气象学会农林气象学分会主席，耶鲁大学森林环境学院博士学部负责人。获
耶鲁大学优秀教师奖，美国自然科学基金CAREER奖，中国自然科学基金海外杰出青年科学家
奖，是中国科学院海外评审专家。教学和科研领域包括全球气候变化科学与政策，温室气体
循环，空气污染，中国环境政策。
Wei Xiao 是中国科学院地理科学与资源研究所博士研究生，从事陆地植被与大气之间氧
同位素交换和陆地生态系统温室气体排放的研究，曾赴美国耶鲁大学森林与环境学院访问学
习一年。她获得南京信息工程大学农业气象学学士学位和气象学硕士学位，之后在广东省气
象局从事短期天气预报工作。博士毕业后她将前往南京信息工程大学应用气象学院就职。
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